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5SAFE RETURN TO PORT AS THE THEME OF BRIDGE CONFERENCE FOR 2011
Different aspects of maritime safety have been the central themes of Bridge conferences held at the faculty 
of Maritime Management at Satakunta University of Applied Sciences in Rauma. The local shipyard has 
been an important partner at the conferences. The conference discussed new research on the industry, the 
development of command bridge appliances and viewpoints on maritime training. 
The special theme for the conference held in June 2011 was “Safe Return to Port” aka SRTP, for which the 
International Maritime Organisation IMO has set specified SOLAS regulations. The regulations particularly 
concern passenger ships and the aim was the prevention of accidents as efficiently as possible and the 
design of ship structures to support evacuation possibilities, so that the people onboard can remain on 
the ship in the event of accident until the ship has reached the dock. Prevention and preparation concern 
severe accidents, such as water entering the ship or onboard fires.
The share of human factor in accidents became clear from the presentations of several speakers at the 
conference, while the topic was already familiar from previous conferences. Critical factors and risk ac-
cumulation were discussed from various perspectives. It is estimated that 60 to 70 percent of accidents 
in commercial seafaring are influenced by human factor. Accidents cause major human and economical 
losses. In addition to these, near-miss incidents are also unfortunately common.
The Finnish Transport Safety Agency has created a special guide for command bridge work, Co-operation 
on the bridge, which was published at the Bridge conference in Rauma. It guides the user to avoid human 
errors in command bridge work through instructions and practical examples. The premise is that errors 
must not be underestimated, and indeed, they need to be recognised and conscious measures need to be 
taken to avoid them.
The acquisition of competence to meet various requirements of the integrated command bridge was dis-
cussed from the viewpoints of training, education and research. In industry-specific training, simulators are 
used to build up experience in systems that will be used in actual work. Great requirements are placed on 
training, as it should produce expert officers whose skills are guaranteed to work at the global maritime 
industry. Employers and educational institutions are expected to tighten their cooperation so that common 
lines can be defined. The employer defines the scope of work and required knowledge, skills and responsi-
bilities. On the other hand, training produces qualified professionals who are able to fulfil the necessary role.
The Bridge conferences introduce the newest ship command bridge appliances and simulation applica-
tions. The centralised and efficient management of appliances is important for maritime safety. Data and 
information can be read from the same multipurpose work station that controls the integrated functions of 
the ship.
Bridge conferences have been previously held in Rauma in 2006, 2007, 2009 and the conference in sum-
mer 2011 was the fourth one. The initial idea of organising this kind of an event together with the shipyard 
was already in the air in 2005 at the 125th anniversary of maritime training at Rauma. The following year, the 
idea was realised. Each time, the event has attracted large numbers of research and educational profes-
sionals as well as business experts. 
The Rauma-based shipyard has always been very visibly on display at the conference, and visitors have 
had the chance to get a glimpse of newbuilds currently under construction. In summer 2011, one project 
attracting plenty of attention from the visitors on the STX Rauma shipyard was newbuild number 1368, 
the M/S Spirit of France of the P&O Ferries shipping company, the first passenger ferry to comply with the 
SRTP requirements. In previous years, visitors have had the chance to get to know Tallink M/S Galaxy and 
especially its command bridge appliances delivered by Kelvin Hughes as well as Color Line’s M/S Color 
Magic and Sperry appliances at the Aker Yards shipyard. In 2009, the target of interest at the STX Rauma 
shipyard was newbuild 1359, Tallink’s M/S Baltic Queen with command bridge appliances manufactured 
by SAMK.
Heikki Koivisto                                            
Kirsi Uola
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ABSTRACT 
STX Finland has three SRTP vessels on order with the world’s first SRTP ferry – NB 1367 the Spirit of Brit-
ain – delivered. Design, approval and commissioning NB 1367 was a challenge because the rule guidelines 
were being developed. The designers are looking forward to STRP improving safety justifying the invest-
ment. 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee adopted at its 82nd session at the end of 2006 a set of amendments 
to SOLAS. One part of this were formed by Safe Return to Port Regulations that are dealing with design 
criteria for passenger ship systems to remain operational after a fire or flooding casualty.
The background for these amendments was motivated by the fact that prevailing SOLAS regulations could 
not meet the challenges introduced with new passenger ship designs and there could be seen areas of 
potential concern in casualties and emergency situations. The work in developing the amended regulations 
was guided by basic philosophy with two premises being as (1) more emphasis should be placed on the 
prevention of a casualty from occurring, and (2) ships should be designed for improved survivability so that 
persons can stay safely on board as the ship proceeds to port after a casualty.
As one result of the above mentioned development work SOLAS was amended with Safe Return to Port 
Regulations II-1/8-1, II-2/21 and II-2/22. These new regulations define redundancy criteria for essential 
systems of passenger ships having length of not less than 120 metres or having three or more vertical main 
fire zones. The regulations entered into force on 1st of July in 2010.
2.  CONTENTS OF THE REGULATIONS 
Casualty threshold is describing criteria for the amount or extension of a damage that a ship is able to with-
stand - in terms of structural and system design - and is still capable of returning to port safely. 
3.  SRTP FERRY DESIGN (ARI’s CHAPTER)
3.1  SRTP VESSELS ON STX FINLAND’S ORDERBOOK
NB 1367-8 the Spirit of Britain and the Spirit of France: Being 213 m long this ferry pair is by far the largest 
travelling between Dover and Calais that is the busiest ferry route in the world. NB 1367 is already sailing. 
NB 1368 will be delivered in September. The ferries are designed for 2000 passengers, 2750 trailer lanes 
and 200 additional cars.
NB 1369 is another benchmark delivery for the Rauma yard. The 134 m long Antarctic supply and research 
ship is an icebreaker, special purpose ship, passenger ship, dry cargo ship and a tanker. She is diesel 
electric and carries 150 people, cargo and fuel for the South African polar bases. She is independent with 
cranes, helicopters and extensive oceanographic research facility.
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8NB 1376 is the new Viking Line ferry for the Turku – Stockholm route. At 57,000 GT she carries conveniently 
2800 passengers day and night. She is the world’s first LNG ferry with a dual fuel diesel electric machinery.
3.2  SRTP AS A DESIGN STANDARD
SRTP legislation sets design standards but not operational guidelines as a rule. However there will be a lot 
of operational requirements for mariners to take advantage of the new battle hardiness built into the pas-
senger ship.
SRTP rule lists the 14 systems or features which shall be designed operational within the casualty thresh-
old. Additional redundancy is then required in the orderly evacuation situation beyond the threshold.
Every required system redundancy must be designed individually. IMO has agreed and published guidelines 
and interpretations for safety criteria of the pipe and cable routes. Another important guideline is the list of 
spaces that may not be origins of fire.
Statutory approval takes time because a new approval stage for each system is required.
Assessment of the system redundancies is a very laborious process because it is done by analyzing each 
fire or flooding scenario system by system.
3.3 CASE OF NB 1367-8
In August 2008 the letter of intent for the ship contract was signed with P&O Ferries. In time the SRTP Rule 
had beed adopted by IMO and it was known to enter into force on 1 July 2010.
The keels of both ferries were to be laid before the entry date. However the Owner decided to adopt the 
new rule as a part of an extensive safety approach with the project. This made us all pioneers in the field.
The development of the rule in IMO was seriously lagging behind schedule. There was no published rule for 
the SRTP flooding scenarios. No official interpretations or guidelines existed.
With the Owner the yard managed to make an agreement with the Flag Authority (MCA) of the most impor-
tant interpretations as a protocol signed by all parties. This agreement worked well during the design and 
approval process.
Some agreed points:
•	 Flooding excluded (no rule existed)
•	 SRTP time set to 6 hours
•	 Ballasting excluded by calculations
•	 AC requirement excluded
Redundant Design Features:
•	 Main engine rooms
•	 Shaft lines
•	 Cooling systems
•	 Steering gear rooms
•	 Auxiliary power generation
•	 Main Switchboards
Some major challenges
•	 Redundant bilge system design
•	 Redundant flooding detection system design
•	 Redundant toilets (!)
•	 Sprinkler design
•	 SRTP system assessment
•	 Approval process
•	 NB 1367-8 have also the LR PMSR* redundancy notation. It requires 50% propulsion power 
 redundancy in any single failure. Its requirements are not always parallel with SRTP rule.
9All parties involved were on steep learning curves. Design and indeed approval schedule was critical. All 
parties were happy to see the final approval and certificates stamped without major modification on agreed 
delivery date.
3.4  CONCLUSIONS
SRTP initiated on high political and cruise ship owner level. Rule making process was of novel type and the 
schedule tight. In the end the legislation involves nearly all passenger ships. Main question remains if the 
ship operators can make the most of this new safety tool: Should the ship be evacuated or not?
For the ship owner it is an investment. Additional building cost arises from more
•	 some doubled equipment
•	 routing design
•	 cabling and electrical components
•	 piping, valves and their control.
•	 Crew training.
If this investment increases passenger safety at least as much than if invested in other safety features, it is 
money well spent and we are saving lives.
SRTP is an investment in passenger ship hardware required by law. It makes the ship more complicated 
and requires special training of mariners. Passenger safety is the objective.
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ABSTRACT
As human factors are the most important cause of incidents at sea and in harbors, a systematic attempt is 
made to develop a training program targeting correction of human behaviour in emergency situations. The 
EU funded project Maritime AIds Development for Emergency Responses (M’AIDER) is looking at develop-
ing training programmes for officers and cadets working onboard vessels by studying incidents that have 
occurred in the past. Also, by analyzing the results of questionnaires handed out to experienced seafarers 
so as to find out the most frequent occurred emergency situations and the prevailing conditions. Through 
this study the human factors leading to emergency situations are identified providing information as to how 
various incident scenarios could be selected for further implementation in integrated and full-mission ship 
simulators. The ship and bridge simulator training environment can be enhanced by following a pre-devel-
oped format for the description of various scenarios to be used into exercises in the simulators. This paper 
demonstrates the recent research carried out on analyzing ship accident and incident reports as well as the 
analyzed results of the questionnaires and how this analysis is implemented and tested at the facilities of a 
full mission simulator training of a maritime university.
Keywords: Shipping incidents, Communication, Human errors, Maritime education, Full mission simulator 
training
 
NOMENCLATURE 
AIS: Automatic Identification System 
ARPA: Automatic Radar Plotting AID
AWO: Assistant Watch Officer
COLREGS: Collision Regulations
CPA: Closest Point of Approach
HOW: Head of Watch
MAIB: Maritime Accident Investigation Branch
M’AIDER: Maritime AIds Development for Emergency Responses 
MET: merchant navy education programmes
MSTC: Maritime Simulator Training Centre
RG: Helmsman
QPS: Quality Positioning Services 
WO: Watch Officer
INTRODUCTION
Various efforts have been made in the past to address the effects of human factors in ship accidents and 
incidents at sea [Aslan and Turan, 2010]. With the M’AIDER project the intention is to go one step further 
by developing a scenario based training programme reducing risk of human errors specifically related to 
navigation leading to collisions, grounding or other dangerous situations [Bosma et al, 2010].
Another focal point of M’AIDER project is the training of deck officers in particular as the accidents are di-
rectly related to the activities on the bridge including communication within the team as well as the bridge 
and engine department]. By analysing the results of questionnaires handed out to experienced seafarers, 
the most frequent occurred emergency situations and the prevailing conditions, incidents can be predicted. 
ENHANCING BRIDGE SIMULATION TRAINING PROGRAMMES WITH 
THE APPLICATION OF MARITIME AIDS FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSES
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Through this study the human factors leading to emergency situations will be identified providing informa-
tion as to how various incident scenarios could be selected for further implementation in integrated and 
full-mission ship simulators. 
In this project a systematic attempt in developing accident or incident scenarios for training of young cadets 
and seafarers working at sea and ports is done. This investigation was carried out at the Maritime Simulator 
Training Centre (MSTC), which is part of the Maritime Institute “Willem Barentsz”, in cooperation with the 
University of Strathclyde. Together development of training programmes for deck officers is a unique op-
portunity in order to prevent accidents. They should be based on real emergency situations/scenarios and 
focus their attention on what could await them when at sea. 
The present paper is structured as follows: section one provides a brief introduction to M’AIDER project 
and shows the main aims and objectives of the project. Section two includes the analyses of the results of 
questionnaires handed out to experienced seafarers so as to find out the most frequent occurred emer-
gency situations and the prevailing conditions are shown. In section three the analysis of the MAIB accident 
and incident reports and the relation between human factors and shipping incidents are presented. Section 
four presents the further implementation of the information in integrated and full-mission ship simulators, in 
which the task of the MSTC in this project was to implement a scenario in student training and investigate 
the results of this scenario. The scenario was based on a real accident, which happened in 2008 in Dover 
Strait. Finally section five presents the conclusions of the paper in hand.
1.1  PROJECT AIMS AND OBJECTIVES
The main aim of the M’AIDER project is to improve safety at sea and in ports. [Bosma et al, 2010]. For that 
purpose the most frequent emergency situations are identified and analysed. The results of the analysis 
will contribute to the development of the training courses for the maritime education training of seafarers 
looking at simulator training, e-learning and e-assessment. Based on these scenarios intelligent exercises 
will be developed for application in both the bridge area and in the integrated and full-mission simulators.
M’AIDER project also investigates the transfer of the knowledge already existing in the form of video soft-
ware or existing internet e-learning/assessment platform for above mentioned purposes. In Fig 1 the main 
structure of the project is shown.
 
Fig.1. M’AIDER work-package (WP) flowchart.
This paper mainly focuses on the developments in WP 2. This work package includes the following tasks:
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•	 Investigate the main causes of previous ship accidents and incidents by analysing the Marine 
 Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) accident reports of the past 19 years. 
•	 Distribute a generic questionnaire. The questionnaire has been distributed to a sample of shipping
 companies and experienced seafarers. The outcomes of the questionnaires have been analyzed to 
 indentify the training needs of young seafarer students.
•	 Study existing (simulation) training materials, so that the training needs can be identified as well as new 
 training can be added in the already existing training programmes.
The outcome of the analysis of the scenarios together with the results of the questionnaires help to create 
the final scenario for application on the bridge simulation, as well as in integrated and full-mission simula-
tors. The project continues with WP3 with the main aim to identify and/or develop appropriate methods and 
methodologies for the development of training course. This leads to the development of training material 
(WP 4) and the design and development of the training contents. A software system will be developed for 
the representation of the learning material. At a later stage of the project an e-learning and e-assessment 
platform will be generated (WP 5-WP 9).
ANALYSED RESULTS OF THE OUTCOMES OF THE QUESTIONNIARE
This paragraph presents the analysis of the questionnaire that has been distributed to experienced mer-
chant marine seafarers. The main aim of the distribution of the questionnaire is to find the shortcomings in 
the current seafarer’s maritime education training and seagoing experience related to emergency scenarios 
and their knowledge of the regulations to avoid accidents at sea. The results of the 145 received question-
naires will contribute to the improvement of the safety at sea and in ports. For that purpose the results of 
the analysis of the questionnaires will contribute to the development of the training courses for the maritime 
education training of seafarers looking at simulator training, e-learning and e-assessment. 
2.1  GENERAL INFORMATION
The majority of participants who filled in the questionnaire are from Lithuania, 30%, Followed by the UK, 
with 21% and the Netherlands, 19%. Just 11% from Turkey and the smallest group of participants are from 
Slovenia, 4% (Fig 2).
 
Fig. 2. Nationality distribution
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The percentage of each rank within the age group is shown in Fig 3.
Fig. 3. Age/Rank relationship
In Fig 3 60% of the cadets belongs to the 18-30 age-group. Cadets have little sea going experience, which 
should be taken into consideration when generating the conclusions about the relationship between the 
age groups. Officers in the same age group are second in count after the cadets. The ratings and masters 
are very low in this age. Masters under the age of 30 are very rare, as a certain amount of sailing years are 
needed to obtain masters certificate licence. In the age group of 31-40 years, the cadets are the smallest 
part. Cadets normally are within the age of 18-25, as part of their training education. More than 40% are 
masters within this age group and about a little less than 40% are officers. No ratings participated in this 
age group. In the age group of 41-50, 80% is master and 10% officer. In the age group of 51 and older, 
85% are master and 18% officer.
2.2  BRIDGE SIMULATION TRAINING
The questions related to the bridge simulator training of the participants were analysed, in order to find the 
shortcomings in the current seafarer’s bridge simulation training and seagoing experience relates to their 
bridge simulation training and their knowledge of the regulations to avoid accidents at sea. This section of 
the questionnaire all relates to experiences of the participants with bridge simulator trainings. The first sets 
of question were about the general information of the participants with their training, where they have been 
trained and what methods were covered. 
61% percent of participants have been trained on a bridge simulator against 39% who not have been 
trained on a bridge simulator. In order to find out if there is a relationship between the nationality of the par-
ticipants and the bridge simulation training, cross tabulation has been carried out (Fig. 4).
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Fig. 4. Cross tabulation bridge simulator training and nationality
Fig. 4 shows the percentages per nationality from the 145 participants who did not have had training on a 
bridge simulation.100% of the participants from the group: ‘other countries, include Belgium, US etc, did 
undertake bridge simulation training, as so did the group of participants who are from Turkeys nationality. 
More than 90% of the Dutch participants had bridge simulator training, against just a very small 4 % who 
did not. As shown in the Fig. 2, 20% of the U.K participants were not trained by means of bridge simulation 
training and 80% from the U.K. did undertake bridge simulation training. However the most concerning 
results from this questionnaire is that 50% of the Lithuanian participants were not trained on the bridge 
simulator, and 33 % of the Slovenian participants who weren’t trained on the bridge simulator either. This 
high amount of percentages from these two countries are concerning. There are not enough bridge simula-
tors or there is no money to train them on the bridge simulator, priority is that these young seafarers from 
these countries get the change to develop the necessary emergency response skills in order to avoid ac-
cidents at sea. 
Table 1 shows the frequency of participants who undertake Bridge Simulator Training within the age groups.
Table 1. Count of participants with Bridge Simulator Training within the age groups
 
As shown in Table 1, 36% of the seafarers who did not have had training on a bridge simulation are in the 
age group of 18-30 years old (count of 29). For the age group 31-40 years old, all of the participants had 
Bridge Simulator Training. 20% of the 41-50 years age group had Bridge simulator Training (count of 2) and 
21% of the 51 and older age group (count of 3).
The existing bridge simulation training methods covered, mainly exist out of practice the ship safety sce-
narios, as a second most covered training methods, role play was chosen. Role play can be very useful in 
order to provide more communication training and an as real life situation as possible. The role play will be 
part of the simulator scenario and is discussed by means of standard lecturing and feedback afterward.
The analysed results of the question asked to the participants if they could name the situations or scenarios 
they have been trained in while receiving bridge simulator training, are presented (Fig. 5).
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Fig. 5. Human factor situations that were covered in BST
Fig. 5 shows the count of human factor situations that were covered in bridge simulation training given by 
Maritime training Institutes. The situation that is covered by participants training on the Bridge simulator 
is ‘communication issues on the bridge between bridge members’. Communication problems occur very 
often on board between bridge members. There are several factors that can cause this communication is-
sues. One of them could be that the standard orders of the captain or other officers or look out crewmem-
bers, are not clear due to cultural problems [Progoulaki 2006]. In this case, it is quite often to come across 
misinterpretation of the message/orders in the bridge area. 
After analysis of the questions related to the usefulness of the bridge simulator training compared to real life 
situations, over 55 % of the participants experienced the bridge training scenarios as very or quite useful 
compared to real life situations. It can be concluded that most participants have experienced the training 
scenarios that were trained on a bridge simulator, as very useful compared to real life situations at sea. 
One of the most important conclusions of the analysed results of the MAIB database accident reports, 
presented in section 3 of this paper, is that 88% of the accidents at sea are caused by human factors, of 
which 60% are directly related to individual mistakes. More than 70% of the participants of the question-
naire said that the absence of human physical well-being due to circumstances on board daily life, fatigue, 
seasickness and the absence of stress is the most important difference compared to real life situations at 
sea (Fig 6).
Fig. 6. Most important differences between BST and real life situations
This absence of real human factors during the bridge simulation training can cause lack of awareness of 
the importance of these factors in real life emergency scenarios at sea. To raise the awareness among the 
seafarers concerning the human factors as 88% of the cause in an incident, running the real life case sce-
narios on the bridge simulators as part of the MAIDER project is of paramount importance.
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In the question asked to the participants if they were aware of an incident database system with procedures 
and reports of past shipping incidents in order to simulate real accident scenario on the bridge simulators 
for training purposes, more than 60% answered they were not aware of an already existing system like this. 
More than 65% of the participants agreed that creating an incident database system would be very useful 
in order to improve people’s awareness and prevent future incidents. 
2.3  COLREGS
The second part of the questionnaire was about the COLREGS, the International Regulations for Avoiding 
Collisions at Sea. As shown in the previous chapter: ‘Analysis of human factors leading to the most occur-
ring scenarios’, one of most important human errors leading to an incident is about collision regulations that 
are not applied or are applied incorrectly. For this reason, the participants of the questionnaire were asked 
about their familiarity with the COLREGS and how useful they were to them compared to the reality. Analy-
sis were carried out to find out what type of incident the participants have experienced and were involved 
in themselves, furthermore the participants were asked, in a couple of questions, about their familiarity with 
the COLREGS, and what training methods they received to get familiarised with the COLREGS. 
The analysed results of the two most effective COLREGS learning techniques, according to the participants 
of the questionnaire, are presented in this paragraph (Fig.7). 
 
Fig. 7. Most effective COLREGS training methods
As shown in Fig.6 the theory session in the classroom and onboard training both are chosen as the two 
most effective learning techniques. Theory session in the classroom as a training method to the COLREGS 
was selected 111 times by the participants and onboard training as most important method to train the 
COLREGS was selected 97 times. Bridge training was found more useful than both individual training and 
training by means of case studies and video presentations of the accidents. Bridge simulator training was 
ticked 71 times; case studies just 32 times and individual training about 22 times, which is very low. Show-
ing accident case studies as an effective learning technique to train the COLREGS is still a much unknown 
method, and therefore the smallest group. 
The see if there is a relationship between the participants who were trained for the COLREGS by one of 
these methods and the most effective training methods they have chosen in this answer a comparison was 
made (Table 2).
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Table 2. Comparison count received training methods/ chosen most effective training methods
 
In Table 2 the comparison between right column, the received training methods, and left column; the most 
effective training methods that were chosen is shown. 115 participants have been trained through theory 
sessions in the classroom to get familiarised with the COLREGS, 111 participants’ selected this method as 
of the most effective one as well. Out of the 77 participants who were trained by means of onboard train-
ing to get familiarised with the COLREGS, 60 of them thought this was one of the most effective learning 
techniques, this means that 17 of them, that’s 22%, who did receive this training to get familiarised with the 
COLREGS, thought it was not the most effective technique. Out of the 47 participants who were trained 
by individual learning techniques, just 22 of them thought this was a useful technique to get familiarised 
with the COLREGS. 30 participants were trained by means of case studies and 32 participants thought this 
was a useful technique. Bridge simulator training as a training method for familiarisation to the COLREGS 
was ticked 60 times. Twice as many participants were trained on a bridge simulator to get familiar with the 
COLREGS compared to the participants who were trained by using accident case scenarios as a learning 
technique. Far more participants (72) thought this was one of the most effective techniques to use to train 
people in the COLREGS. 
Both case studies and bridge simulator training are very important methods that have to be used in order to 
familiarise people with COLREGS. In order to familiarise all student seafarers with all the real accident case 
scenarios and all the human underlying factors as a serious cause of these accidents, more knowledge of 
both methods have to be studied and developed.
The results of the question about the participants experience at sea and in what type of accident they were 
involved in are presented in Fig 8.
 
Fig. 8. Participants’ involvement in incidents count
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As shown, the count of participants who were involved in one of the most occurring incidents is shown. 
Most incidents experienced are machinery failures, more than 60 participants out of 145 that are over 
40%. The cause of the machinery failures in this case is unknown. If this was due to lack of maintenance, 
human factors or other remains unknown. Nearly 50 participants out of 145 experienced a near collision, 
while close quarter’s situation with another vessel is more than 30%. Participants who experienced a close 
contact or a collision with a shore structure are just under the count of 30. Collision means that the vessel 
hits another vessel in port or at sea or a vessel that is anchored. This was followed by 34 participants who 
experienced a near grounding or collision; grounding means making involuntary contact with the ground 
and 31 participants experienced fire onboard the ship. Close contact or even a collision in port has not been 
experienced very often, just 17 participants out of 145 (12%). The most frequent experienced incidents by 
the participants on board the ships are collisions. 86% of the participants were involved in a collision or near 
collision during their time at sea. This is in agreement with the analysis carried out of the MAIB database 
accident reports of which the results were partly presented in the next chapter. After analysis of the incident 
types with UK flagged merchant ships involved, 36% % of the accidents are collisions.
In another set of questions the participants were asked about the reason the collision occurred. Most said 
it had to do with low vision or leaving or entering a harbour or channel or that the collision was caused 
by the high density of traffic. Collision caused by a poor lookout was not chosen very often as a possible 
cause to collision, just 12 % of the participants have actually chosen ‘poor lookout’ as the real cause of the 
collision (Fig.9). 
 
Fig. 9. Type of collision scenario count
This is a remarkable conclusion because in the question asked if the participants could rank the factors 
contributing to collisions, they ranked the factor ‘poor look out’ as one of the most important factors con-
tributing to collision (Table 3).
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Table 3. Ranking according to importance
 
The conclusion therefore is that most of the participants are unaware of the real underlying human factors 
contributing to the incidents. Incidents caused by low vision have often to do with lack of knowledge in the 
COLREGS or not applying these regulations correctly in low vision situations. Even more frequent occurring 
emergency scenarios are due to poor look out. 
More awareness of the usefulness of bridge simulator training in order to prevent incidents at sea is needed. 
86% of the participants agreed that bridge simulation training is efficient training method to prevent collision 
incidents at sea.
One of the most important conclusions learnt in the questionnaire is the need of improvement of people’s 
awareness; in order to prevent incident at sea, mitigating the amount of human errors that cause the inci-
dents, improvement of people’s awareness of the importance of bridge simulation training and of the part 
the human behaviour and errors are playing a role in this, is needed.
RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS OF THE MAIB ACCIDENT REPORTS
In the report ‘Investigation of ship incidents based on the analysis of the MAIB database’ (Bosma et al, 
2010) the identification of the most critical emergency cases that can be used in developing real case sce-
narios to enhance the training approach and content was presented. 
3.1  ANALYSIS MOST FREQUENT ACCIDENT SCENARIO
In order to find the most occurring accident scenario, the most frequent occurred accident scenarios were 
analysed. The majority of incidents occurred in coastal waters, 36%. After analysis the relationship between 
the different vessel categories and the frequency of accidents, passenger vessels had the highest incident 
frequency in both coastal waters as in port and harbour areas, 52% and in river/canal areas even 56%. As 
12 % of the UK merchant vessel fleet are passenger vessels. In general collisions, 36% and groundings, 
33% are the most frequent occurred incident types on all locations. Using the analysis results in the perfect 
choice of emergency scenario in order to set up a training approach will have to include the following: an 
incident in coastal waters involving a collision with a passenger Ro Ro ferry as 59% of these passenger 
vessels are Ro-Ro vehicle/passenger ferries. Therefore the best training scenarios will have to involve an 
incident in coastal water with a Ro-Ro ferry as can be seen in Fig 10.
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Fig. 10. Show the perfect training scenario location, incident type and vessel type according to the results of 
the MAIB database analysis report [Bosma et al, 2010]
3.1  ANALYSIS OF HUMAN FACTORS LEADING TO THE MOST OCCURING SCENARIOS 
The second part of the MAIB database analysis, presented the results of the analysis of human factors 
that are leading to the most occurring scenarios. There are a lot of underlying factors like alcohol abuse on 
board which Branangan et al investigated in their paper [Branagan and Turan, 2010] or misinterpretation of 
the regulations but the most notable factors in this category are:
•	 The Unawareness of a situation (9%). This could be an incorrect understanding of the current 
 situation which can lead to faulty hypothesis regarding a future situation.
•	 Poor decision making, use of information (7%).
•	 Procedure carried out inadequately (7%) 
•	 Inattention. The loss of attention, (6%).
These three most frequently occurred underlying factors will eventually lead to the human errors; these are 
the errors that will lead directly to the incident. The two most frequent occurring types of human error are:
•	 Incorrect or insufficient action taken (17%)
•	 Collision regulations not applied (9%)
By integrating some of the most frequent occurring incidents caused by human errors in the bridge simula-
tors training programmes, human errors leading to incidents can be mitigated. 
IMPLEMENTATION OF ACCIDENTS SCENARIO AND OBSERVING THE RESULTS
The M’AIDER project mainly concerns aspects of human error related to emergency situations which can 
be corrected by preparing a whole range of scenarios, simulating actual incidents, incidents and near 
misses. The MSTC investigated the knowledge of students attending a simulator course as part of their 
training to become a marine officer. The task of the MSTC in this project was to implement a scenario in 
student training and investigate the results of this scenario. The scenario was based on a real accident, 
which happened in Dover Strait in 2008.
4.1  INITIAL SITUATION
The accident occurred on 29 October 2008 when the UK registered general cargo vessel Scot Isles was in 
collision with the Egyptian bulk carrier Wadi Halfa. The Scot Isles, which was on a passage from Rochester 
to Antwerp and crossing the NE traffic lane of the Dover Strait Traffic Separation Scheme, did not detect 
the Wadi Halfa. This resulted in a collision. 
The simulation exercise starts at 03.15 UTC when the Scot Isles starts to cross the Traffic Separation 
Scheme. For this simulation, ship models were used which had a service speed close to the speed of the 
vessels involved. 
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Further initial settings of simulator were (Table 4):
Table 4. Initial settings of the simulator
 
STUDENT CHARACTERISTICS
In total the simulation training exercise ‘run’ approximately 40 times, just enough to give a good judgement 
about the exercise. The students which participated in the exercises were mainly students studying at sec-
ondary nautical institutes in the Netherlands. The students: 
Have already followed two years of education on their institutes.
•	 Will most probably start their time at sea as cadet in the next few months.
•	 Have followed a short course on radar observation and navigation.
•	 Should have knowledge of the COLREGS.
4.3  PREPARING STAGE FOR THE SIMULATION PROCESS
The exercises have a duration of two and a half hours each and consist of:
 a) Briefing
 b) Simulation 
 c) Debriefing (evaluation)
4.3  (a) Briefing
During the briefing the students are familiarized with the goals of the exercise and have time to prepare the 
exercise. Main items during the briefing include:
•	 Plan voyage as indicated by instructor. 
•	 Vessel is heading for Antwerp and has to cross Dover Strait.
•	 Comply with the regulations and sail the vessel safely towards the West hinder traffic lane. 
After having received the basic theoretical instructions the students have to plan the exercise themselves. 
During the briefing the instructor keeps a low profile. He checks if the preparation is done thoroughly. The 
briefing room is a specially equipped room with all the material necessary for preparation available such as 
instruction books, charts etc. At the end of the briefing the students inform the instructor about their pas-
sage planning. The bridge procedure briefing is also part of the total evaluation of the exercise.
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4.3  (b) Simulation
The exercise is ‘run’ as part of the simulator training on a 360° simulator. The students have to show that 
they meet the goals set during the briefing. For the purposes of the exercise, a scenario is written to cover 
the whole process. By following the scenario the instructor can see that all students meet the same degree 
of difficulty. During the exercise the instructor only interact in the simulator training if by any means goals 
cannot be reached without interaction of the instructor. Normally the instructor does not give any instruc-
tions during the training. He/she only observes the students during the training and takes notes during the 
exercise. These notes are written in a logbook for each group. The instructor can use video recording as 
well, which enables him/her to give detailed information about Bridge Resource Management.
4.3 (c) Debriefing
After the training, the exercise is debriefed. During the debriefing everything that happened during the 
exercise is discussed by the instructor and the students. This is a step-by-step approach by means of a 
computer, with the possibility to replay the exercise. The debriefing is a very important part of the training 
and therefore has to be done thoroughly. At first the students can give their opinion about the way they have 
performed and can ask questions and discuss things with each other. Then the instructor gives his opinion 
about whether and how the students have reached their goals. With the aid of an additional video of QPS, 
with AIS data of the accident, there can be a discussion with the students about the things that happened 
during the real scenario when both ships collided and the exercise the students have participated in.
At the end, conclusions can be formulated about human factors that play an important role in this accident. 
Finally the instructor provides a total review of the exercise.
ASSESSMENT OF STUDENTS
Training students using simulators is an expensive way of education. This is why the usage of trainers and 
simulators needs to be optimized. However there must be time available to assess the students as well. 
For this particular exercise there was a function created for each member in the group. The following tasks 
were created: Head of Watch (HOW), Watch Officer (WO), Assistant Watch Officer (AWO) and Helmsman 
(RG). The tasks of the functions were defined as follows:
Head of Watch: Overall responsibility of the bridge process, control of set criteria for the predefined route.
Watch Officer: Knowledge of shipping in vicinity of own vessel, by using radar plots, AIS and other means 
of identification of shipping. In case of close quarter situation WO should inform HOW. He/she carries out 
the necessary communication with other ships.
Assistant Watch Officer: In control of position own vessel by using Charts, Radar and AIS information. As a 
member of the Bridge team he informs HOW about dangers when vessel comes close to relevant dangers.
Helsman: Steers the vessel on manual and obey orders of HOW. As a member of the Bridge team he in-
forms his colleagues when he observes irregularities. 
During the exercise the instructor assesses the students on their tasks. The MSTC developed a web-based 
assessment tool which makes it possible to assess the students during a week of training. Each student is 
assessed by several trainers and on several assessment criteria. At the end of the training week an overall 
score is calculated by the system for the final assessment. 
4.4  (a) Assessment tool
The assessment tool is custom-made for the training process at the MSTC. Every week about 28 students 
carry out simulation training. The students are divided in 7 groups of 4 persons each. The simulation training 
is divided in Cargo Handling, Bridge and Engine room simulation. The process for filling in this assessment 
is:
Instructor login
•	 Selecting group to assess
•	 Select the person or whole group to assess
•	 Select exercise to assess
•	 Fill in exercise criteria
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•	 Select next person to assess or stop assessment if all persons are assessed or group is assessed 
 as a whole
4.4  (b) Continue assessments
Filling in an assessment takes an instructor a couple of minute’s time. During the exercise, he/she makes 
some notes, so it is only filling out these notes into the web-based system.
4.4  (c) More features
Other features of the system are:
Student record tracking
•	 Certificate administration
•	 Evaluation of student remarks for the quality system
•	 Analyze assessment data
RESULTS 
During this exercise the focus was laid upon the following items: 
 a) When do students notice the target for the first time?
 b) When do students first recognize the risk of collision?
 c) When do students start avoiding the target?
 d) Which actions are taken to avoid the target?
 e) What will be the Closest Point of Approach (CPA)?
 f) Finally, when do they return to original course continuing the voyage?
4.5  (a) When do students notice the target for the first time?
Students needed, in general, a lot of time to get acquainted with the simulator instruments. So their first 
focus is mainly on the instruments. As the target is still some 9 miles away and the radar range is mostly set 
on a 6 mile radius, the students do not notice the target at once.
Results showed that the majority of the students saw the target after approx. 10 minutes (Fig. 11). 
 
Fig. 11. First detection of target
There are some differences in the measuring results as a large group of results also showed that the target 
was seen after approx. 18 minutes. This can be declared by the fact that during the time of taking these 
results some of the students were sent to the training institute without having any experience with radar. 
After 18 minutes the target becomes visible on radar screen with a 6 mile radius (radar centre in the middle).
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4.5  (b) When do students first recognize the risk of collision?
In this case the students start plotting the target as it is shown in the radius of 6 mile. With the aid of ARPA 
and AIS as well, the risk of collision is observed by the students. Hardly any group has shown any intention 
until now to look what the target’s position is in the outside view. Observation of groups of students shows 
that the students are relying much on automation systems. They hardly use the visual bearing anymore. Fig 
12 shows most of the students mostly recognize the risk at approx. 20 minutes. 
 
Fig. 12. First recognition of collision
When we look closer to the results of the exercise, we observe that the students who detect the target after 
approximately. 10 minutes are more relaxed due to the distance of the vessel. They observe the risk of col-
lision and after approximately 5 minutes they decide what action should be taken. Intensive conversation 
in the bridge team is also observed. The action which is decided after close consultation with the bridge 
team is mostly a relative small alteration of course to Starboard (SB) (in relation with CPA) and sometimes 
the reduction of speed.
Students who detect the target after approx. 18 minutes start avoiding the target relatively quickly after they 
recognise the risk of collision. When risk is observed there is mostly a quick action to avoid the target. Most 
of the time this action is carried out by making an alteration of course to SB.
4.5  (c) When do students start avoiding the target:
As also mentioned in the paragraph above, the students who have relatively a lot of experience in radar 
plotting are more relaxed in deciding which alteration should be made. Students with relatively small experi-
ence in radar plotting are eager to start immediately avoiding the target even if there is a lot of time before 
action is to be taken. The majority of the students take appropriate action in time as can be seen in the 
figure below (Fig. 13).
 
Fig. 13. Timing the action taken so as to avoid the target (in minutes)
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Keeping in mind that the real accident occurred at 03.49 UTC and simulation starts at 03.15, and then Fig. 
11 shows that approximately 29% of the students were relatively late in avoiding the target. Approximately 
12% of the students started very early to avoid the target and the target then was relatively still at a great 
distance.
4.5  (d) what actions are taken to avoid the target (Fig 14).
 
Fig. 14. Action to avoid the target
As can be seen in Fig 14 most of the students started to make a deviation to Starboard to avoid the target. 
A few of the students (17%) anticipated by making a reduction in speed. Those students who reduced 
speed did this well in time, which resulted in a safe passage of the ships. In case of the course alteration 
to SB several situations occurred; a few of the students made use of trial observation on radar and were 
changing course in accordance with the results observed on radar. Most of the students however changed 
course more than 60°. In several occasions this was done by making course changes in steps of 5 to 10 °. 
4.5  (e) what will be the Closest Point of Approach (CPA)?
 
Fig 15. Closest Point of Approach (CPA)
As shown in Fig 15, average CPA which was observed in the exercises was between 0.5 – 1 mile. Those 
students, who made an early deviation to SB and at the same time reduced speed, had CPA’s of approxi-
mately 1 – 2 miles.
4.5  (f) finally, when do they return to original course continuing the voyage?
Most of the students returned to original course as soon as the target was passed and well clear on Port 
side of own ship. Course was set to the next waypoint and in some circumstances change of course was 
made.
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4.6  CONCLUSIONS OF SIMULATION SCENARIO
It appears that during the exercise students had been well aware of the risk of collision with the target on 
starboard side. The target has been spotted in 95% of the time on an early stage and adequate action 
had been taken by the students. When observing the video with the accident, as manufactured by QPS, 
students were surprised that this accident had occurred. 
Discussion was held by the instructor about the competence of the officer navigating the vessel and stu-
dents own experiences during the exercise. Questions were asked about:
•	 Doing nothing when the lookout observed the red light to starboard. 
•	 Not plotting of ship positions on the chart.
•	 Not plotting any ship’s positions
•	 The possibility of fatigue (although there is no evidence to conclude this)
•	 The advantages of AIS information and what was done with this information. 
5  CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
The M’AIDER projects’ intention is to develop a scenario based training programme reducing risk of human 
errors specifically related to navigation leading to collisions, grounding or other dangerous situations. An-
other focal point of M’AIDER project is the training of deck officers in particular as the accidents are directly 
related to the activities on the bridge including communication within the team as well as the bridge and 
engine department. By analysing the results of questionnaires handed out to experienced seafarers, the 
most frequent occurred emergency situations and the prevailing conditions, incidents can be predicted. 
Through this study the human factors leading to emergency situations has been identified providing infor-
mation as to how various incident scenarios could be selected for further implementation in integrated and 
full-mission ship simulators. 
With regards to the above, a systematic attempt in developing accident or incident scenarios for training 
of young cadets and seafarers working at sea and ports is performed. This investigation was carried out at 
the Maritime Simulator Training Centre (MSTC), which is part of the Maritime Institute “Willem Barentsz”, in 
cooperation with the University of Strathclyde. Concurrent development of training programmes for deck 
officers is a unique opportunity in order to prevent accidents. They should be based on real emergency 
situations/scenarios and focus their attention on what could await them when at sea. 
The analysis of the results of questionnaires handed out to experienced seafarers so as to find out the most 
frequent occurred emergency situations and the prevailing conditions are shown. One of the most impor-
tant conclusions of the analysed results of the MAIB database accident reports, presented in section 3 of 
this paper, is that 88% of the accidents at sea are due to human factors, 60% of which are directly related 
to the individual mistakes. More than 70% of the participants in the questionnaire said that the absence of 
human physical well-being due to circumstances on board daily life, fatigue, seasickness and the absence 
of stress is the most important difference compared to real life situations at sea. This absence of real human 
factors during the bridge simulation training can cause lack of awareness of the importance of these factors 
in real life emergency scenarios at sea. To raise the awareness among the seafarers concerning the human 
factors as 88% of the cause in an incident, running the real life case scenarios on the bridge simulators as 
part of the MAIDER project is of paramount importance [Hetherington C et al, 2006].
The most frequent experienced incidents by the participants onboard the ships are collisions. 86% of the 
participants were involved in a collision or near collision during their time at sea. This is in agreement with 
the analysis carried out in the MAIB database. After analysis of the incident types with UK flagged merchant 
ships involved, 36% % of the accidents are collisions. Collision caused by a poor lookout was not chosen 
very often as a possible cause to collision, just 12 % of the participants have actually chosen ‘poor lookout’ 
as the real cause of the collision.
This is a remarkable conclusion because in the question asked if the participants could rank the factors 
contributing to collisions, they ranked the factor ‘poor look out’ as one of the most important factors con-
tributing to collision. The conclusion therefore is that most of the participants are unaware of the real un-
derlying human factors contributing to the incidents. Incidents caused by low vision have often to do with 
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lack of knowledge in the COLREGS or not applying these regulations correctly in low vision situations. Even 
more frequent occurring emergency scenarios are due to poor look out. 
One of the most important conclusions from the questionnaire is the need of improvement of people’s 
awareness; in order to prevent incident at sea, mitigating the number of human errors that cause the inci-
dents, improvement of people’s awareness of the importance of bridge simulation training and of the part 
the human behaviour and errors are playing a role in this, is needed [Wagenaar and Groeneweg, 2008]
The task of the MSTC in this project was to implement a real emergency accident scenario in student train-
ing and investigate the results of this scenario. The real case scenario, an accident which occurred in Dover 
strait in 2008, was based on the results from the analysis of the MAIB database and the results of the ques-
tionnaire. During this exercise students were well aware of the risk of collision with the target on starboard 
side. The target was spotted in 95% of the time on an early stage and adequate action was taken by the 
students. When observing the video with the accident, as manufactured by QPS, students were surprised 
that this accident had happened. By training the seafarer students on bridge simulators with real case sce-
narios like this, the awareness for human factor errors is raised and therefore accidents at sea mitigated.
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ABSTRACT
 
In this paper an attempt to consider two aspects of IMO definition of the IBS as a component of an up-
to-date Bridge Operation Simulator have been made: 1) Which systems and on which workstations are 
included in the combination with the declared functionality and 2) What should be understood to mean the 
suitably qualified personnel. The Chapter 2 contains some extracts from the DNV additional requirements 
for simulators intended for training on Integrated Bridge Systems including Integrated Navigation, and pro-
vides some comments on them. Transas NTPRO Simulator layouts illustrate these extracts. The Chapter 3 
contains a graphic description of Transas “Multi-Function Display 4000” INS. The Chapter 4 contains some 
extracts from the IMO STCW 78 Code with Manila Amendments for drawing the following conclusion: the 
IBS bridge operation simulators with 7 workstations described in this paper are perfectly suited for the sea-
farers’ training and certification at the management, operational and support levels of responsibility.
Keywords: Bridge resource management, DNV standard 2.14, Integrated Bridge System (IBS), Integrated 
Navigation System (INS), Manila amendments, Navi-Trainer Professional (NTPRO) simulator.
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
An integrated bridge system (IBS) is defined by the IMO as a combination of systems which are intercon-
nected in order to allow centralized access to the sensor information or command/control from worksta-
tions, with the aim of increasing safe and efficient ship management by suitably qualified personnel.
In this paper we have made an attempt to consider two aspects of this definition of the IBS as a component 
of an up-to-date Bridge Operation Simulator:
 1. Which systems and on which workstations are included in the combination with the declared 
  functionality.
 2. What should be understood to mean the suitably qualified personnel.
When looking into the first aspect, we will take DNV Requirements 2.14 Standard “Maritime Simulator Sys-
tems” (January 2011) [1] as a point of departure. In considering the second aspect we will proceed from the 
requirements of the IMO STCW 78 Code with Manila Amendments (June 2010) [2, 3, 4, 5]
2.  CENTRALIZED ACCESS TO SENSOR INFORMATION AND COMMAND/CONTROL 
 FROM WORKSTATIONS 
The Chapter will contain some extracts from the DNV additional requirements for simulators intended for 
training on Integrated Bridge Systems including Integrated Navigation, and provide some comments on 
them, the main comment being offered right away:
All workstations are completely multifunctional (MFWs), and may be used for any IBS function at any time. 
All MFWs provide access to all information, enabling the duty officer(s) to configure the bridge console 
layout in accordance with the mission being performed, bridge manning or system status (i.e., damage or 
malfunction), or to suit the personal preference of the navigation officer.
Note: All systems related to the IBS include failure control(s) and method(s) to train and assess the learner 
in the use of advanced equipment, technology and enable familiarization and training to understand the 
limitations of automatic systems.
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2.1  IBS BRIDGE ERGONOMICS
Transas has many years of experience with advanced IBS bridge layouts, and the latest innovations in user 
ergonomics are taken into account. Three-dimensional layout studies are offered to ensure the best pos-
sible working environment and compliance with IMO and class rules. Control of all main systems is readily 
available from the navigator chairs. Visibility analysis will ensure minimal interference of blind angles and 
ensure optimal visual capability.
 
Fig.1. Transas NTPRO Simulator. IBS bridge layout
2.2  WORKSTATION FOR NAVIGATING AND MANOEUVRING
The interconnected systems included in the Workstation for navigating and manoeuvring are shown in Fig.2
 
Fig. 2. Transas NTPRO Simulator. Workstation for navigating and manoeuvring
2.2  (a) Comments 
The following systems of the Workstation are integrated in the Transas IBS Simulator [6]:
•	 MFD 4000 ECDIS / Radar X-Band / Conning Display / AMS (Master station);
•	 Manoeuvring console with controls and indicators for main engine(s), propulsion and steering systems;
•	 Overhead navigation display for indication ship surge, sway, heave, yaw, roll and pitch values;
•	 Overhead navigation display for indication weather conditions;
•	 Overhead navigation display for indication navigational instruments data;
•	 Ship’s signals transmitter;
•	 Automatic device for emergency alarm;
•	 VHF point with channel selector;
•	 Internal communication equipment;
•	 Night vision and searchlight equipment;
•	 Watch and internal alarms panel.
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2.3 WORKSTATION FOR MONITORING
The interconnected systems included in the Workstation for monitoring are shown in Fig. 3
 
Fig. 3. Transas NTPRO Simulator. Workstation for monitoring
2.3 (a) Comments 
The following systems of the Workstation are integrated in the Transas IBS Simulator [6]:
•	 MFD 4000 ECDIS / Radar S-Band / Conning Display /AMS (Slave station);
•	 NTPRO Conning Display;
•	 Ship’s signals transmitter;
•	 VHF point with channel selector;
•	 Internal communication equipment;
•	 Watch and internal alarms panel.
2.4  WORKSTATION FOR STEERING (HELMSMAN’S)
The interconnected systems included in the Workstation for steering are shown in Fig. 4
 
Fig.4. Transas NTPRO Simulator. Workstation for steering
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2.4  (a) Comments 
The following systems of the Workstation are integrated in the Transas IBS Simulator [6]:
•	 Steering wheel / steering lever
•	 Steering mode selector switch
•	 Rudder pump selector switch
•	 Autopilot;
•	 Gyro and Magnetic repeaters;
•	 Rudder order and angle indicators;
•	 Rate of turn indicator;
•	 Talkback to bridge wing workstation.
2.5  WORKSTATION FOR DOCKING (BRIDGE WING)
The interconnected systems included in the Workstation for docking are shown in Fig. 5
 
Fig. 5. Transas NTPRO Simulator. Workstation for docking
2.5  (a) Comments 
The following systems of the Workstation are integrated in the Transas IBS Simulator [6]:
•	 Steering position selector switch;
•	 Controls and indicators for main engine(s), propulsion and steering systems;
•	 Indicators for wind direction and velocity;
•	 VHF point with channel selector;
•	 Internal communication equipment;
•	 Night vision and search light equipment;
•	 Watch and internal alarms panel.
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2.6  WORKSTATION FOR PLANNING AND DOCUMENTATION
The interconnected systems included in the Workstation for planning and documentation are shown in Fig.6
 
Fig. 6. Transas NTPRO Simulator. Workstation for planning and documentation
2.6  (a) Comments 
The following equipment and systems of the Workstation are integrated in the Transas IBS Simulator [6]:
•	 Chart table with drawing instruments;
•	 MFD 4000 ECDIS (BackUp station) with Chart Assistant, Route Planner and Weather chart plotter;
•	 NavAids Conning Display;
•	 Command printer;
•	 VHF point with channel selector
2.7  WORKSTATION FOR SAFETY
The interconnected systems included in the Workstation for safety are shown in Fig. 7
 
Fig. 7. Transas NTPRO Simulator. Workstation for safety
2.7  (a) Comments 
The following systems of the Workstation are integrated in the Transas IBS Simulator [6]:
•	 Auxiliary Systems from Transas Engine Room Simulator (Fire alarm, Fire-extinguishing, Air condition 
 and Ventilation, Refrigerating, Bilge and Ballast systems);
•	 Electric Power Plant controls and indicators from Transas Engine Room Simulator (SEPS control panel,
 Bridge distribution switchboard);
•	 Fin Stabilizer Control panel;
•	 Strength Load Monitor;
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•	 Monitor of SOx and NOx emissions, CO concentration and unburned fuel contents, fuel consumption;
•	 Internal communication equipment;
•	 Two-way VHF radiotelephone (walkie-talkie).
2.8  WORKSTATION FOR COMMUNICATIONS
The interconnected systems included in the Workstation for communication are shown in Fig. 8
 
Fig. 8. Transas NTPRO Simulator. Workstation for communication
2.8  (a) Comments 
The following systems of the Workstation are integrated in the Transas IBS Simulator [6]:
•	 GMDSS equipment as required for the applicable sea area:
•	 VHF-DSC, radiotelephone
•	 MF-DSC, radiotelephone
•	 MF/HF-DSC, NBDP, radiotelephone
•	 Inmarsat-SES
•	 NAVTEX/EGC/HF direct printing telegraph
•	 EPIRB trigger
•	 Main station for two-way VHF radiotelephone (walkie-talkie).
3.  MFD 4000 INTEGRATED NAVIGATION SYSTEM
Transas Multi-Function Display (MFD) 4000 is the kernel of the NTPRO IBS [7].
The MFD 4000 is very flexible concerning the interfacing of navigation sensors, combat management 
systems, Integrated Platform Management System and communication systems. Because of this system 
integration expertise and open system approach, the MFD 4000 can accept sensor inputs from a wide 
variety of suppliers supporting most common signal transmission methods and protocols, while being able 
to adapt to special needs.
Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) operation and presentation, Advance Position Prediction and Voyage Data 
Recorder (VDR) are available for integration with the MFD. Integration of Automatic Identification Systems 
(AIS) with ECDIS/ARPA is also offered as required by IMO regulations. Provided below are figures of the 
main MFD 4000 sub-systems with some explanatory notes.
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3.1  TRANSAS INTEGRATOR UTILITY
 
Fig.9. Transas Integrator utility
3.2 TRANSAS CHART ASSISTANT UTILITY
 
Fig.10. Transas Chart Assistant utility
3.3  TRANSAS NAVI-PLANNER
 
Fig.11. Transas Navi-Planner
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3.4  ECDIS MULTI-FUNCTION DISPLAY
 
Fig. 12. ECDIS Multi-Function Display
3.5  RADAR MULTI-FUNCTION DISPLAY
 
Fig. 13. RADAR Multi-Function Display
3.6  CONNING MULTI-FUNCTION DISPLAY
 
Fig.14. CONNING Standard View
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3.7  CONNING MULTI-FUNCTION DISPLAY (CONTINUATION)
Fig. 15. CONNING Charts with CCTV
3.8  ALARM MONITORING SYSTEM
 
Fig. 16. Alarm Monitoring System
3.9  MFD PLAYBACK
 
Fig. 17. MFD Playback
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3.10 VOYAGE DATA RECORDER
 
Fig. 18. Voyage Data Recorder
3.11 MFD 4000 SENSORS
 
Fig. 19. MFD 4000 Sensors
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3.12  MFD INTERCONNECTION DIAGRAM 
 
Fig. 20. MFD Interconnection Diagram
4. NEW STANDARDS OF TRAINING AND CERTIFICATION FOR SUITABLY 
 QUALIFIED PERSONNEL
Considering the issue of what should be understood to mean the suitably qualified personnel, we will pro-
ceed from the new requirements of the IMO STCW 78 Code with Manila Amendments (June 2010).
A) Let us start with the “Standard of competence for OONW on ships of 500 gross tonnage or more”. Here 
4 new Bridge resource management requirements have appeared for the “Maintain a safe navigational 
watch” competence, including:
 1.  allocation, assignment, and prioritization of resources;
 2.  effective communication on board and ashore;
 3.  assertiveness and leadership, including motivation; 
 4.  obtaining and maintaining situational awareness.
B) We will then refer to the “Standard of competence for masters and chief mates on ships of 500 gross 
tonnage or more”. Here numerous requirements have been added for the assessment of an entirely new 
competence: “Maintain the safety of navigation through the use of ECDIS and associated navigation sys-
tems to assist command decision making”. Here are the most significant of them:
 1.  manage procurement, licensing and updating of chart data and system software to conform 
  to established procedures
 2. system and information updating, including the ability to update ECDIS system version in accordance  
  with vendor’s product development
 3. create and maintain system configuration and backup files
 4. create and maintain log files in accordance with established procedures
 5. create and maintain route plan files in accordance with established procedures
 6. use ECDIS log-book and track history functions for inspection of system functions, alarm settings 
  and user responses
 7. use ECDIS playback functionality for passage review, route planning and review of system functions
C) Also added here are some requirements for another absolutely new competence: “ Use of leadership 
and managerial skill ”.
  
Knowledge and ability to apply effective resource management:
See item A) and the following additional requirement:
 5. decisions reflect consideration of team experiences
Knowledge and ability to apply decision-making techniques:
 1. situation and risk assessment
 2. identify and generate options
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 3. selecting course of action
 4. evaluation of outcome effectiveness
In addition to A), B), C), the scope of courses and trainees is going to expand:
 1. Special training courses for personnel on certain types of ships, including large ships with Azipod 
  propulsion system;
 2. Joint ship and port Security Officer courses;
 3. Electrical Department personnel courses for the additional maintenance of electronic navigational 
  and GMDSS equipment;
 4. Members of the ship’s deck crew other than the master or an officer (deck ratings) will have to 
  demonstrate their ability to perform elementary navigator’s duties: course plotting, course selection for 
  a helmsman, etc.
So, the most important new knowledge and skill the navigator is required to have is to be capable of situ-
ational awareness in the conditions of various arising risks. It is, therefore, simulators for the concurrent 
training and competency assessment of different marine specialities which will be in demand.
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The IBS bridge operation simulators with 7 workstations described above are perfectly suited for the seafar-
ers’ training and certification at the management, operational and support levels of responsibility.
Thank you for your attention!
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ABSTRACT 
It has been almost 40 years since the 1972 International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea known 
as Colregs were introduced and there have been several amendments to Colregs rules since then until now. 
Collision avoidance is believed, in a sense, to prevent groundings, the striking of fixed obstacles and ships 
colliding. Over the last half-century despite improvements in navigational aids such as ARPA and attempts 
to raise the standards of training through various STCW conventions, collisions still occur. Many studies 
and accident reports indicate that the accidents are caused by either human error or are associated with 
human error as a result of inappropriate human responses. Collisions commonly represent the majority of 
these accidents. 
This paper does not attempt to examine all Colregs rules, but is concerned with the basic rules that are 
usually ignored or disregarded, in order to identify the deficiencies in the application of Collision rules at 
sea. This paper will also touch on the deficiencies in the maritime education and training (MET) navigational 
officers’ programme that is related to Colregs teaching. 
This paper will suggest the development of a course with a set of standards and study units for testing 
the understanding of seafarers in applying the Colregs rules. The standards will be developed from real 
accident cases while testing the potential navigators’ understanding with real time situations. This would 
improve the application of the Colregs rules at sea environment. 
Keywords: Colregs, maritime education and training, collision avoidance
 
1. INTRODUCTION
Colregs is one of the internationally agreed conventions of the sea. It is essential to ensure that all officers 
responsible for the navigational watches have a full understanding and good interpretation of the rules to 
apply them at sea to avoid collisions. The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) developed the first 
standards for Vocational Education and Training (VET) programmes for merchant navy officers (STCW) in 
1978, and it has been amended in 1991, 1995, 2003 and 2010 respectively. However, there are currently 
no mechanisms to monitor how these standards are being applied as many VET providers have been 
found not to follow many of the requirements. Therefore, there has always been substantial diversity on the 
knowledge, understanding, interpretation and application of these rules in the high seas and coastal waters 
that has always threatened the safety of life at sea. Colregs rules are reported to be difficult to understand 
and apply at sea by navigational officers (Stitt, 2002). Ziarati (2007) reports that majority of these accidents 
and incidents are related to collisions and near misses. Therefore, there is a need to reduce the accidents 
and near misses at sea.
The Colregs rules are basically a set of rules that are required to be followed by all navigation officers. The 
rules provide various guidelines regarding passing, crossing, overtaking manoeuvres to be made; detailing 
which ships have the right of way depending on the circumstances and the types of ships involved, and 
what actions these ships should take. It also describes the rules on signals (lights, shapes and sounds sig-
nals). It is one of the most important International Conventions in a seafarer’s education and training, where 
full understanding and knowledge must be performed by interpreting the Colregs rules. 
AN INVESTIGATION INTO COLREGS AND 
THEIR APPLICATIONS AT SEA
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The rules in fact serve two main purposes:
 a) To provide guidance to mariners on how to prevent collisions at sea 
 b) To serve as a basis for apportioning blame when collisions occur (Stitt, 2002)
The recent IMO bulletin “maritime knowledge centre” reports that more than 90% of collisions are attributed 
to the human factors (IMO, 2010), and this had earlier been reported by Parker (2010). It is interesting to 
note that earlier studies reported human error, contributing to 85% of all accidents, either directly initiated 
by human error or associated with human error as a result of inappropriate human response (Ziarati, 2006). 
Human error is reported to be the main cause of accidents, which has now apparently increased by some 
5 percent in recent years. 
The following figure shows the number of accidents that UK merchant vessels involved in recent 12 years.
 
Fig. 1. UK merchant Vessels involved in Collisions [Source: maritime Accident Investigation Branch 1997-2009]
The Maritime Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) and Mariners’ Alerting and Reporting Scheme (MARS) 
reports conclude that many of the basic principles of collision avoidance are improperly understood/applied 
at sea (MAIB, MARS). There is a clear signal from the reports that Collision regulations are either not under-
stood or ignored, even though Colregs provides a primary set of rules for taking actions to avoid collisions.
2. COLREGS IN MET
Maritime education and training programmes include Colregs training under a Navigational Watch unit, 
which is usually supported by full mission simulator training. This includes a number of hours teaching in a 
classroom environment at a theoretical/practical level, whilst also being supported by full mission simulator 
training. The IMO model courses allocate 100 hours for this Navigational Watch Unit for deck officer pro-
grammes (IMO, 1999). Similarly, at senior and higher levels, the programmes include 30 hours of training 
that is considered as a refresher course. These model courses are designed to provide additional guidance 
to MET providers as per required in the Standard Training Certification and Watchkeeping (STCW) II/1 level.
Different countries have varying methods of teaching Colregs rules as well as having different methods to 
test and certify the knowledge and competency of deck officers in Collision rules. For instance, in Turkey, 
the national authorities choose to test the knowledge of seafarers with multiple choice type questions. 
Whereas, in the UK, candidates are tested through a one-to-one oral examination with an experienced 
captain directing questions using model ships as a demo to identify whether the candidate is able to explain 
their Colregs knowledge and apply it to different situations where the risk of collisions exists. 
The research conducted by Syms (2002) highlights the seafarers’ view. The seafarers agree that the im-
provement of maritime training and education (MET) systems are necessary, when they think it will help to 
improve the application of Colregs at sea. 
The same research (Syms, 2002) also reports that in northern countries such as the United Kingdom, 
Germany and France, the application and understanding of Colregs is of a higher standard than when 
compared to other countries. 
	  
42
Ziarati (2006) extends the problems associated with Colregs emphasising that mistakes are usually made 
not because of deficient or inadequate regulations, but because the regulations and standards, that do 
exist, are often ignored. 
3. RESEARCH INTO COLREGS RULES
Colregs currently have thirty eight rules and four annexes. It applies to all vessels on the high seas and in 
all waters navigable by seagoing vessels, except where the local rules are not in effect. However, the local 
rules in any case should be in line with the international rules where possible as stated in Rule 1 (Application) 
of Colregs (Ford, 2003). For instance, in the United States of America, additional rules for vessels navigating 
inland waterways are published alongside the international rules (US, 1989). 
Belcher (2002) states that Colregs are intended to operate in a environment where the Navigation Officer 
on each vessel has a complete understanding of the situation, knowing which rules are in effect, how those 
rules are interpreted and what needs to be done. In case the action does not occur, Belcher (2002) per-
ceives that Colregs operate in an environment of mutual comprehension, understanding and coordination, 
with clear logical steps ensuring clarity and predictability.
 
Fig. 2. Variation and Causes of Accidents [Source: UK Protection and Indemnity Club, 2007]
MAIB (2004) has conducted a safety study that reviewed 66 collisions and near collisions in their accident 
database. As a result of the study, the most common contributory factors in all these collisions were poor 
lookouts (Rule 5) and poor use of radar (rule 7(b), (c). This means that the standards of lookouts are poor 
and ineffective and radar is not used properly to identify the risk of collision. In fact, Colregs clearly state the 
necessity of maintaining lookout in Rule 5 and the use of radar in Rule 7(b) and7(c):
“Rule 5 - Every vessel shall all the times maintain a proper lookout by sight and by hearing as well as by all 
available means appropriate in the prevailing circumstances and conditions so as to make full appraisal of 
the situation and the risk of collision” 
“Rule 7(b) – Proper use shall be made on radar equipment if fitted and operational, including long-range 
scanning to obtain early warning of risk of collision and radar plotting or equivalent systematic observations 
of detected objects. 
Rule 7(c) – Assumptions shall not be made on the basis of scanty information, especially scanty radar in-
formation.
Examples of Colregs Rule 5, Rule 7(b) and Rule 7(c) are basic and easy to understand, interpret and comply 
with compared to the other rules of Colregs. However, it is interesting to note that the application of these 
Rules is the first concern of the report, expressed in the MAIB full study (MAIB, 2004). The same report 
(ibid) also points out that substantial numbers of accidents occurred at night and in restricted visibility. This 
proves the lack of understanding of seafarers Part C – Lights and Shapes and Rule 19 – Conducts of Ves-
sels in restricted Visibility. 
The accident case below shows the collision attributed by poor lookout.
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Case 1 - Poor lookout
A dredger collided with a fishing vessel in Dover Traffic Separation Zone, in daylight, calm conditions and 
clear visibility. The dredger had been on passage and following the flow of traffic, and the fishing vessel 
was not engaged in fishing when in the separation zone. The vessels approached each other on a collision 
course for 10 to 12 minutes with the fishing vessel on the dredger’s port bow. The watchkeeper on the 
dredger had seen the other vessel and, having identified it as a fishing vessel not engaged in fishing, was 
expecting her to alter course at the last minute. 
Fig. 3. Vessels failing to keep a proper lookout [Source: Maritime Accident Investigation Branch, 2004]
With regard to the provision of a lookout, STCW 95 states that the officer in charge of the navigation watch 
may be the sole lookout “in daylight” provided it can satisfy the provisions in STCW for lookout requirements 
(STCW, 95). Despite this international requirement to maintain lookout at night, the MAIB research also 
points that at least three of fifteen vessels involved in accidents had failed to do so. 
 
Fig. 4. Lookout perspective to Collisions [Source: Maritime Accident Investigation Branch, 2004] 
In the same report, the reason for not maintaining a lookout was attributed to a “lack of competency”. 
However, MAIB believes that poor visual lookout is also linked to the poor employment of ratings on the 
bridge (MAIB, 2004).
The same report also points that many collisions has two common factor: One is that many seafarers are 
found to be fatigue and second is that there is an issue with the competency of seafarers in complying with 
rules.
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Fig. 5. Possible factors of Collisions [Source: Maritime Accident Investigation Branch,2004] 
 
Bridge watchkeeping practices have inevitably changed in recent years under the influence of automated 
systems which are being implemented in order to enhance efficiency and safety as well as overcoming the 
shortage of seafarers (Hwang, 2001). As advanced automation systems are developed and deployed on 
board, it influences the international rules and regulations which are under consideration for being updated 
in parallel to revolved systems on board the vessels.
An earlier survey conducted among seafarers highlighted the concerns regarding the application of Colregs 
rules at sea. The survey results showed that 50% of the responses by these seafarers either ignored or dis-
regarded Colregs rules (Syms, R.J, 2002). In the same survey, 90% of the responders identified the reason 
as “ignorance”, “Poor knowledge of Colregs” and “lack of training”.
Fig. 6. Reasons for manoeuvres contrary to Colregs (Syms, R.J, 2002). 
4. THE USE OF VHF AT SEA 
Collisions should theoretically be avoided if all navigation officers comply with International Rules for the 
prevention of collisions at Sea 1972. It is however dreadful that these regulations are contravened to varying 
degrees in different locations across the world, as evident in many of the MAIB and MARS reports. 
It is reported that the use of VHF radio is more attractive and it has become common practice in collision 
avoidance, although it is not part of Colregs. The MCA (Maritime and Coastguard Agency) in the UK and 
several other countries took this issue seriously and issued guidance for their seafarer network to highlight 
the dangers associated with the use of VHF radio (MCA, 2002). The summary of that same report states 
that 
“Although the use of VHF radio may be justified on occasion in collision avoidance, the provisions of the 
Collision Regulations should remain uppermost, as misunderstandings can arise even where the language 
of communication is not a problem” 
Similarly, MARS reporting has been collating the collision and near miss reports received from seafarers to 
emphasize the dangers associated with the use of VHF. (MARS, 2005). MARS recommended the following:
	  
45
“The use of VHF should be kept to minimum and only be used, for instance, an obstruction exists on star-
board side for stand on vessel, and however, reduction of speed should be preferred on communicating 
the intention on VHF”
It should not normally be the case for a navigation officer to use VHF to take action to avoid collisions, how-
ever, it does usually happen, and the only reason might be that using VHF is easier than understanding and 
interpreting the 38 rules and annexes in different collision situations. 
The MAIB (2004) study shows that after examining the use of VHF in collisions and near misses that it was 
only used in 14 of the 47 collisions, and was only effective in 3 of those. 
The accident cases below shown below is a collision attributed with the use of VHF radio.
Case 2 - VHF assisted collision
A cargo vessel was outbound from the River Humber in poor visibility. The master of the cargo vessel had 
the control, a helmsman was steering and the bosun was stationed on the forecastle as a lookout. The 
master saw the target of an inbound vessel on his radar, and he called the unknown fishing vessel using 
VHF with the intention of requesting to pass “green-to-green” in the channel. He received instant response 
but, by then it was too late. His ship was committed to the manoeuvre, and the fishing vessel was trying to 
pass red-to-red. They collided, causing extensive damage to the fishing vessel. 
Case 3 – VHF assisted collision
Two container ships were navigating in the China Sea. A risk of collision appeared however both did not 
realised until 3 minutes before the accident. The stand on vessel tried to make contact via VHF on 3 min-
utes before the collision instead of complying with the Colregs rules. However, he received a response after 
several calls, and disagreement took place and the ships collided.
5. E-COLREGS TESTING STANDARDS
Colregs in a way is not dissimilar to the necessity of seafarers to be able to make use of Maritime English at 
sea. It is very obvious that it is one of the most critical safety regulations, and that if it is known and applied 
in an environment that has mutual understanding. It would stop many collisions and groundings from hap-
pening if it is applied correctly. Without creating a common understanding and interpretation for navigational 
officers to take action against the risk of collision, Colregs rules are not effective to prevent the collisions, as 
stated in many MAIB accident reports.
Every country has diverse systems in training and testing seafarers understanding in collision avoidance. 
The knowledge of seafarers in collision avoidance is usually tested in the maritime colleges/universities in 
which the students are enrolled. Later on, students are externally tested again by the national authorities 
of the countries that they will be certified as competent. These exams are usually carried out in the way of 
multiple choice and open ended questions or one-to-one exams to make sure that the candidate is able to 
act and take action against any risk of collision under their certification processes. 
There is currently no international or European common interpretation of these rules that is efficiently ap-
plied by all countries. The level of navigators understanding and interpretation of Colregs rules are incon-
sistent. Besides, there is always a question mark how student’s knowledge is taught and being tested. 
Furthermore, the level of competency varies significantly across institutions in a given country and this is 
even more inconsistent across EU. The officers are in fact expected to reach certain levels of proficiency 
and competency either by their companies or potential employers. The collision avoidance actions require 
to be applied in all waterways, unless additional national rules are set by national authorities in their inland 
and coastal waters. 
There are currently two generic problems with Colregs. Firstly, there is no common interpretation of Colregs 
rules that are widely used, where navigators could have the same understanding. Secondly, it is difficult to 
apply Colregs rules in different locations and situations at sea. To remedy the first problem, there needs to be 
a common interpretation which is used by countries taking into account where and how those rules should 
be applied. A solution to the second problem is a set of scenarios, including critical parts of the world, being 
developed based on real accidents. This would be a novel approach of showing where the Colregs rules 
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are being breached. This will remedy the difficulties in applying the Colregs rules at sea in real time situa-
tions. The common interpretation and testing may well be translated to different country languages so that 
it would aid the creation of a mutual understanding of Colregs. To this end, a set of standards to test the 
competency of navigators in applying the Colregs rules at sea could be the main focus. The standards will 
be designed so that the industry could use them to assess the competency of their potential employees.
In some countries, many seafarers have serious problems in understanding and interpreting the rules, and 
that complicates the application of the rules at sea as the individual ships do not operate in a vacuum. 
The focus should be to remedy the problems relating to the competency of seafarers in Collision regulations 
when they are applied to real time situations. A project could be developed concerning the establishment 
of standards of collision regulations for all classes of navigators. The standards are expected to be rec-
ognised by international professional bodies and licensing authorities. To ensure these developments are 
implemented effectively, the project could:
•	 develop supporting training programmes for the intended standards by formation of pilot groups in 
 many countries and then re-run them and/or validate them in other countries
•	 establish a network of transnational partners to support the development of the project to set the 
 standards for application of Colregs rules set in Colregs 1972 by IMO
•	 design a programme for trainers and assessors development and their certification for the application
 of the intended standards and subsequent tests as well as for the internal assessment ad verification
 process, in line with European Vocational qualifications for Assessors and Verifiers 
•	 facilitate the secondment of trainers and assessors to partners’ establishments on short assignments
 in order to familiarise the trainers and assessors with the necessary skills and good practice
6. CONCLUSIONS 
Establishing standards for collision rules from real accident cases should be considered innovative. De-
veloping standards for potential navigational officers and targeting skill/competencies needed in a unit of 
study could be used as a guideline and a benchmark for improving existing Colregs testing standards so 
that Colregs can operate in an environment of mutual comprehension, understanding and coordination. 
The content of the tests will rely on existing Colregs rules with a number of real time situations developed 
from real accidents to test the knowledge of seafarers. 
It is evident that in the northern part of Europe, Colregs are being taken more seriously and the probable 
effect is that more confident navigation duties that are performed by officers the less they need to depend 
on VHF. 
MET programmes are not complete if Colregs are not effectively interpreted and navigators are tested to 
see whether they can apply it in real time situation. MET institutions should revise their navigation pro-
grammes and make sure that the seafarers know Colregs as required.
National authorities should take the Colregs rules more seriously and issue guidance similar to MCA (2002) 
to their seafarers with an intention to spread the word Colregs and discourage the use of VHF at sea.
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A careful study of the accident reports reveals that 85% of all accidents are either directly initiated by human 
error or are associated with human error by means of inappropriate human response (Ziarati, 2006). This is 
in line with the findings of a recent paper (IMO, 2005) that 80% of accidents at sea are caused by human 
error. Turkish Government is also aware that collision is the most common type of accident in Turkey and 
this was again confirmed by the latest data published by the Main Search and Rescue Coordination Centre 
of Turkey in 2009. Collision amounted to 60% of all accidents if grounding and contacts are included. 
The research shows that mistakes are usually made not because of deficient or inadequate regulations, 
but because the regulations and standards, that do exist, are often ignored. The IMO MSC (Ziarati, 2006) 
clearly indicates the causes of many of the accidents at sea are due to deficiencies in maritime education 
and training (MET) of seafarers or disregard for current standards and regulations. Ziarati also reports (2007) 
that majority of accidents and incidents are related to collisions or groundings. 
The International Regulations for Preventing collisions at Sea 1972 (Colregs) are rules to be followed by 
Deck/Navigation officers. It was initially designed to update the Collision Regulations of 1960 and entered 
into force in 1977. The last amendments were made in 2007. It is one of the most important International 
Conventions that all seagoing officers must have full knowledge of it before taking charge of a ship. How-
ever, a case law (MARS, 2005) indicate that many of the basic principles of collision avoidance are improp-
erly understood /applied. It is also a common practice to use VHF Radio in collision avoidance procedures 
although not being part of the Colregs (MAIB, 2001; Ziarati, 2007). 
The project aims to transfer innovation from existing novel products and practices developed in the UK 
(‘Rule of the Road’ exercises and e-assessment) and Slovenia (e-learning) to other partners in the project 
with the intention of improving the existing knowledge and VET training practice of Deck officers and raise 
awareness on the correct application of International Regulations to prevent collisions at sea (Colregs). The 
main aims of the project are to: 
 1. Promote and identify VET key competencies in collision avoidance,
 2. Improve systems for VET quality assurance through the transfer of innovation from the outcomes of the 
  two successful Leonardo projects, EGMDSS and MarTEL, and 
 3. Involve shipping companies including the smaller ones to interpret Colregs correctly and through MET 
  institutions to promote correct application of Colregs. 
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Figs. 1 and 2. Common Factors in Collisions and Grounding (Source: Ziarati, 2007)
 
The partnership is composed of major MET centres in several EU countries (Holland, Poland, Finland, 
Slovenia, UK and Turkey) with considerable Leonardo experience. The partners have been involved in 
Leonardo e-learning projects (E-GMDSS 2006-08, E-GMDSS 2008-10 and MarTEL 2007-09). The main 
tangible outcome is an online and novel learning and assessment platform facilitating the correct applica-
tion of Colregs leading to substantially reduced accidents at sea. Impact will be substantial as it concerns 
the training of all Deck cadets and officers and an up-dating course for those already working in the sector.
Why this project is important
The International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972 (Colregs) are a set out of the rules to 
be followed by Deck/navigation officers at sea. It was initially designed to update the Collision Regulations 
of 1960 and entered into force in 1977. A series of amendments have been made in 1981, 1987, 1989, 
1993, 2001 and 2007. It fundamentally prescribes the conduct of vessels underway; specify the display of 
internationally understood lights and collision avoidance actions in close quarter situations at sea. It is one 
of the most important International Convention that all seagoing Officers must have full knowledge, and the 
implementation skills, before taking charge for Bridge navigation duties. However, a case law, (MARS 2005) 
indicate that many of the basic principles of collision avoidance are improperly understood. It is also a com-
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mon practice to use VHF Radio in collision avoidance procedures although it is not prescribed or stated in 
the Colregs (MAIB, 2001, Ziarati, 2007). 
A careful study of the accident reports reveals that 85% of all accidents are either directly initiated by hu-
man error or are associated with human error by means of inappropriate human response (Ziarati, 2006). 
This is in line with the findings of a recent paper (IMO, 2005) that 80% of accidents at sea are caused by 
human error. The earlier paper notes that mistakes are usually made not because of deficient or inadequate 
regulations, but because the regulations and standards, that do exist, are often ignored. The (IMO MSC, 
2006; Ziarati, 2006) clearly indicates the causes of many of the accidents at sea are due to deficiencies in 
education and training of seafarers or disregard for current standards and regulations.
There is a clear indication that Collision regulations are either not understood or ignored although it is a 
primary set of rules for taking actions to avoid collisions. A common interpretation of Colregs from the 
perspective of seafarers will be promoted in this project and translated and transferred to MET partners in 
the project in the first instance and later throughout the EU and worldwide by engaging major awarding, 
accrediting and licensing authorities and well as bodies such as EMSA and IMO. An existing e-learning 
(www.egmdss.com) and e-assessment (www.martel.pro) will be adapted for delivery and assessment of 
the intended course which will also be used as an updating/refresher course for Deck officers working in 
the sector.
The research, as shown in Table 1, shows that almost half of the seafarers are ignorant to COLREG. All in 
all, these answers confirm the current suspicions engendered by MARS and other sources that the Colregs 
are often misunderstood, misinterpreted or just plainly ignored on frequent occasions. Although what pro-
portion can be set against each possibility remains open to argument.
 
Table 1. Improving the application of Colregs - Captain R. J. Syms, FNI
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Table 2. Improving the application of Colregs - Captain R. J. Syms, FNI
 
A survey (Table 2) was also conducted by the Australian Maritime College to test mariner’s clear under-
standing of Colregs
The project will increase cooperation between the training institutions and several social partners because 
of the labour market needs on overcoming the knowledge deficiency in application of the Collision regula-
tions. Improved learning will be achieved by using real life scenarios extracted from accident case studies 
for the development of the intended course.
The online course is intended to be recognized by major awarding such as Edexcel/BTEC, accredited by a 
major chartered professional institution such as IMarEST (and/or Nautical Institute) and endorsed by major 
licensing authorities such as MCA. The course will also be used as a refresher course for officers working 
at sea and ports. In parallel, an assessment method (criterion referencing) based on an early system devel-
oped as part of the Leonardo SOS (2005-07) which received recognition from Edexcel/BTEC and IMarEST 
as well as MCA will be established to ensure safe application of Colregs at sea and worldwide recognition 
for the intended E-COLREGS course in a similar manner to Turkey well known Safety On Sea (SOS) pro-
grammes/courses. 
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ABSTRACT 
Classification societies and regulators in general are fighting with demons to reduce the amount of ac-
cidents caused by human error. It is hard to understand why majority of all accidents are still caused by 
human influence one way or another despite of all efforts to enhance competence, certification and training. 
It is easy to point the finger now to the equipment manufacturers and system providers as when the work 
onboard becomes easier the equipment becomes more complicated. Only way to tackle the problem is to 
provide more user friendly solutions.
Adaptive learning by “trial & error” does not really fit today’s challenging vessel operations. We do not 
survive without those electronic aids and software applications. In order to make operations more safe, 
efficient, ergonomic, and productive we need to understand the vessel as “one”. This is only possible by a 
total system integration and we are already on that path whether we want it or not. Combining and utilizing 
all available information in prudent way we optimize the target setting of the operator. Information sharing 
between the vessel automation and integrated bridge is the key issue for 3C. 
Wärtsilä has the leading edge in the industry to bring the system integration into a new level by harnessing 
the know how within its entire organization and utilizing its extensive portfolio to support the development 
of 3C. Wärtsilä 3C is not just a bridge but rather a long-awaited link between the engines, the automation, 
the propulsion and the bridge. Integration is nothing new, but Wärtsilä 3C will provide the optimum per-
formance with minimum fuel consumption and emissions by the exclusive and totally unforeseen system 
integration.
WÄRTSILÄ CONTROL & COMMUNICATION CENTRE 3C
PRESENTATIONS
I Safe Return to Port
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SRTP FERRY DESIGN
Ari Huttunen
STX Finland
SRTP Ferry Design         Huttunen, A.
Topics of today
1. SRTP vessels in STX orderbook
2. SRTP Principe from design perspective
3. Most Important Additional Redundancy
4. Solutions
5. Conclusions
June 2011  |  Page 2
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SRTP VESSELS IN STX ORDERBOOK.
June 2011  |  Page 3
M/S SPIRIT of BRITAIN
NB 1367
M/S SPIRIT of FRANCE 
NB 1368
Route Dover-Calais
Flag British
Class LR
Main Engines MAN 7L48/60CR
Generators MAN 7L21/31
Building location STX Rauma, Finland
Delivery 1367 I Quarter 2011
1368 III Quarter 2011
Length oa 213 m
Breadth 31,4 m
Speed in shallow water 22 kn
Propulsion power 30,4 MW
GT 48000
Passengers 2000
Truck lane metres 2750 m
Additional car lane metres 1000 m
June 2011  |  Page 4
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Safe return to port  - Principle
Casualty
threshold Casualty
severity
The ship is evacuated/abandoned  in 
orderly manner
Systems for evacuation and abandonment 
are operational during 3 hours (fire only)
The ship is capable to return to port 
under its own power
A safe area is provided for passengers 
and crew members
Essential systems for the safe return to 
port and the safe area are operational:
- List of 14 points
Casualty < threshold Casualty > threshold
= Technical Design Standard
June 2011|  Page 6
SRTP SHIP - Redundancy in Layout
Separate -
• Main Engine Rooms
• Cooling Systems
• Fuel treatment
• Auxiliary power
• Switchboard
• Steering gear rooms
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SRTP SHIP - More Battle Hardiness
Tunnel protected through going shaft
- Additional cooling inside
- New guidelines do not require this
- Significant obstacle
Design Challenges
- Bilge system
- Flooding Detection system
- Sprinkler system
- Systems SRTP assessment
SRTP with NB 1367-8 Spirit of Britain & Spirit of France
• P&O Ferries decided to adopt the new rule, although not mandatory (keels 
laid before 1.7.2010).
• No interpretations or guidelines how to adopt the rule
• Discussions 2007/2008 between P&O Ferries, MCA and Class
• At contract phase meetings between the Owner, Yard, MCA and Class
• A set of interpretations was agreed with Flag approval.
• The agreement was successfully carried out during the project.
June 2011  |  Page 8
58
NB 1367-8 SRTP APPLICATION 1(2)
Flooding was excluded from SRTP as there were no IMO rule yet. 
SRTP time was agreed as 6 h due to the special sailing area of the ferries.
Ballasting with SRTP was excluded, proven with calulations.
No minimum speed was specified because even one engine gives enough.
No AC was deemed necessary
PSMR* notation requires 50% Propulsion power system redundancy.
- Fire or flooding
- Requirements with SRTP not completely parallel
June 2011  |  Page 9
SAFE AREAS FOR PASSENGERS
• Toilet system redundant (!)
• Potable water to be stored in  bottles, one for each passenger
• No requirement for food on this short route
• A second doctors bag to be located outside the medical centre
• Thermal blankets for each passenger stored
• Safe Area Lighting
• No heating requirement
NB 1367-8 SRTP APPLICATION 2(2)
June 2011  |  Page 10
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Casualty Scenarios Assessment – Lower decks only
June 2011  |  Page 11
June 2011  |  Page 12
Length over all, about 134.0 m
Length between perpendiculars 121.25 m
Breadth moulded 22.0 m
Breadth, max., about 23.0 m
Height to  Main Deck 10.55 m
Draught, design 7.65 m
Deadweight at design draught, about 5020 t
Service Speed 14.0 knots
Speed at 1.0 m level ice 5.0 knots
Passengers 100
Crew 44
Cargo hold capacity 4000 m3
Flag: South Africa
Class notation: DNV + 1A1 PASSENGER SHIP, PC5, 
WINTERISED BASIC, DAT(-35), EO, RP, HELDEK-
SHF,CLEAN DESIGN,COMF V(2)/C(2),NAUT-AW, 
TMON, BIS, DYNPOS-AUT, DE-ICE, LFL 
App:(ICE 10 for HULL)
NB1369 - DEA POLAR SUPPLY AND RESEARCH VESSEL
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Operational Area of the Vessel (NB 1369 DEA)
NB 1376 VIKING LINE 57.000 GT CRUISE FERRY + option
LNG powered
Diesel electric
Turku-Åland-Stockholm route.
Length 218 m
2800 passengers, 880 cabins, 200 crew
Lanes 1275 m + 500 m car garage
June 2011  |  Page 14
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SRTP comparison between projects at STX Finland
P&O Ferries DEA Overnigth Ferry
Short
International
International Short
International
Distance/speed 6 h 1000 nm
12 kn 83 h
max 200 nm
10 kn 24 h
Provision No requirement, 
bottled water
Galley & stores
divided
Usually several
stores & galleys
Toilets etc Divided Divided Divided
Scenarios 126 175 ?
June 2011  |  Page 15
NB 1367 P&O FERRIES Emergency steering position
June 2011  |  Page 16
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NB 1369 DEA Emergency steering position
June 2011  |  Page 17
Portable control panel
in lounge
Conclusions regarding SRTP
1. DESIGN PHASE
• More routeing design work
• Inconsistencies with old SOLAS such as “Safe Area” m2, speed, toilets, hospital
• Guidelines MSC.1/Circ 1369 helpful
• Plentiful assessment scenarios => stage design changes risk.
2. PRODUCTION PHASE
• More cabling and pipe work
3. COMMISSIONING PHASE
• No official guidelines
• Testing procedures must be agreed on for quay side trials and sea trial
4. MAINTENANCE, CHANGES?
• Some guidelines MSC.1/Circ 1369
5. HAVE LIVES BEEN SAVED?
June 2011  |  Page 18
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thank you for your attention
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SRTP Requirements – Contents of the Regulations     Baarman, L.
1


09-Jun-2011   /   Bridge 2011   /   Rauma 
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

 
 
 
 
 
 
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 






→ 
 
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
 
 

 
 



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
 

 
 ≥ 

≥ 
   
  
  
 
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 

 

 
 

 
 
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 
Flooding
or
Fire
Casualty
threshold
Essential 
systems
Orderly
evacuation
Essential
systems
Safe return
to port
Safe area
EXCEEDED
- extensive fire
NOT EXCEEDED
- restricted fire or
flooding
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 
 


 
 
 
 

 

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

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 
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 



 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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 
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 
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Operator’s Perspective            Todd, V. L.
SRTP	  
Operator’s	  Perspec0ve	  
Presentation by: Vincent L. Todd C/E/O Spirit of France (Owners Inspector, Machinery, New Build) 
So	  Why	  SRTP/PMSR*?	  
•  The	  Keels	  for	  both	  Spirit	  of	  Britain	  and	  Spirit	  of	  
France	  were	  both	  laid	  before	  1st	  July	  2010	  	  
SRTP   Safe Return to Port 
PSMR*   Propulsion and Steering Machinery Redundancy  
  (Separate Compartments)     
73
	  
	  
•  P&O	  Ferries	  is	  the	  United	  Kingdom’s	  leading	  ferry	  
operator.	  
•  We	  carry	  a	  huge	  range	  of	  passengers	  -­‐	  nearly	  ten	  
million	  a	  year	  -­‐	  from	  children	  on	  school	  trips,	  and	  
families	  going	  on	  holiday,	  to	  business	  travellers	  and	  
freight	  drivers.	  
•  Our	  Short	  Sea	  Route	  trades	  from	  the	  Port	  of	  Dover,	  
which	  is	  arguably	  the	  busiest	  passenger	  Port	  in	  the	  
World,	  and	  crosses	  the	  English	  Channel,	  the	  busiest	  
interna0onal	  seaway	  in	  the	  world.	  
w	  
•  P&O	  Ferries	  prides	  itself	  on	  its	  Safety	  Management	  Systems	  
and	  strives	  to	  be	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  passenger	  ship	  safety.	  
•  With	  all	  of	  this	  in	  mind	  P&O	  Ferries	  wanted	  to	  build	  the	  safest	  
possible	  passenger	  ferries	  and	  hence	  adopted	  SRTP	  rules	  
ahead	  of	  0me	  as	  well	  as	  voluntarily	  adop0ng	  Lloyds	  PSMR*	  
nota0on.	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Spirit	  of	  Britain	  /	  Pride	  of	  Calais	  (foreground)	  
SRTP	  and	  Design	  
•  The	  basic	  design	  concept	  behind	  SRTP	  is	  that	  there	  should	  be	  
minimal	  operator	  required	  ac0ons	  when	  a	  casualty	  scenario	  
occurs.	  
•  SRTP	  is	  part	  of	  the	  design	  of	  the	  vessel.	  
•  Operator	  ac0ons	  should	  only	  be	  required	  when	  they	  cannot	  
be	  designed	  out	  or	  construc0on	  costs	  are	  proved	  to	  be	  
prohibi0ve.	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Systems	  
Essen8al	  Systems	  
•  Systems	  that	  are	  required	  
to	  remain	  opera0onal	  aTer	  
a	  ﬁre	  or	  ﬂooding	  casualty	  
case	  as	  described	  earlier.	  
Cri8cal	  Systems	  
•  Essen0al	  systems	  having	  the	  
poten0al	  to	  fail	  to	  operate	  
as	  a	  consequence	  of	  a	  
casualty	  case.	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Systems	  
•  Each	  essen0al	  system	  was	  assessed	  during	  the	  design	  phase.	  
•  From	  the	  assessment	  of	  each	  essen0al	  system	  within	  a	  space,	  
or	  passing	  through	  a	  space,	  of	  ﬁre	  origin,	  a	  list	  of	  manual	  
ac0ons	  for	  that	  space	  has	  been	  formulated.	  
•  Some	  cri0cal	  systems	  are	  protected	  by	  design.	  
–  i.e.	  Fire	  main	  fully	  welded	  and	  lagged	  where	  it	  transits	  an	  
area	  of	  ﬁre	  origin	  that	  it	  does	  not	  serve.	  
•  Other	  cri0cal	  systems	  are	  protected	  by	  manual	  operator	  
interven0on.	  
•  Spirit	  of	  Britain	  and	  Spirit	  of	  France	  each	  have	  126	  casualty	  
scenarios	  that	  require	  manual	  operator	  ac0ons	  to	  protect	  
cri0cal	  systems.	  
Manual	  Operator	  Ac0ons	  
•  These	  manual	  ac0ons	  can	  be	  as	  simple	  as	  closing	  one	  valve	  for	  
scenario	  103.	  
–  i.e.	  For	  a	  ﬁre	  in	  wet	  weather	  gear	  locker	  10	  04	  02	  sprinkler	  
valve	  5274V907	  would	  need	  to	  be	  closed.	  
•  Or	  as	  complicated	  as	  the	  mul0ple	  ac0ons	  required	  for	  scenario	  
012.	  
–  i.e.	  For	  a	  ﬁre	  in	  the	  aT	  Main	  Engine	  Room	  there	  are	  42	  
separate	  ac0ons	  including	  opening	  and	  closing	  valves	  and	  
disconnec0ng	  shaT	  generator	  couplings.	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•  Of	  the	  126	  casualty	  scenarios	  for	  Spirit	  of	  Britain	  and	  Spirit	  of	  
France	  only	  11	  of	  these	  are	  considered	  as	  “big”,	  involving	  10	  
or	  more	  ac0ons.	  
•  That	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  any	  one	  scenario	  is	  more	  important	  
than	  another.	  
•  Scenarios	  involving	  only	  one	  ac0on	  are	  deemed	  as	  important	  
as	  those	  involving	  mul0ple	  ac0ons.	  
SRTP	  Ac0ons	  
•  At	  what	  stage	  does	  an	  incident	  in	  a	  space	  become	  a	  casualty	  
scenario?	  
•  This	  is	  at	  the	  discre0on	  of	  the	  Master.	  
•  If	  there	  was	  an	  incident	  in	  a	  space	  then	  all	  normal	  counter	  
measures	  would	  be	  used	  before	  declaring	  a	  SRTP	  situa0on.	  
–  Use	  of	  ﬁxed	  ﬁre	  ﬁgh0ng	  equipment.	  
–  Fire	  and	  damage	  control	  par0es.	  
–  Quick	  closing	  valves.	  
–  Ven0la0on	  control.	  
–  Etc.	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•  Once	  a	  decision	  has	  been	  made	  to	  isolate	  a	  space	  due	  to	  a	  
casualty	  scenario	  the	  operator	  needs	  to	  know	  which	  cri0cal	  
systems	  would	  be	  aﬀected	  and	  what	  manual	  ac0ons	  are	  
required	  for	  the	  vessel	  to	  safely	  return	  to	  port,	  or	  for	  an	  
orderly	  evacua0on	  to	  take	  place.	  
•  To	  do	  this	  one	  would	  normally	  refer	  to	  the	  paper	  based	  SRTP	  
documenta0on	  supplied	  by	  the	  ship	  building	  yard.	  
•  This	  consists	  of	  3	  large	  A4	  size	  binders	  containing	  mul0ple	  
assessment	  tables	  that	  need	  to	  be	  cross	  referenced	  to	  ﬁnd	  
out	  what	  systems	  are	  aﬀected	  and	  what	  ac0ons	  need	  to	  be	  
taken.	  
•  These	  assessment	  tables	  are	  not	  very	  “user	  friendly”	  and	  
without	  in0mate	  knowledge	  of	  how	  these	  documents	  were	  
constructed	  they	  would	  prove	  to	  be	  very	  diﬃcult	  to	  use	  in	  an	  
emergency.	  
Decision	  Support	  System	  for	  SRTP	  
•  To	  overcome	  the	  user	  interface	  problems	  with	  the	  SRTP	  
documenta0on,	  Delta	  Marin,	  in	  conjunc0on	  with	  STX,	  have	  
produced	  a	  computer	  based	  DSS	  program	  for	  SRTP.	  
•  This	  computer	  program	  gives	  	  a	  pictorial	  representa0on	  of	  the	  
informa0on	  contained	  within	  the	  assessment	  tables	  showing	  
what	  operator	  ac0ons	  are	  required	  in	  each	  casualty	  scenario.	  
•  The	  computers	  loaded	  with	  this	  soTware	  are	  situated	  on	  the	  
Bridge	  and	  in	  the	  Engine	  Control	  Room	  on	  Spirit	  of	  Britain.	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Valve	  labelling,	  iden8ﬁca8on	  and	  access	  
All	  SRTP	  valves	  must	  be	  correctly	  labelled	  	  as	  such	  and	  be	  iden0ﬁed	  with	  
a	  valve	  tag	  corresponding	  	  to	  the	  SRTP	  assessment	  and	  relevant	  
drawings.	  
Access	  to	  all	  SRTP	  valves	  	  must	  be	  reasonable	  and	  not	  obstructed.	  
Forward	  and	  AD	  Engine	  Rooms	  Colour	  Coded	  
On	  Spirit	  of	  Britain	  Engine	  Rooms	  have	  been	  colour	  coded	  to	  aid	  
iden0ﬁca0on	  on	  CCTV	  monitors	  so	  that	  correct	  	  quick	  closing	  valves,	  
emergency	  stops	  	  and	  water	  mist	  systems	  can	  be	  operated	  quickly	  in	  an	  
emergency.	  
Water Mist Panel in ECR Emergency Stop Panel in ECR 
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Integratated	  Automa8on	  System	  Screens	  
These	  have	  been	  colour	  coded	  to	  match	  to	  try	  and	  minimise	  the	  risk	  of	  
shujng	  down	  wrong	  equipment.	  
Watch	  keeping	  in	  SRTP	  Situa0on	  
•  It	  must	  be	  noted	  that	  in	  certain	  SRTP	  casualty	  scenarios	  watch	  
keeping	  prac0ces	  must	  be	  observed	  with	  regards	  to	  speciﬁc	  
equipment.	  
•  The	  speciﬁc	  watch	  keeping	  opera0ons	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  
SRTP	  documenta0on.	  
•  Hopefully	  a	  future	  development	  will	  be	  to	  include	  these	  
prac0ces	  within	  the	  computer	  based	  DSS	  tool.	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Tes0ng	  of	  SRTP	  Equipment	  
•  The	  tes0ng	  of	  SRTP	  equipment	  should	  be	  incorporated	  into	  
the	  planned	  maintenance	  system	  of	  the	  vessel.	  
•  Tes0ng	  of	  equipment	  will	  range	  from	  checking	  local	  and	  
redundant	  steering	  posi0on	  opera0on	  of	  steering	  gear,	  to	  
checking	  redundant	  naviga0onal	  lights	  to	  tes0ng	  of	  isola0on	  
valves	  etc.	  
•  Again	  items	  that	  need	  checking/tes0ng	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  
paper	  version	  of	  the	  SRTP	  documenta0on.	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How	  good	  is	  SRTP?	  
•  SRTP	  for	  a	  vessel	  is	  only	  as	  good	  as	  the	  original	  assessments	  
undertaken	  and	  design	  of	  equipment.	  
–  On	  Spirit	  of	  Britain	  it	  was	  found	  on	  sea	  trials	  that	  the	  
emergency	  MDO	  fuel	  system	  for	  AT	  Main	  Engines	  ran	  at	  
too	  high	  a	  pressure.	  
–  When	  in	  service	  it	  was	  found	  that	  if	  bearing	  lubrica0ng	  oil	  
pumps	  for	  shaT	  alternators	  in	  AT	  Main	  Engine	  Room	  
(driven	  by	  the	  engines	  in	  Forward	  MER)	  were	  
disconnected	  then	  the	  Forward	  Main	  Engines	  could	  not	  be	  
started.	  
–  Both	  of	  these	  problems	  have	  now	  been	  rec0ﬁed	  but	  
assessment	  tables	  and	  DSS	  program	  have	  had	  to	  be	  
updated.	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•  Ships	  crew	  have	  to	  be	  fully	  conversant	  with	  both	  SRTP	  
principles	  and	  prac0ces.	  
•  Casualty	  scenario	  drills	  have	  to	  be	  undertaken	  at	  regular	  
intervals	  (126	  scenarios	  on	  Spirit	  of	  Britain).	  
•  Ships	  crew	  have	  to	  be	  fully	  aware	  of	  the	  consequences	  of	  
modiﬁca0on	  to	  any	  essen0al	  systems	  as	  it	  could	  aﬀect	  the	  
original	  SRTP	  assessment.	  
•  Ships	  crew	  have	  to	  be	  aware	  that	  when	  maintaining	  
equipment	  it	  could	  aﬀect	  the	  SRTP	  status	  of	  the	  vessel.	  
•  Ships	  crew	  also	  have	  to	  be	  aware	  that	  if	  certain	  equipment	  	  
should	  fail	  then	  the	  vessels	  SRTP	  status	  could	  be	  
compromised.	  
–  On	  Spirit	  of	  Britain	  if	  the	  forward	  bilge	  pump	  were	  to	  fail,	  then	  bilges	  forward	  of	  the	  
Forward	  MER	  may	  	  not	  be	  able	  to	  be	  pumped	  if	  there	  was	  a	  casualty	  scenario	  in	  the	  
forward	  MER.	  
•  At	  present	  P&O	  Ferries	  are	  working,	  in	  conjunc0on	  with	  STX,	  
on	  an	  essen0al	  equipment	  out	  of	  service	  matrix	  with	  regards	  
to	  its’	  aﬀect	  on	  the	  SRTP	  status	  of	  the	  vessel.	  
•  This	  will	  help	  us	  to	  quickly	  iden0fy	  to	  the	  authori0es	  any	  
failure	  of	  equipment	  that	  could	  aﬀect	  the	  Vessels	  SRTP	  status	  
•  It	  will	  also	  help	  us	  to	  iden0fy	  what	  cri0cal	  spares	  the	  vessel	  
needs	  to	  carry.	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II Human factors
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Enhancing Bridge Simulation Training Programmes          Bosma, T. 
with the Application of Maritime Aids for Emergency Responses
Enhancing bridge simulation training programmes 
with the application of maritime aids for emergency 
responses 
Part II: implementation of accidents 
scenario and observing the results 
Initial situation. 
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Initial Settings of the simulator. 
Own Ship 
Type 
Dimensions (m)   
"Willem Barentsz" PIPZ 
General Cargo vessel 
(129.0 * 20.5 * 8.7) 
Area 
Destination  
Dover Strait 
Antwerp 
Chart(s)  BA 323, BA 2449 
Course / Speed  112° / 12 kn (Full Seaspeed) 
Wind  NW 3 Bft. 
Visibility  > 10 M 
i.c.  0.0° 
Tidal Stream  To be determined 
Starting Position 
Date / Time  
51°24’.4 N, 001°50’.1 
29/10/2008 at 03.15 UTC 
Student characteristics 
•  Mainly students from nautical institutes in the 
Netherlands. 
•  Students have already followed 2 years of education. 
•  Students most probably start their time at sea in the next 
few months. 
•  Students have followed a short course on radar 
observation and navigation. 
•  Students should have knowledge of the collision rules. 
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Preparing stage for the simulation process 
•  Exercise has a duration of 2,5 hours and consist of: 
–  Briefing 
–  Simulation 
–  Debriefing (evaluation) 
Briefing simulation ( preparation by students). 
92
Bridge simulation 
Instructor interaction during simulator exercise 
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Debriefing of exercise 
Evaluation of exercise 
•  Students own opinion about their performance 
•  Exercise results 
•  Discussion about performance of team. 
•  Performance of students on the bridge, (
exercise video) 
•  Showing additional video of QPS, with AIS data 
of the real accident 
•  Discussion with students about real scenario 
when ships collided. 
•  Maritime Resource Management 
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Assessment of students 
•  Group of students consist of 4 persons 
•  Tasks are divided in: 
–  Head of Watch 
–  Watch officer 
–  Assistant watch officer 
–  Helmsman 
 
Assessment system 
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Results of exercise 
•  When do students notice the target for the first time? 
•  When do students first recognize the risk of collision? 
•  When do students start avoiding the target? 
•  Which actions are taken to avoid the target? 
•  What will be the CPA? 
•  Finally, when do students return to the original course? 
First detection of target. 
0-­‐5	  minutes,	  
4% 5-­‐10	  minutes,	  
42%
10-­‐15	  minutes,	  
8%
15-­‐20	  minutes,	  
29%
20-­‐25	  minutes,	  
17%
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First recognition of target. 
5-­‐10	  minutes,	  
4%
10-­‐15	  minutes,	  
13%
15-­‐20	  minutes,	  
33%
20-­‐25	  minutes,	  
37%
25-­‐30	  minutes,	  
13%
Timing the action taken so as to avoid the target. 
15-­‐20	  
minutes,	  
13%
20-­‐25	  
minutes,	  
33%
25-­‐30	  
minutes,	  
25%
30-­‐35	  
minutes,	  
29%
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Action to avoid the target. 
Deviate	  to	  
starboard,	  
75%
Reduce	  
speed,	  17%
Deviate	  to	  
port,	  8%
Closest Point of Approach (CPA). 
0-­‐0.5	  mile,	  
2%
0.5-­‐1.0	  mile,	  
62%
1.0-­‐1.5	  mile,	  
21%
1.5-­‐2.0	  
mile,	  13%
2.0-­‐2.5	  mile,	  
2%
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Conclusions of simulation scenario. 
•  Students had been well aware of the risk of collision with 
the target. 
•  Results are influenced by students knowledge of radar 
plotting and trial manoeuvres. 
•  The majority of students started to deviate to SB to avoid 
the target. 
•  Average CPA was between 0.5 – 1.0 mile 
Movie AIS information from QPS. 
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Discussion with students experiences 
•  Plotting of ship positions on radar and chart. 
•  Advantages of AIS information 
•  Possibility of fatigue. 
•  Information from lookout about other shipping. 
•  Need of Maritime Resource Management. 
Questions? 
If not, thank you for listening 
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Co-operation on the Bridge – Application Handbook        Erkama, P.
Co-operation on the bridge
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Ensuring Safety
Safety is a critical issue for maritime industry, and there are signifi-
cant safety, environmental and economical risks for vessel traffic. 
The main task of bridge personnel is to control these risks while 
operating the ship. This is a challenging task, and indeed, most 
maritime accidents result from the errors of bridge personnel 
(IMO, 1999).
It is impossible to completely eliminate the risk of accident, but 
the likelihood of accident can be reduced by decreasing the risk 
level of operations. It is difficult to estimate the risk level for nor-
mal operations, as the operational weaknesses are not obvious and 
only become apparent in such situations and circumstances that 
may lead to accidents. Routine operations may seem safe until a 
situation emerges where routines do not provide protection from 
risks. A central part of risk management is to spot the weaknesses 
in normal operations and to choose compensatory routines. Usu-
ally, everyday risk management refers to verification routines 
which are used to confirm that everything functions normally. 
Indeed, risk management practices may sometimes feel like frus-
trating repetitions or tasks that are obvious or already checked. 
However, the value of these practices is measured in situations 
where deviant observations are made or corrective measures car-
ried out. The safety level of operations cannot be measured by 
how much the personnel think about safety. Safety is measured by 
risk management practices and the priorities that guide decision 
making. From the worker’s point of view, safety means  
safe routines.
An accident is always a sum of many events, and it is easier to 
perceive the chain of events retrospectively. There are many under-
lying events where the personnel could have affected the chain of 
events, but the factors affecting the accident and their significance 
were not understood. Hence, the bridge operations were not 
adjusted to meet the demands of the situation, even though there 
was a chance to do so. In other words, the accident could often 
have been avoided, had the working practices better supported the 
making of observations and the forming of better situation aware-
ness.
In addition to external risk factors, there are often errors under-
lying the accidents made by bridge personnel as well. It is natural 
to make errors, and it is impossible to completely remove them 
from human activities. Circumstances also have an effect on the 
making of errors. The more demanding the task and the working 
conditions, the more errors are made, the harder it is to identify 
them, and the more serious their consequences will be. Being a 
professional in risk management does not mean that you are capa-
ble of performing your task without errors, but rather that you are 
able to identify situations where errors are made and choose work-
ing practices that can affect the identification of errors and their 
consequences.
Seafarers have always been successful in managing risks, and 
safe working methods and the identification of the issues relevant 
for safety are not novel inventions. The ability to identify risks, to 
distinguish between relevant and irrelevant observations and the 
ability to modify one’s routines according to the situation at hand 
are the hallmarks of experiential knowledge. Risk management 
skills that have been accumulated with experience are often 
instinctive, and top professionals often find it hard to explain the 
reasons underlying their methods of operation in detail. This com-
plicates teamwork and the formation of shared situation awareness 
on the bridge. Moreover, the transfer of knowledge and good prac-
tices to the inexperienced employees will be slower. The definition 
of risk management skills will offer extra value to the development 
of the overall safety of the operations, and it will also provide tools 
for communication-based teamwork and thus for efficient resource 
management as well. Moreover, it makes it easier to transfer expe-
riential knowledge and knowhow, and to learn from even smal 
operational deviations.
Safe co-operation on the bridge is intended as a handbook for 
bridge personnel. The purpose of the handbook is to help the 
bridge personnel to apply work regulations to their own work in 
order to ensure safety.
 
 
Background and Aims of the 
Application Handbook
Maritime legislation places requirements on the development of 
the working methods on the bridge as well as the training of per-
sonnel. These requirements are intended to prevent accidents that 
are caused by human errors. The instructions and requirements 
can be found from several sources. This application handbook is a 
compilation of practices, instructions and regulations related to 
risk and human error management. It also introduces ways to 
apply the methods required by law. The general risk and error 
management principles covered in the handbook can be applied in 
different operational environments, although the actual working 
method will always depend on the properties of  the actual work-
ing environment.
The requirements for the practices discussed in the application 
handbook are introduced in the following international regula-
tions, for example:
The STCW Code (International Convention on Standards of 
Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers). In part A of 
the code that introduces the mandatory training requirements, there 
Introduction
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is a requirement of having a secure lookout to maintain efficient 
operations of the bridge. Part B of the code contains recommenda-
tions and specifications for the requirements, including, for exam-
ple, instructions for shipping companies regarding lookouts. The 
shipping companies are recommended to provide instructions of 
the appropriate operational practices on the bridge and to promote 
the use of checklists. Additional instructions are also provided, and 
these include topics such as the sufficient manning of the bridge, 
division of labour and clear communication.
SOLAS ISM Code requires the shipping companies to compile a 
safety leadership protocol for the vessels. The aim of the protocol 
is to make the shipping company define safe working methods 
and security protocols for all identified risks and also to continu-
ally improve the personnel’s safety leadership skills. (1.2 Objec-
tives).
Instructions related to the topic can also be found in several 
other sources. This application handbook refers to the following 
ones:
IMO’s circular that provides instructions for the integrated use 
of the bridge (MSC/Circ. 1061) recommends, for example, that 
shipping companies register the practice of the integrated use of 
bridge automation to the vessel operating manuals (VOM). The 
circular also discloses several important concepts, including bridge 
procedures and standard operating procedures. 
IMO’s guidelines for voyage planning (Res. A.893(21)), which 
define requirements concerning the contents and execution of a 
voyage plan. An annex to the guideline (Annex 24) emphasises the 
role of risk management as part of the planning and execution of 
the voyage.
IMO’s model course for ship simulator and bridge teamwork 
(1.22) describes co-operation practices concerning the briefing of 
the personnel, workload management and decision making.
In 2003, IMO compiled the so-called Human Element Vision 
principles and goals whose aim is to take into account the effect of 
human factors in the areas related to maritime safety as compre-
hensively as possible. In the principles of the programme it is 
mentioned that all material related to the topic should aim at 
reducing the human errors as quickly as possible (Principles, h).
The main goal of the application handbook is to improve mari-
time safety by reducing operative risks and the number of acci-
dents and hazardous situations caused by human errors. The guide 
aims at increasing awareness on the practices applied to risk and 
error management and providing instructions for their application 
in different situations. The handbook is intended to be used by 
maritime professionals, from the operative personnel to manage-
ment, and by those in charge of the development of safety man-
agement schemes.
 
Composition of the  
Application Handbook
The application handbook is divided into three parts: risk manage-
ment, human error management, and bridge resource manage-
ment.
Risk Management. This section covers risk factors typical of mar-
itime navigation and sea transport as well as risk management pro-
cedures and principles. The application handbook concentrates 
especially on voyage planning and the practices associated with 
the sharing of the plan.
Error Management. This section focuses on the different types of 
human errors related to work on a bridge as well as error manage-
ment procedures and principles. The application handbook covers 
the following procedures related to error management: monitor-
ing, task sharing, checklists, communication practices, practices 
for abnormal situations, and co-operation and resource manage-
ment.
Bridge resource management. All procedures for risk and 
human error management are based on the efficient use of 
resources available for the bridge personnel. Bridge resource man-
agement also includes principles that cannot be defined as work-
ing practices. Bridge resource management and the related princi-
ples are discussed in the fourth part of the handbook.
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Risk Management on the Bridge
Introduction
From the bridge personnel’s perspective, the safety risks of opera-
tional work can be divided into two parts: external and internal 
risk factors. The internal risk factors refer to errors made by the 
bridge personnel. Consequently, the personnel’s activities can also 
be divided into two parts: risk management and error management 
(Figure 1).
External risk factors refer to situations and circumstances in 
maritime navigation and sea transport that are beyond the person-
nel’s influence. These factors can either be very familiar and fre-
quently occurring, or surprising and not experienced before. 
External risk factors include all circumstances and situations that 
in some way elevate the risk level of operations. External risk fac-
tors are a natural part of operations.
Risk management procedures refer to the bridge personnel’s 
decisions and actions that are used to eliminate or minimise the 
effects of the external risk factor on operations. A prerequisite for 
the management of external risk factors is to identify them and 
understand their significance.
Internal risk factors refer to the errors made by the personnel. 
Making errors is part of human activities and cannot be completely 
eliminated. However, it is possible to affect the number of errors 
as well as their detectability and consequentiality by operational 
methods that are called error management procedures. A prerequi-
site for efficient error management is to identify the situations and 
actions where errors are made and where the consequences of the 
errors are significant.
External and internal risk factors are interrelated. The more exter-
nal risk factors there are in a task, the more significant the manage-
ment of internal risks becomes. In other words, the more demanding 
the circumstances and the task, the more probable it is to make 
errors, and the more difficult and slower it is to detect them. Moreo-
ver, in more demanding circumstances the consequences of errors 
are often more severe, and they are also realised more quickly after 
the error has occurred. Good risk management could be described 
by quoting an old adage: “Good bridge personnel will avoid the situ-
ations that can only be handled by skilled bridge personnel”. 
Figure 1. Risk Management on the Bridge
(Adapted from Helmreich, R.L. et al. 1999).
External Risk Factors in Maritime  
Navigation and Sea Transport
External risk factors in maritime navigation and sea transport 
include all the stages, conditions and situations of the voyage 
where the risk level has increased (this application handbook does 
not consider the risk factors included in cargo operations or the 
transfer of cargo). Examples of the different stages of the sea voy-
age include ports, archipelagos and other narrow and tight pas-
sages as well as congested routes. In these areas, the margin for 
detecting and managing errors is small. Conditions, on the other 
hand, include deteriorated weather conditions, darkness, ice con-
ditions and other conditions where it is more difficult to steer the 
vessel, such as streaming water and other conditions that create 
suction (squat, bank effect etc.). Risk-increasing situations include 
locks, towing, support situations in icy conditions and abnormal 
and emergency situations on the vessel.
A study conducted in Finland in 2007 investigated the effect of 
risk factors on the accidents that happened in Finland’s territorial 
waters in 1995–2005 (Merenkulkulaitos, 2007). The report found 
that the accidents or hazardous situations where at least one of the 
underlying factors was a human error made by bridge personnel 
had usually occurred in the increased-risk conditions mentioned 
above. Of the 52 accidents and hazardous situations selected as 
Risk Management Practices
Error Management Practices
External Risk Factors
Internal Risk Factors
(Errors by the personnel)
 
Accident
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examples in the report, 94% (49) took place in the archipelago or 
port area, 38.5% (20) in poor visibility and approximately 60% 
(31) in dim or dark conditions. Wind was a factor in the accident 
or the hazardous situation in 35% of the cases. Cases that occurred 
during dim or dark conditions and/or poor  visibility comprised 
81% (42) of the cases. 65% of all cases included two or more risk 
factors (e.g. ice conditions, other traffic, busy radio communica-
tions etc.). The report also found that 60% of the chosen accidents 
and hazardous  situations took place during the autumn/winter 
season, i.e. between October and March.
As underlying causes of human errors, risk factors have an 
effect on the safety of operations both directly and indirectly. The 
starting point of safe operations is to identify the risks in the work-
ing environment and to modify the operations to meet the chal-
lenges in the environment. These risk management principles are 
discussed in the next section.
 
Risk Management Practices
The starting point of risk management is the identification and rec-
ognition of risks. However, even this is not enough in a complex 
and changing operational environment, as the status and the signifi-
cance that the identified issues have on safety must be followed and 
assessed regularly. More generally, one can talk about forming a 
view of the situation and actively updating it. The more demanding 
the conditions are and the more risk factors are identified, the more 
actively the view of the situation needs to be updated through one’s 
own actions.
However, it is not enough just to form a general view of the sit-
uation, i.e. just to be aware of the present risks. The identification 
of risk factors should always be followed by the question: “How 
should I act in order to minimise the effects of this risk factor?” In 
principle, each observation should lead into conscious deliberation 
concerning the way operations are organised. It is, of course, 
acceptable that in some cases the result of the deliberation may be 
that there is no need to modify the current operations. In such 
cases the situation  will be monitored more carefully, if necessary, 
and the operations modified at a later time (Figure 2).
Risk management on the bridge is based on co-operation. It is 
important that the bridge personnel shares the same view of the 
situation, i.e. has shared situation awareness,  and understands the 
current risks. The observations and the actions related to them will 
be discussed among the crew so that everyone will understand the 
risks and participate in their management. 
Figure 2. Principle of Risk Management
Once the external risk factor is recognised, there are basically two 
ways to manage it: its effects can be completely eliminated or they 
can be reduced. In some cases, such as severe wind conditions in 
port, the risk factor can be removed simply by delaying entrance 
to port until the conditions have improved. Similarly, the risks 
associated with poor visibility or heavy traffic can in some routes 
be eliminated by choosing another route, if possible.
However, it is often not feasible to remove the external risk fac-
tors, which means that the personnel must adapt to the situation. 
In these cases, the central task in risk management is to define the 
effects that the risk factor has on operational safety and to modify 
the personnel’s routines in order to minimise these effects. Exter-
nal risk factors often increase the risk level of operations because 
the operations become more susceptible to errors made by the per-
sonnel. This is why error management practices based on condi-
tions are included as part of risk management.
Principle of Anticipatory Risk Management
Several external risks that have an effect on the operations are 
already known before the voyage. It is therefore possible to con-
sider these risk factors beforehand and to decide which of them 
require special actions in terms of risk management. These actions 
can then be documented in a checklist, for example, as recom-
mended in the IMO guidelines. The purpose of the checklist is not 
to describe the actions related to risk management as such, but 
rather to help the bridge personnel to be sure that every necessary 
operational modification has been considered when the risk level 
changes.
Observation Action?
Follow-up
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EXAMPLE ACCIDENT 1.
A vessel was grounded after passing the turning point, as the 
officer of the watch made a mistake on the sector lights. The vessel 
had travelled through the archipelago after midnight. It was dark, 
but the visibility was good. The officer of the watch had been work-
ing on the vessel only for two weeks and had not travelled the 
route before. The ship’s electronic nautical chart had broken down 
a little earlier after the vessel had left port. Based on these issues, 
the captain had decided that the conditions were demanding for 
the officer of the watch, and had remained on the bridge as a look-
out. When the captain considered the situation to be peaceful, he 
went to rest on the bridge’s couch.
Risk factors
˜ The officer of the watch was  inexperienced on the vessel
˜ The chief watchman was not familiar  with the route 
˜ The vessel was operated in the archipelago˜ Night-time˜ The captain was tired˜ A technical fault made navigation  more difficult
˜ External distraction (radio traffic)
Errors
˜ Missing the turning point˜ Incorrect interpretation of the lights
Several external risk factors made operations demanding. The 
risk for a navigational error had increased, and the detectability 
of an error had become more difficult. When the officer of the 
watch was momentarily distracted by radio traffic, he missed one 
of the turning points. This error was detected too late, as the cir-
cumstances made its detection difficult. 
External risk factors were partially taken into account when 
The officer of the watch paid attention to the VHF traffic 
just before the next turn. As he started to prepare for the next 
turn, he thought that he could not match the lights he saw, 
and therefore informed the captain that the situation seemed 
to be a little unclear to him. The officer of the watch had mis-
taken a beacon light for a buoy light after missing the turning 
point. When the captain arose from the couch, the situation 
had already escalated to a point where grounding was immi-
nent.
It is possible to recognise several risk factors as well as two 
human errors contributing to the accident:
 
the captain decided to stay on the bridge. However, the task 
sharing was not agreed upon, and the captain did not take part 
in steering the ship, nor did he monitor theofficer of the watch. 
While the captain was on the bridge, he was not utilised as a 
resource. A clear task sharing and the utilisation of the captain in 
cross checking navigation would have helped in detecting the 
navigation error and to prevent grounding.
Risk management practices
Error management practices
External risk factors
Internal risk factors
(Errors made by the crew)
Accident
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Voyage and Route Plans
Planning forms a central part of risk management. The purpose of 
planning is to ensure that all future actions are coordinated and 
that every relevant factor affecting operations is taken into account 
and recognised by the personnel. In the planning phase, the pro-
spective situation is discussed along with the necessary proce-
dures, risks associated with the situation and their control as well 
as the co-operation between the personnel during the situation.
PRACTICAL EXAMPLE 1.
Dividing the stages of the voyage in different areas 
according to risk level
The risks related to the voyage that are known beforehand 
can be taken into account by dividing the different stages of 
the voyage into risk classes: high risk, increased risk and low 
risk. Each class can be defined according to the following 
topics, for example:
˜ Manning of the bridge˜ Task sharing˜ Working practices˜ Use of automation and other equipment˜ Manning of the engine room ˜ Operations of the main engine and auxiliary engines
In addition to these, further constraints can be put in place 
for different risk levels. For example, it can be decided that 
outsiders are not allowed on the bridge in high risk zones, or 
that it is only allowed to talk about issues related to the 
steering and navigation of the vessel. These zones can be 
marked into the route plan beforehand. When moving from 
one zone to the next, the procedures can be ensured by 
using a checklist and standardised communications.
The same operating principle can also be used in situa-
tions where, for example, weather or other operating condi-
tions result in the change from one risk level to another.
Traditional tools for this purpose include voyage and route plans. 
Standardised planning can also be applied  to exit and entrance sit-
uations, piloting and other special situations.
“The need for voyage and passage planning applies to all vessels. 
There are several factors that may impede the safe navigation of all 
vessels and additional factors that may impede the navigation of 
large vessels or vessels carrying hazardous cargoes. These factors 
will need to be taken into account in the preparation of the plan 
and in the subsequent monitoring of the execution of the plan.” 
(IMO Res. A.893(21) Guidelines for voyage planning, 1.2)
From the point of view of risk management, the most 
important tasks in planning include:
˜ Identification of the external and internal risks  affecting operations
˜ Definition of those stages of the voyage that  are affected by the identified risk factors
˜ The possible effects of the risk factors  on the personnel’s performance
˜ A risk management plan  (manning, use of equipment etc.)
˜ Procedures and practices related to the monitoring  and verification of operations
If the plan is not made jointly, it is important that it will be 
discussed with all those who are taking part in the operations 
included in the plan. The aim of planning is to ensure that the 
whole personnel have shared situation awareness and to allow 
different perspectives to be expressed and considered during the 
drafting phase of the plan. In addition to choosing the passage and 
other issues related to the voyage, it is important to justify the 
decisions and the risks associated with them during planning and 
ensure that everyone is aware of them. 
108
10   C O - O P E R A T I O N  O N  T H E  B R I D G E
Briefing of the Plan
Master shall lead a pre-departure briefing which includes:
˜ Presentation of the route plan˜ Interaction with the bridge team˜ Setting of stipulated requirements˜ Identification of possible weak links on the route˜ Establishing standards and guidelines to be met   during the passage
˜ Setting the environment for an effective team  oriented operation
˜ Brief the pilot on the ship’s characteristics and  equipment using the pilot card
˜ Ask the pilot to present his route plan and give  information on local conditions
˜ Demonstrate responsibility to brief and coordinate  operational factors with the bridge team
(IMO, Model Course, 1.22, 7 Briefing and debriefing)
Whether there is a documented voyage plan or only an idea about 
the activities in a prospective situation, it is at least as essential to 
brief the plan to everyone involved in the activities as it is to make 
the plan itself. Briefing of the plan will provide the personnel with 
an opportunity to comment on the safety of the plan and to raise 
issues that the person drawing up the plan may have missed. Brief-
ing the plan in a standardised form, i.e. introducing all aspects 
always in the same order, will facilitate the monitoring of the plan 
in the agreed manner and also ensure that all relevant issues have 
been taken into account.
Planning and anticipation do not always need to – and indeed, 
often cannot – be based on a written plan of future activities. There 
are many situations, such as planning for a meeting with another 
vessel, that are based on a short briefing among the crew. The ques-
tion is about the identification of the risks and a plan for their man-
agement in these cases as well.
From the co-operative point of view, the briefing should determine:
˜ The activities and intentions related to the plan˜ The planned order and timing of the activities˜ Task sharing for the planned activities˜ Responsibilities related to the monitoring  of the operations
˜ Critical phases and deviations that  require a change in the plan
˜ Alternative plans and reasons for their deployment
EXAMPLE ACCIDENT 2.
A vessel was grounded during a turn. The master and the 
pilot were on the bridge. There was a thick fog, and the pilot 
made a mistake on the starting point of the turn. The master 
could not help the pilot because he had made a voyage plan 
for a different route from the one the pilot eventually took. 
The route taken by the pilot was not familiar to the master.
Before leaving port, the master had introduced his plan to 
the pilot. At this point, the pilot had not mentioned that he 
planned to use another route because of the ice conditions. 
The master found this out only when the vessel diverted into 
the detour the pilot had planned.
The co-operation between the master and the pilot was 
insufficient especially in relation to the briefing of the plans. 
A briefing before the piloting voyage would have provided 
the master with a better opportunity to help the pilot in navi-
gating the vessel and to monitor the pilot’s actions. Better 
co-operation and a clearer task sharing on the bridge would 
also have facilitated safe operations in demanding condi-
tions.
Master shall during the voyage, brief the team 
on any significant situations encountered 
(IMO, Model Course, 1.22, 7 Briefing and debriefing) 
Summary
Active risk management creates the prerequisites for safe opera-
tions. The most important issue is to try to identify the operative 
risks beforehand and to form a clear plan that will help to mini-
mise the consequences of the risks. The majority of external risks 
can be identified well in advance, and they can be taken into con-
sideration as part of normal operative planning. The traditional 
planning practices, such as formulating a voyage plan, can be com-
plemented with the identification and management of those risk 
factors that can be anticipated efficiently.
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Human Errors and Their Management
Introduction
“To err is human.”
Errors are a natural part of human activities. The strength  of 
human activities lies in their flexibility and adaptability to chang-
ing conditions, but the price of this is the chance of failure. This 
section aims at answering the question: what kinds of human 
errors are there and how can we manage them?
Humans will always make errors, but it is possible by one’s 
own actions to try to ensure that they will not endanger the safety 
of others. These actions are called error management procedures. 
Thus, successful error management does not refer to error-free 
operations, but rather to the fact that errors are recognised on time 
and their impact on safety is minimised. Understanding this is a 
prerequisite for the personnel to be motivated to develop and 
apply error management practices in their work.
Figure 3. The Basic Error Types (Adapted from Reason, J. 1990).
Human Errors on the Bridge
Errors can occur in diverse ways, and they can also be classified 
accordingly. Understanding different kinds of errors will provide a 
basis for perceiving weaknesses in human activities. This is impor-
tant as different factors are relevant for the emergence of different 
kinds of errors. Moreover, errors are of a different kind in different 
tasks, and consequently, different kinds of errors can be managed 
in various ways.
Errors may seem similar at a first glance even if they have 
occurred for different reasons. An erroneous choice of speed may, 
for example:
˜ be intentional, yet erroneous, if the choice is based on  an incorrect assessment of the situation (mistake)
˜ be a result of a slip during the speed selection task,  which means that the choice was not deliberate (slip) 
˜ be a result of a deliberate choice to proceed at a speed that   breaches regulations, which may mean that the decision is  
 based on a general practice, or that it is a circumstantial decision  
 not to comply with the regulations (violation)
All three errors mentioned above will lead into different actions to 
prevent or manage errors in the future. Therefore, it is essential for 
the development procedures to understand the types and back-
ground of the different errors.
The starting point for the definition of the error type is always 
to find out whether the chosen action was intentional or not. Next, 
the error can be classified further into one of the four categories 
depicted in Figure 3.
E.g. 
˜ Speeding to be back  on schedule
˜ Interrupting watch  duty momentarily
E.g. 
˜ Erroneous course  selection
˜ Steering the vessel in  the wrong direction
˜ Pressing the wrong  switch
E.g. 
˜ Forgetting the technical  inspection of a device
˜ Forgetting the stability  check of the cargo
˜ Forgetting the  system selection
E.g. 
˜ Erroneous route choice˜ Erroneous choice of  the passing direction 
 in a yield situation
˜ Using the wrong  steering mode
Actions
Unintentional Intentional
Slips Memory errors Mistakes Violations
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Different error types require different procedures to avoid and 
identify the errors. An erroneous choice of direction in a planned 
route resulting from a slip can be identified and corrected by good 
monitoring. If the choice of direction was a result of a misunder-
standing, the proper error control method can be found in the 
development of planning practices. The next chapters focus on 
each of the error types, the factors related to them and their man-
agement.
Slips and Memory errors
Slips and memory errors occur in normal and routine activities.  
A slip refers to an error where a person tries to accomplish a result 
through their activities, but they fail in their performance. Slips 
occur even in activities that have been learned well. Advanced 
skills will lead into fluent, fast and effortless activities, but they 
will also result in decreased awareness of the activities and the 
concentration required for them. This, in turn, will make the skills 
vulnerable of slips.
Slips are probably the most common type of error on the 
bridge. Typical slips include, for example, incorrect expression or 
execution of helm orders (or setting the autopilot). Perception 
errors form another common group – other vessels or other 
objects, such as sea marks are not detected early enough for one 
reason or another.
A memory error is a dysfunction of performance that results in 
omitting a task, one part of the task or a single issue. Memory 
errors occur both in well-mastered routine tasks and new tasks. 
Sometimes they may have fatal consequences for safety. For exam-
ple, an omission has caused an accident in a situation where the 
personnel forgot to transfer the controls of the vessel from one 
wing to another (or to midship) and also in another situation 
where steering was not transferred from autopilot to manual steer-
ing.
There may be several factors affecting a person’s performance 
that underlie slips and memory errors, such as too low (monoto-
nous) or high (busy) workload, stress or fatigue; all of which are 
recognised problems for work on bridge. In addition to the factors 
mentioned above, the probability of routine errors is affected by 
the difficulty of the work, ergonomics of the work environment 
and external distractions, among others.
Slips and memory errors cannot be completely avoided, which 
means that their possibility must be taken into account when 
assessing the safety of operations. Consequently, the procedures 
that are critical for safety should be assured with verification pro-
cedures that will help to detect a slip or a memory error quickly 
enough. These procedures typically include:
˜ X-checking˜ Call-outs˜ Checklists
Mistakes
A mistake refers to a situation where a person successfully performs 
a task, but the outcome of the task is different from the person’s 
expectations. Underlying the mistake, there is often a misconcep-
tion of the situation at hand, which can be based on insufficient 
information or a false interpretation. Mistakes may also occur 
because the consequences of the chosen action are assessed incor-
rectly or all affecting factors are not taken into account.
On the bridge, mistakes may occur, for example, when setting 
the radar scale or interpreting the lights on safety devices. In the 
example accident discussed under Risk Management Procedures 
(Example accident 1, p.6), the immediate cause of the accident was 
a mistake concerning the lights marking the fairway.
As mistakes are usually related to an incorrect assessment of the 
situation or erroneous decision making, they should primarily be 
avoided by using all available information in ensuring good situation 
awareness and decision making. This requires effective communica-
tion and co-operation among the crew. The follow up of decisions 
and actions that have been made is also a fundamental part of mis-
take management. In practice, avoiding mistakes is primarily based 
on good planning and the briefing of the personnel as well as active 
checking of activities and assertive intervention if a plan or a deci-
sion is not deemed to be safe or their outcomes are not as expected.
Violations
This error type refers to the intentional noncompliance with orders 
or regulations. What is essential when it comes to violations is that 
the actions are undertaken knowingly and purposefully. There may 
be different motives and reasons underlying a violation that can be 
related either to the individual or to the organisation. The person 
committing the violation may think, for example, that the regulation 
that is broken is not relevant for the particular situation, or they 
may commit the violation because it is necessary for the task at 
hand. The person committing the violation may also think that it 
provides them with a possibility to perform the task better and 
faster, or that the organisation expects that violations are committed 
in order to secure smooth operations. Although violations should 
not be accepted at the organisational level, it is however important 
to understand why violations do occur in certain situations in order 
to prevent them.
The number and properties of violations serve as an indicator of 
the prevailing working culture. Certain orders may be ignored rou-
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tinely, and in such cases the question is not about a deviation 
caused by an individual person or situation, but rather a structural 
problem in the operational system. The safety issues caused by vio-
lations usually include the fact that the significance of the ignored 
order is not understood or the consequences of noncompliance are 
not considered. Effective co-operation and open communication 
have a central role in managing violations. It is more likely that 
through co-operation and communication others that have noticed 
the situation will intervene in the violations and raise questions 
about the reasons behind the deviant activity.
Error Management Practices
”Master shall establish specific preventive measures to guard 
against external and internal errors.” (IMO, Model course 1.22)
Human errors can never be avoided in operations, but they can be 
managed so that there will be no hazardous situations or acci-
dents.
The first phase of human error management is to reduce their 
number. Here, the relevant issue is to predict the risks that affect 
operations. If the potential risk and the criticality of a certain task 
can be identified beforehand, the error can probably be avoided. 
This can be accomplished, for example, by focusing on a task 
where errors are especially common and minimising all distrac-
tions while performing the task.
The second phase of error management is to ensure that the 
error will be detected when it occurs, or at least before the possible 
consequences of the error start affecting the safety of the opera-
tions. Typical methods used in error identification include the 
monitoring and checking of operations, which in team work 
includes communication during the tasks. For example, the people 
involved in the steering of the vessel should be notified of a change 
in course. In this way, another person can confirm whether the 
action was appropriate or not (detecting a possible mistake), and 
the correct selection of the new course can be verified from the ves-
sel’s equipment (detecting a possible slip). In order to detect errors 
it is important to have a clear task sharing about who is in charge 
of executing an action and who of their verification.
In the third phase, the focus is on the identification and correc-
tion of the error induced situation. If the error is not identified 
early enough, it will usually lead into the deviation from expecta-
tions (the vessel will not have the expected course, for example). 
In these cases the situation may have reached a point where the 
error cannot be repaired using normal procedures; abnormal pro-
cedures, such as using alternative steering systems, must be used 
instead. From the point of view of identification and management 
of error critical situations it is important to be well aware of the 
threshold requiring the use of abnormal procedures as well as the 
actions that these procedures comprise. For example, in a turning 
situation in a narrow passage, everyone involved in steering 
should know what the safe tolerance for staying on the route line 
is and the amount of deviation that should be reported clearly, as 
well as the alternative actions that must be applied if the vessel 
cannot be kept inside the safe area by normal procedures. 
Figure 4. Phases of error management
ERROR
Hazardous  
situation 
or an accident
Avoiding 
the Error
Detecting  
the error
Error  
induced  
situation
Management  
of the error  
induced situation
• Planning
• Anticipation
• Briefing
• Monitoring
• Checklists
• Communications
• Task sharing
•  Abnormal 
 procedures
Increasing risk level           Decreased time
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Activities on these three levels may be based on documented 
working methods, procedures, or undocumented working meth-
ods used by the personnel and developed through training and 
experience (Figure 4). The following sections describe the most 
typical methods of error management as well as practices in abnor-
mal situations.
Monitoring
“All essential information should be collected, processed and  
interpreted, and made conveniently available to those who require 
it for the performance of their duties.” 
(STCW Section B-VIII/2, Part 3–1, 5.12)
By monitoring is generally understood an activity that is especially 
related to the monitoring of the location of the vessel and the exe-
cution of the voyage plan. Indeed, from the perspective of mari-
time safety, monitoring and checking related to navigation are cen-
tral tasks on the bridge. 80% of the accidents related to navigation 
are caused by human errors. In many cases, the information that 
could have prevented the accident would have been available, but 
for some reason it was not used. Therefore, IMO recommends that 
all decisions are cross-checked so that potential errors could be 
detected and corrected as early as possible. Moreover, deck officers 
should ensure that all available information is used in a systematic 
way.
“Masters, skippers and watchkeepers should ensure that optimum 
and systematic use is made of all appropriate information that 
becomes available to the navigational staff.”  
(STCW Section B-VIII/2, Part 3–1, 5.12)
However, monitoring is not only limited to following the planned 
route; it is rather applied to the verification and follow-up of all 
critical tasks. The aim of monitoring is to provide the relevant 
information to all who need it.
For monitoring to be successful, the following issues should be 
considered:
˜ Which functions should be monitored  at the given moment?
˜ Who is responsible for the monitoring of these functions?˜ Which observations should be communicated  to other personnel?
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PRACTICAL EXAMPLE 2.
Efficient monitoring while proceeding in a narrow passage
It is extremely critical for the vessel to stay on the planned route 
line when proceeding in a narrow passage because straying from 
the line may quickly lead into a situation where grounding cannot 
be avoided. Therefore, the monitoring of the turns is a relevant 
part of safe navigation in narrow passages. The targets of moni-
toring in turning situations include the location of the vessel in 
relation to the route line, direction of steering, course, speed and 
the correct functioning of the devices and steering systems used 
in the turn. Below you will find an example that is based on the 
monitoring of a critical turn. The example includes three phases, 
which are used to ensure that all the aforementioned factors are 
monitored until the critical turning phase is completed.
The three phases to the right of the picture ensure the 
monitoring during the turn. Preparations for monitoring can be 
initiated by using a standard call-out (e.g. “Approaching”), 
which directs the attention to the most significant monitoring 
targets of the turn. As the turn begins, it is important to com-
municate clearly the choices and procedures related to steer-
ing; their validity should be confirmed by other personnel. The 
final phase is the conclusion of monitoring where it is ensured 
that the vessel has obtained the desired course and location, 
and that the turning phase is completed. Attention can now 
be shifted to other operations on the bridge.
On the left side of the picture, there are two zones that are 
related to the vessel drifting away from the safe route line during 
the turn. The first of these is the “stopping zone”, which starts 
from the point where the vessel can no longer be kept within 
the desired route. In this case the only way to prevent grounding 
is to stop the vessel either by using the main or alternative steer-
ing systems. If the vessel cannot be stopped, the vessel enters 
the “danger zone” where the collision cannot be avoided; it is 
only possible to minimise the damages caused by the collision 
by slowing down the vessel’s speed as much as possible and/or 
steering the vessel to a direction that best helps it to withstand 
the collision.
DANGER ZONE
A zone where it is no longer possible to stop 
the vessel safely. > Emergency procedures are
initiated to minimize damages.
STOPPING ZONE
A zone where the vessel can still be stopped 
safely > Abnormal procedures are initiated 
to halt the vessel.
END POINT OF THE TURN 
> Verifying the safe location/course 
> end of the monitoring of the turn
STARTING POINT OF THE TURN 
Starting the turn 
> Information of the initiation of procedures
> Checking the steering procedures
PREPARATION POINT FOR THE TURN 
> Preparing for monitoring 
(secondary activities are interrupted)
Grounding
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The aim of monitoring and the related exchange of information is 
to maintain the shared situation awareness of the personnel. If the 
available information is not used to maintain the situation aware-
ness, as has been the case in several accidents, the following three 
questions can be used to approach the problem:
˜ Did someone detect the issue in question?˜ Was the issue considered to be important enough  to be presented?
˜ Was the issue communicated in a way that resulted  in a shared situation awareness?
Good monitoring practice will ensure that the confusions 
described above will not prevent information exchange to those 
who need it. Hence, the basic prerequisite for successful monitor-
ing can be considered to be a task sharing that clearly defines 
whose current responsibility it is to monitor the function in ques-
tion, which observations are relevant to the operations and how 
they should be reported.
Monitoring can be divided into passive (i.e. reactive) and active 
(i.e. anticipatory) monitoring. The difference between passive and 
active monitoring methods is whether monitoring is general moni-
toring of the activities or conscious checking of specific functions.
Passive monitoring refers to the monitoring of the general level 
of activities. General level monitoring is based on the presence of 
the monitoring officer and on stimulus-based reactions in situa-
tions where a deviation from the normal situation or another cor-
responding event causes the monitoring officer to take notice of 
the situation. A stimulus of this kind may be a system warning, for 
example. The weaknesses of passive monitoring include the inca-
pability to detect small and slowly occurring deviations, the inabil-
ity to react early to quickly evolving situations and the decrease of 
vigilance in a monotonous environment that includes only few 
stimuli.
Active monitoring refers to activities where a member of the 
bridge personnel knowingly pays attention to predetermined tar-
gets, whose expected status or functions he attempts to follow or 
ensure at a certain moment. When the person monitors several 
things, he will change the target of monitoring regularly.
Active monitoring requires that the targets requiring attention 
are known in advance and that the responsibility for their moni-
toring is clearly determined. The personnel should therefore know 
where to pay attention in different situations or during different 
procedures, and which changes are included in the plan and 
which are not. The following phases, which will result in commu-
nication, are included in several monitoring principles:
1. Preparing for monitoring 
 (the situation requiring monitoring is approaching)
2. Initiation of activities (the monitored phase begins),
3. Checking of activities 
 (changes according to plan) and
4. Ending the monitoring 
 (attention can be shifted to other matters).
Communication is a central part of monitoring. It is not possible to 
maintain shared situation awareness and to ensure that attention is 
paid to the correct matters in co-operative monitoring if communi-
cation among personnel does not work.
Moreover, a protocol for reporting deviations needs to be 
defined in order to ensure that reactions to the observed deviations 
from the plan are sufficiently fast. Example 3 depicts how the dif-
ferent monitoring phases are shown during a turn in a narrow pas-
sage.
Procedures for active monitoring and communicating of devia-
tions need to be in place for all situations where the detection of 
error is critical in terms of time, as in:
˜ Turn situations˜ Port areas˜ Archipelagos˜ Narrow places (e.g. shallows and nearby areas,  straits, rivers, locks etc.)
˜ Streaming water˜ Conditions where the vessel is subject to pull  (squat, bank effect)
˜ Busy regions˜ Demanding conditions ˜ Other special situations, such as ice conditions,  with a tugboat, abnormal and emergency situations etc.
To summarise, general observations (passive monitoring) do not 
necessarily guide the attention to the issues that are important for 
operations. Therefore, monitoring practices should be developed 
in such a way that focus will be on ensuring the matters relevant 
to the situation. This requires that the issues that are monitored 
are known by the personnel, the task sharing is clear concerning 
monitoring responsibilities, and the way the observations and 
deviations are communicated is agreed upon.
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Task sharing
“Duties should be clearly and unambiguously assigned to specific 
individuals, who should confirm that they understand their responsi-
bilities.” (STCW Section B-VIII/2, Part 3–1, 5.3) 
Excessive workload and unclear task sharing have often been dis-
cussed with reference to accidents. Any confusions regarding the 
task sharing will easily lead to memory errors caused by the work-
load, misunderstanding in co-operation based on assumptions, 
insufficient checking of critical procedures and poor utilisation of 
resources. These problems can be avoided by clear task sharing.
The starting point for functional co-operation should be a clear 
division of responsibilities, roles and tasks among all the operators 
in the group at all times. In this case, roles refer to predefined 
basic activities that include many responsibilities concerning pro-
cedures and their checking. Roles can be assigned and changed 
depending on the situation.
The manning of the bridge may vary for several reasons. In the 
offing, the bridge may be manned by one person only, whereas 
when proceeding in a fairway in poor weather conditions, the helm 
may be occupied by a helmsman, a lookout, the first mate, the mas-
ter and a pilot. Many vessels have regulations for the minimum man-
ning of the bridge for different stages of the voyage or different con-
ditions. However, the mere presence of these people is not enough; 
rather, the task sharing in different manning conditions should be 
clear as well. For example, a situation where the master is called to 
the bridge should not automatically result in a change in the current 
task sharing. The change in the task sharing should be communi-
cated clearly when the change is deemed necessary and the task 
sharing is altered. Manning changes will pose a challenge for the def-
inition of standardised task sharing. Usually, tasks cannot be pre-
assigned to certain people; instead, the task sharing must be defined 
individually for each manning situation according to the “working 
roles”. Because of this, the most important starting point is to iden-
tify which tasks should be assigned and which person is the best 
choice for each task in each manning situation from the perspective 
of efficient use of resources. The most important questions from the 
point of view of efficient resource management include: 
1. Who has the best qualifications to carry out the task?
2.  How can it be ensured that the task sharing 
 is clear for everyone?
In functional task sharing models, the activities and responsibili-
ties are clearly coordinated at least for the following operations:
˜ Steering and control of the manouevring area˜ Positioning and choosing the course˜ Confirming the positioning (monitoring)˜ Monitoring of the traffic situation˜ Planning for meeting with other vessels˜ Lookout˜ Communication with people outside the bridge  (bow, aft, engine room, tugboats etc.)
˜ Communication with other vessels and the VTS centre
In other words, the task sharing is not only about the division of 
the tasks to be performed, but also about the monitoring activities. 
The task sharing for both the monitoring of the external operating 
environment and the checking of performed activities should be 
clear. In connection with task sharing, it is possible to define the 
ways that the group members can take part in the tasks and 
responsibilities of another group member. The monitoring of activ-
ities should be based on clear communication about the planned 
procedures and a clear way of expressing the occurrence of devia-
tions if the procedures are not completed according to plan.
EXAMPLE ACCIDENT 3.
A vessel was on its way to port in hard wind conditions. Two 
tugboats were assisting the vessel. There were five people 
on the bridge: the master, the pilot, the staff captain, the 
chief mate and the helmsman. The master was steering the 
ship, while the pilot was taking care of communications with 
the tugboats, and the chief mate was observing the distance 
between the vessel and buoys from the other wing. The staff 
captain did not have a specific task. The master and the pilot 
had jointly agreed on the way to enter port. 
They had decided to drive the vessel to port backwards. 
This failed, however, as the wind pushed the vessel off the 
passage. The people on the bridge did not detect the drifting 
of the ship, even though the electronic nautical chart would 
have shown it. In the dark, perceiving distances is optically 
difficult.
The investigation reported that the unclear task sharing on 
the bridge contributed to the accident. Although the bridge was 
sufficiently manned, the drifting of the vessel was not detected 
because the monitoring of positioning and wind direction from 
different devices was not clearly agreed upon, and the relevant 
information about the drifting of the vessel that was observable 
from the electronic nautical chart was not used.
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In order to avoid unclear situations, changes in the task sharing 
should always be performed using a procedure based on standard-
ised routines. Especially the responsibilities concerning the steer-
ing of the vessel should be confirmed by standardised call-outs. 
For example, the shift of steering from the wing to midship can be 
confirmed by using standardised call-outs: “steering to midship” 
(call-out by the person on the wing) and “steering at midship” 
(confirmation by the person at midship).
 Workload Management
“Non-essential activity and distractions should be avoided,  
suppressed or removed.”  
 
“Tasks should be performed according to a clear order of priority.”
 
“No member of the navigational watch should be assigned more 
duties or more difficult tasks than can be performed effectively.” 
(STCW Section B-VIII/2, Part 3–1; 5.4, 5.5 ja 5.10)
Workload management is based on sufficient anticipatory meas-
ures, task-specific task sharing, the management of available time, 
the prioritisation of relevant activities and the effective resource 
management.
The amount of workload will differ during the operation 
depending on conditions. By anticipatory measures and planning 
it is often possible to shift part of the workload-increasing tasks 
from a recognisable heavy workload situation to be performed 
before the highest workload peak. In this way, the workload can 
be kept reasonable for human performance during the entire oper-
ation.
The pressure caused by high workload may often result in a 
person trying to perform several tasks at once. This will often, 
however, slow down the overall performance, as shifting one’s 
focus and orientation between tasks takes time. Moreover, the 
number of errors will increase, as performing one task will have a 
negative impact on performing another. Because of this, it is 
important to structure the work in high workload situations in a 
way that the performance and the disturbances caused by simulta-
neous tasks are minimised. This requires active decision making 
concerning the order of performing the tasks and guiding the 
activities so that the tasks or their parts are performed one at a 
time.
The management of available time is a crucial part of workload 
management. Under time pressure, it may go unnoticed that it 
would be possible to gain more time to perform the task by suita-
ble solutions, such as slowing down the speed, changing the route, 
or other solutions that are feasible in the situation. As the work-
load increases to a high level, the ways to gain more time to per-
form the tasks should become the focus of active consideration.
If no extra time can be gained to perform the tasks in the situa-
tion and the workload increases to a level that is too high for the 
situation, activities will need to be prioritised. This refers to active 
decision making about which tasks are the most important ones in 
the situation and which tasks can be disregarded. The collapse in 
performance caused by high workload and stress can be avoided by 
efficient prioritisation. Efficient resource management is the most 
central part of workload management in a teamwork situation. This 
includes the utilization of the personnel, equipment and the availa-
ble information when handling the situation. Resource manage-
ment is discussed in more detail in a separate chapter.
Checklists
“Companies should issue guidance on proper bridge procedures, 
and promote the use of checklists appropriate to each ship taking 
into account national and international guidance.” (STCW Section 
B-VIII/2, Part 3–1, 4) 
 
“The Company should establish procedures for the preparation of 
plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key 
shipboard operations concerning the safety of the ship and the  
prevention of pollution.” (ISM Code Part A, 7) 
 
“A description of the checklists and purpose of the specific items 
should be included in the Vessel Operation Manual.” 
(MSC/Circ. 1061)
Checklists are used to ensure that the most important tasks in a 
situation are performed, thus minimising the risks caused by 
memory errors. Checklists are typically used after the preparation 
phase to ensure that all relevant tasks have been performed before 
the critical working phases. There are two kinds of checklists: a 
work list (so called read-and-do list) and a confirmation list (the 
so-called do-and-verify list). A work list refers to a list that guides 
the work and that is designed to be used as a memory aid as the 
work proceeds. Here, the worker will carry out the tasks while 
reading the list. Confirmation lists are used after certain working 
phases to ensure that the tasks that are the most critical and the 
most difficult to detect have been performed. Both kinds of check-
lists can be used either individually or in a team.
When using checklists, it should be defined who will request 
the list and when this will be done. Typically, the person request-
ing for the list as well as the person reading the list are defined, 
and the list will then be performed jointly.
A practice concerning work lists and confirmation lists for pre-
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departure procedures on the ship is described below. The operat-
ing model is based on the idea that each person has a work list 
guiding the procedures of his own area of responsibility, according 
to which the preparatory activities are performed. When the prep-
arations are finished, the personnel will use the confirmation list to 
check the most central procedures. The articles in the confirma-
tion list can be used to verify whether the activities based on the 
task lists have been accomplished.
In terms of usability, the confirmation list should be short and 
concise so that it can be gone through at a single time without 
interruptions. The activities included in the work list may take a 
significant amount of time, but operations can be made flexible by 
a good task sharing and timing of the separate tasks, as the activi-
ties included in the different work lists are independent of each 
other.
PRACTICAL EXAMPLE 3.
Pre-departure checklists
In the example below, the vessel’s pre-departure preparations 
include altogether 18 preparatory activities or checks that are 
performed in the engine room or on the bridge. These proce-
dures are managed by work lists that can be reviewed by differ-
ent persons. When the preparatory tasks have been completed, 
a confirmation type checklist will be read just before departure. 
The confirmation list will then be used to check the most critical 
preparatory activities. This will be performed quickly; for example, 
the master will read aloud each item that needs to be checked 
according to the list, and the person who carried out the task will 
then confirm that the task has indeed been completed. 
By using the described practice, it is possible to carry out the activities efficiently and with a clear task sharing. 
Moreover, the most important activities are checked twice.
ENGINE ROOM BRIDGE
Work list A Work list B Work list C
ACTIVITIES COMPLETED
Confirmation list
(4 critical 
activities 
to be checked)
(18 performed activities)
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Checklists can be applied to many different situations. ICS’s Bridge 
Procedures manual includes examples of checklists and their con-
tents. The manual provides examples of the checking of the fol-
lowing situations, for example:
˜ Preparing for departure˜ Departure and arrival situations˜ Initiation of piloting˜ Moving from one navigation area to another, e.g. from  the high sea to the archipelago, or from the archipelago 
 to port area
˜ Special situations, such as anchoring, passing through  ice, or towing
˜ Changing the lookout˜ Abnormal and emergency situations
Using a checklist to support memory is an excellent way to avoid 
human memory errors, but its usability should be considered care-
fully when planning the list. List structures that are too heavy or 
impractical will easily lead to people ignoring the list. Moreover, 
the longer the list, the more likely it is to overlook an item 
included in it. The division to work lists which guide different 
activities, and to short and concise confirmation lists helps to 
avoid this problem. Work lists may be long if needed, and they 
also include activities that are not relevant for safety. Confirmation 
lists, on the other hand, only include issues that are critical for 
safety, and they are short enough to guarantee easy use.
Communications Practices
“Communications among members of the navigational watch 
should be clear, immediate, reliable, and relevant to the business at 
hand.” (STCW section B-VIII/2, Part 3–1, 5.9)  
 
“Terminology for standard Call-Outs should be developed by the 
Company and presented in the Vessel Operation Manual.” (MSC/
Circ. 1061)
Communications practices are standardised ways that are intended 
to convey information that is critical for safety among the person-
nel so that the risk of misunderstandings in communication has 
been minimised. Call-outs (short standardised words or word 
pairs) and standard phraseology (standardised ways of expressing 
critical messages) are the most common ways to avoid misunder-
standings. Moreover, in a safety critical environment it is impor-
tant that the sender of the message ensures that the receiver of the 
message has indeed received the message and understood it cor-
rectly. This is verified by a practice where the receiver indicates 
that he has received the message, and shows that he has under-
stood it correctly by repeating the central contents of the message. 
In this way the sender may be assured that the communication 
was successful. This practice is referred to as closed loop commu-
nication (Figure 5).
 
Figure 5. The closed loop communication principle
The need for standardised communication practices as well as suita-
ble means of communication need to be defined separately in each 
operating environment and situation. Nevertheless, standardised 
communication practices should be utilised at least in the following 
situations:
˜ Situations that immediately affect the steering  and the navigation of the vessel, such as 
˜ Changes in the steering orders ˜ Speed changes˜ Steering changes˜ Changes in the level of automation˜ Turning situations ˜ Yield situations˜ Changes in roles and responsibilities, e.g. changing  the officer of the watch, changing the lookout etc.
˜ When reporting sightings, e.g. of another vessel,  a sea mark (especially on fast vessels)
˜ VHF traffic, e.g. VTS communications or  arranging a meeting with another vessel 
 (SMCP Standard Marine Communication Phrases)
˜ Certain communications with other groups on the  vessel, such as deck groups (e.g. mooring and  
 unmooring commands) and the engine room, and
˜ Other special situations, such as starting and ending  pilotage, towing, assistance in ice conditions etc.
The starting point of a standardised message is to define the mes-
sage and the following answer in a way that minimises the risk of 
misunderstanding. In practice, the most usual way is to repeat the 
entire message, which ensures that the receiver heard the message 
exactly as it was sent. Repetition is especially used in conveying 
messages that concern steering. These messages often include 
Message
Confirmation
SENDER                    RECEIVER
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”Steady as she goes” Helm order ; directs the course at the time of command
”Full ahead” Engine order; full speed
”Stand by bow and aft” Message to the deck groups to start preparations for mooring or unmooring the vessel
”Untie the aft spring” Command to untie the aft spring
”Steering to midship” Notification of changing the vessel’s steering to midship
”Autopilot track mode” Notification of setting the autopilot to track mode
”A vessel 10 to the right” Notification of a detected ship 10 degrees right of the bow
”Port area” Notification of moving into port area. This means that bridge operations are changed to  
correspond to a critical port area (manning, tasks, device and engine settings etc.)
”How do you read me” A question in VHF traffic to find out about the coverage of the radio communication
”Steer ... degrees to make a lee” The pilot is asking the vessel to make a lee
”Passing buoy number one” VTS announcement of a required passing point (in this case buoy 1) 
Table 1. Examples of call-outs in use
numerical values, the correct hearing and understanding of which 
can only be confirmed by repeating the contents of the message. 
On the other hand, standardised call-outs should not be too rigid, 
as this will increase the risk of not using them. Repeating the 
entire message is certainly not necessary in all situations. In situa-
tions where there is no risk of misunderstanding the action related 
to the request or a command, the form of communication can be a 
general acknowledgement like “ok” or “roger”, which will only 
confirm that the message has been received. Often, the communi-
cation chain also contains “two phases”. In the first phase, the 
command is conveyed and its reception is confirmed. In the sec-
ond phase, the completion of the requested activity is reported 
and the reception of this information is confirmed, as in the exam-
ple below (Figure 6).
Figure 6. Communicating a helm order
Table 1 includes examples of the standardised call-outs used on the 
bridge. 
The examples are not necessarily in use everywhere in the same 
form; there are many variations. Standardised call-outs are usually 
used in connection to the steering of the vessel, engine orders and 
VHF traffic.
“New course XXX” “Course XXX”
Action
“Course XXX”“OK”
Phase 1 Command Confirmation
Acknowledge-
ment
NotificationPhase 2
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IMO’s Standard Marine Communication Phrases is a good guide-
line for unifying communication in English.
Practices in abnormal situations
“The Company should establish procedures to identify, describe and 
respond to potential emergency shipboard situations.” 
(ISM Code, Part A, 8.1)
An abnormal situation may occur on the bridge for several differ-
ent reasons. The reason may be an unexpected change in the ves-
sel’s course caused by the conditions, a mistake, and a malfunction 
in the bridge systems or, for example, an emergency on the ship 
caused by a fire. Clear procedural guidelines that include direc-
tions for the personnel’s actions should be in place for the foresee-
able abnormal situations.
In an abnormal situation, the workload usually increases tem-
porarily to a high level, and there may not be much time to per-
form the tasks. For this reason, the procedures related to the man-
agement of abnormal situations should be especially clear and well 
rehearsed. This emphasises the need to define the operating proce-
dures related to foreseeable abnormal situations, and furthermore, 
maintain the preparedness through training (see the section “Main-
taining Preparedness for Abnormal Situations”).
Procedures for abnormal situations can be divided into abnor-
mal procedures and emergency procedures. An abnormal situation 
requires attention either immediately or soon, but it does not nec-
essarily cause an immediate danger for safety. An emergency situa-
tion, on the other hand, demands immediate attention and imme-
diate action to avoid damages. This distinction is important for the 
correct prioritisation of activities. If the operations are in a critical 
phase when the abnormal situation emerges (e.g. a device warning 
signal during a turn in a narrow passage), the activities related to 
the turn should be completed before attention is shifted to, say, a 
small device malfunction that has no effect on the vessel’s steering 
and navigation capabilities. However, if the malfunction leads to a 
loss of steering in a corresponding situation, the actions leading to 
restoring the vessel’s steering should of course be prioritised, and 
hence avoid drifting away from the passage.
Examples of abnormal situations include:
˜ Malfunction in the communications system˜ Malfunction in a single navigation device ˜ Bout of illness (for someone who does not take part  in the vessel’s steering)
Examples of emergency situations include:
˜ Loss of steering capability˜ Grounding˜ Blackout
Procedures used in abnormal and emergency situations can be 
described in procedures whose form and structure should be as 
clear as possible for optimum usability. Similarly to checklists used 
in normal operations, the procedures for abnormal and emergency 
procedures can be documented in loose-leaf books or a laminated 
guideline kept in the working area (if the instructions cover only a 
situation related to a particular working area). The instructions can 
be encoded by a colour and content scheme to facilitate its usabil-
ity (e.g. abnormal procedures can be kept separate from emer-
gency procedures), and the contents can be classified by different 
situations and devices, which will help in finding the correct pro-
cedure.
Equally important to the availability and usability of the proce-
dures is the principle underlying their application. Workload will 
increase in critical situations, and therefore the task sharing must 
be as efficient as possible in order to ensure sufficient resources 
both for the accomplishment of the procedures and their check-
ing. Moreover, when the procedures are being defined, the per-
sons responsible for the continuation of normal operations (e.g. 
steering, navigation) should also be defined along with those 
responsible for the initiation, performing and checking of abnor-
mal procedures. It can be considered a general practice that the 
person in charge of the operations will give the order to initiate the 
procedures, after which one person will read the procedure from 
the abnormal (work list type of) checklist while another person 
performs the tasks. Going through the procedures in a coordinated 
way is ensured by using standardised communication related to 
the performance of the activities.
As mentioned before, the initiation of the procedures may 
require quick reactions to avoid grounding, especially in emergen-
cies related to the steering of the vessel. In these situations there 
may not be time even to consult an abnormal checklist that is eas-
ily available; instead the procedures need to be initiated immedi-
ately. For these situations, the so-called “by-heart procedures” 
should be defined. There procedures are performed from memory 
immediately when the situation is noticed, and verified from the 
relevant procedure after their execution. These kinds of situations 
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are not common, and they are usually related to the vessel’s steer-
ing and navigation ability. The example below shows how the pro-
cedure would work in a situation where the vessel does not turn to 
the expected course due to a failure in the steering system.
The first items in the procedure are marked with an asterisk (*), 
which means that they must be performed immediately by mem-
ory. After this, they are checked using the emergency checklist. 
Only those activities that are critical for time should be performed 
by memory. In practice, the above activities should be performed 
so that the person who is in charge of steering and who noticed the 
problem would report “steering control failure”, after which he 
would perform or give orders to perform the immediate activities. 
After this, he would give the order “emergency checklist”. At this 
point another person should take the emergency checklist and read 
aloud the tasks included in it step by step. While going through the 
first two tasks that have already been performed, the person 
responsible for these tasks would confirm the tasks to be com-
pleted (“applied”, “engaged”). Following tasks would then be con-
tinued in accordance with the procedure. The procedure will also 
guide the user ahead depending on whether the situation can be 
managed by determined procedures or if it leads to a subsequent 
emergency (grounding).
When it comes to the procedures, the example is not 
perfect for the situation in question, and cannot be directly 
adapted to the bridge. Nevertheless, it can be used to show the 
form of the lists of emergency procedures and their central princi-
ples of use.
PRACTICAL EXAMPLE 4.
Failure in the steering system
STEERING CONTROL FAILURE
MANUAL CONTROL .........................................................APPLY* 
ENGINE EMERGENCY STEERING ...............................ENGAGE*
ANCHORING (if shallow water) ..................................PREPARE 
If unsuccessful to gain steering control:
ANCHORING ......................................................................APPLY
In case of grounding, see TAB 5: ”GROUNDING” 
(Adapted from ICS Bridge Procedures Guide, 1998)
Maintaining Preparedness for abnormal situations
The ability to act in accordance with the procedures in abnormal 
and emergency situations requires that the situations in question 
are practiced regularly. In training, special attention should be 
paid to the use of the procedures and co-operation in abnormal 
and emergency situations, and not only to the technical under-
standing of the consequences of the procedures. 
In addition to regular repetitive training, especially the knowl-
edge of the most critical activities performed by memory should be 
ensured before each voyage. In practice, this will be accomplished 
so that one phase of the normal departure preparations should 
consist of going through the critical procedures in accordance with 
the corresponding task sharing. The procedures are not actually 
performed, but the necessary procedures are practiced, for exam-
ple, by placing a hand on an emergency switch etc.
Summary
Error management is based on the detection of potential errors 
and the application of the procedures related to their management. 
The most important starting point for successful error manage-
ment is to understand the critical phases in the operations, the 
potential errors related to them as well as their consequences. In 
this way, it is possible to develop procedures for checking the 
tasks relevant for safety and for avoiding errors. As human mem-
ory errors and slips can never be completely avoided, the routines 
on the bridge should be developed so that all errors are detected 
early enough. Different checking procedures are the most impor-
tant part of the activities related to the detection of errors. As it is 
very unlikely that the same mistake is made at exactly the same 
time by several persons, the cross-checking of the critical activities 
is a central part of error management.
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Co-operation and Resource Management
Resource Management as  
Practical Activity
Resource management refers to the maximally efficient use of all 
human and technical resources in order to ensure safe and efficient 
operations. In practice, these resources refer to the skills and 
knowledge of the personnel, third party assistance, and technical 
devices, such as automation, that can be used both in workload 
management and as a source of information.
The management of these resources is an active process that is 
manifested primarily as communication between the personnel. In 
other words, communication is not only a part of resource man-
agement, but rather a tool for all sorts of resource management. In 
decision making situations, all available information cannot be 
used without interpersonal communication. Moreover, it is not 
possible to anticipate risks or maintain situation awareness if 
related information, observations or plans are not communicated 
among the personnel.
The aim of this application handbook is to describe how co-
operation and resource management are manifested in operations. 
Resource management can be divided into different parts that each 
has their own co-operative goals. There are also clearly identifiable 
working methods in the personnel’s operations that are aimed at 
achieving a certain goal. The four most important parts of resource 
management are described below (Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8. Parts of co-operation on the bridge
“Companies should also issue guidance to masters and officers 
in charge of the navigational watch on each ship concerning 
the need for continuously reassessing how bridge-watch 
resources are being allocated and used, based on bridge 
resource management principles such as the following.”  
(STCW Section B-VIII/2, Part 3–1)
Resource management training was initiated in commercial mari-
time in the 1980’s as Bridge Resource Management (BRM) train-
ing, which was based on Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) 
training developed in aviation. The training takes into account the 
fact that insufficient technical knowhow was not the problem 
underlying the accidents that were caused by a human error, but 
rather problems related to co-operation, decision making or lead-
ership. Recent developments have expanded the point of view to 
also include co-operation between people outside the bridge. The 
aim of Maritime Resource Management training is to develop 
resource management for the entire operational system.
BRM training covers the limitations of human performance, the 
mechanisms behind human errors and the procedures for co-oper-
ation and resource management. An example of the topics 
included in the course is given below (Figure 7).
Content of the BRM course
The BRM course covers the following topics:
˜ Human Performance & limitations˜ Attitudes˜ Situational Awareness˜ Cultural Awareness˜ Communications and Briefings˜ Authority & Assertiveness˜ Challenge & Response˜ Short Term Strategy˜ Workload˜ Humans and Automation˜ Team State˜ Error Management˜ Leadership Styles˜ Decision Making˜ Crisis Management˜ Crowd Management˜ Critical Incident Debriefing
Figure 7. An example of the contents of a BRM course
Co-operation
Situational  
awareness
Leadership and  
managerial skills
Decision making
Communication
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“Master should establish an open, interactive and closed loop  
communication style.” (IMO, Model Course 1.22)
The first part of successful resource management is to support 
active co-operation, whose aim is to create an open climate for 
communication and a motivation to work towards a common goal. 
As a result, people will be more active in exchanging information, 
voicing their interpretations of different situations and potential 
deviations.
Another important part of co-operation is leading of a situation 
and a task. Efficient leadership is based on sufficient planning and 
anticipation, an effective task sharing and active direction of oper-
ations. For co-operation to be successful, all activities that are 
related to leadership should include active communication, which 
helps to ensure that everyone has a shared situational awareness of 
the planned activity and their roles in it.
The third part of co-operation, maintaining situational aware-
ness, has often been mentioned in the investigations of hazardous 
situations in maritime. Situational awareness is mainly related to 
the positioning of the vessel, the conditions affecting operations 
and the status of devices and systems. From the point of view of 
resource management, the maintaining of situational awareness 
Practices related to the creation of  
a co-operative climate
Examples of communication between  
members of the personnel
Encourages to participate ”Let’s look at it together.”
Encourages to express one’s opinion ”What do you think?”
”Please tell me if you disagree.”
Takes other people’s comments into account ”Thank you for pointing that out.”
Emphasises the group, not the individual ”So, have we done everything now?”
Takes other people’s knowhow into account  
before taking action
”How would you feel if I handled this?”
Avoids personalisation of conflicts ”Let’s focus on this problem here...”
Has a problem-solving mentality ”I think that these are the alternatives we have...”
Table 2. How a co-operative climate is reflected in communication
refers to an effective process of acquiring information from several 
sources in order to combine and analyse it to construct and main-
tain a realistic view of the situation.
The third part of co-operation is decision making. In decision 
making, resource management aims to produce the best prerequi-
sites possible for making a safe decision by offering enough infor-
mation, alternatives and risk assessment to support decision mak-
ing. The decision making process will be manifested as 
communication during the different phases of decision making.
Several different practices that can be related to the aspects of 
co-operation mentioned above can be identified in the actions of 
different bridge staffs. These practices may also be grouped more 
specifically for each sub-part according to different aims. These 
practices are described for each sub-part in the following:
Supporting Co-operation
Co-operation is understood broadly as referring to all co-operative 
interpersonal activities on the bridge. Co-operative practices, how-
ever, refer here to the measures that are taken to encourage the 
personnel to report more actively about deviations and their obser-
vations, to be involved in other people’s activities and to express 
their personal interpretations of situations. The following table 
includes examples of this (Table 2).
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Leadership
“The crew are allocated duties and informed of expected standards 
of work and behaviour in a manner appropriate to the individuals 
concerned.” (STCW Table A II/2 Organize and manage the crew, 
Criteria for evaluating competence)
Leading a task is one of the key parts of co-operation as far as 
operational safety is concerned. The significance of leadership is 
especially emphasised in situations where the workload on the 
bridge is increased along with the probability for errors on the per-
sonnel’s part. Workload management is based on sufficient antici-
patory measures, a task-specific task sharing, management of the 
available time and prioritisation of relevant tasks as well as correct 
Practices related to the leadership of a situation and a task Examples of communication between members  
of the personnel
Discusses the upcoming situations ”We need to start preparing in a minute...”
Brings out factors affecting the operations ”At least those vessel’s seem to become relevant in a moment”
Communicates plans and intentions clearly ”I thought that I’d slow down a little so that the vessel beside us can 
overtake us well before that turn”
Prepares for alternative methods of action ”If that vessel won’t turn to the right before we get there, let’s take...”
Uses all resources effectively ”Could you please use the VTS to ask if they know...”
Ensures a clear task sharing ”Confirm steering at midship?”, ”steering at midship”
Prioritises the issues that are operationally  
the most important ones
”Let’s first put some distance between us and this place,  
and after that we can...”
Table 3. Practices related to management of personnel
allocation of resources. For example, by proper anticipatory meas-
ures and methodical re-assignment of workload it is possible to 
perform some of the workload-increasing tasks already before the 
workload peaks, and thus keep the workload reasonable for 
human performance during the entire operation. In high workload 
situations, the working situation is made more transparent by 
structuring the work carefully, minimising the number of unneces-
sary interruptions and making sure that there is enough time to 
perform the task without interference.
From the point of view of risk management, it is possible to take 
into account the potential risk factors affecting the operations early 
enough by using efficient anticipatory measures, and create a plan 
which the personnel can use to minimise the risks related to these 
factors or their effects. The following table (Table 3) includes lead-
ership practices that describe how a member of personnel works.
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Practices related to the maintaining  
of situational awareness
Examples of communication between  
members of personnel
Anticipates the signs for positioning the vessel  
(Awareness of the vessel’s position)
”Next we should see a buoy to the right.”
Confirms the position of the vessel  
(Awareness of the vessel’s position)
”We just passed...”
Confirms the position from several sources  
(Awareness of the vessel’s position)
”We are now on this position according to the radar.  
Can you see...”
Introduces the threats to the operations in advance  
(Awareness of the conditions affecting the operations)
”Visibility is becoming worse.” ”The traffic on that part of the 
passage seems to be exceptionally heavy.”
Collects information about the factors affecting the operations 
(Awareness of the conditions affecting the operations)
”Can you see anything on the radar that we should take into 
account?”
Communicates the choices concerning the use of devices  
(Awareness of the vessel’s devices and systems)
”Changing to manual steering”  
– ”You have manual steering.”
Communicates the perceived changes in the status of the  
systems (Awareness of the vessel’s devices and systems)
”Changing speed to seventeen.”  
(Automatic activation of a pre-programmed change)
Table 4. Maintaining situational awareness and related communication
Maintaining Situational Awareness
Situational awareness can be approached by considering which 
operative functions of the personnel it concerns. These functions 
are the positioning of the vessel, the conditions affecting the opera-
tions and the status of the devices and systems on the vessel or the 
bridge. As these three functions are different from each other, the 
procedures that are used to maintain situational awareness also fall 
naturally into three parts, as can be seen in the following table 
(Table 4). The situational awareness of the personnel, i.e. the form-
ing of a realistic view of the situation, should not be seen only as a 
process taking place in the individual’s mind, but rather as a prod-
uct of communication between the members of the personnel. 
Even if everyone shares a common view of the situation, this will 
not be obvious before this common view is ensured via communi-
cation. The following includes a description of the practices related 
to the maintaining of situational awareness, including examples of 
the ways in which a member of personnel may act.
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The role of the practices related to maintaining situational aware-
ness is naturally emphasised in conditions that are the most chal-
lenging for navigation as well as other critical stages of the voyage, 
such as mooring or port operations. Therefore, there should be a 
clear change in the activity of maintaining and communicating sit-
uational awareness when a more challenging phase is entered. 
Likewise, as the margins for positioning are increased, it is natural 
that communication related to position will decrease, at least as 
far as active monitoring of position is concerned. It is difficult to 
define a critical minimum level for safety, but a starting point 
could be that all navigational procedures should always be com-
municated on the bridge to ensure that all members of the per-
sonnel maintain a shared view of the vessel’s current movement.
When it comes to devices and systems, communication should 
primarily be concerned with the actions and choices that have an 
immediate impact on the reliability and safety of the operations. 
One can wonder why not communicate every action and choice 
that takes place on the bridge. While this approach is basically 
positive, it is not recommended because it includes the risk that 
when everything is verbalized the line between extremely signifi-
cant and less significant information becomes blurred. As the 
members of the personnel limit the communication to the issues 
they personally deem relevant in any case, it is a challenge to 
achieve a unified communicational policy.
Decision Making
For decision making, the key question concerning co-operation is 
to use all available information for defining the problem, assessing 
alternatives and executing the decision, so that all the people 
involved in the operations remain aware of what is going on and 
for what reason. The co-operative principles related to decision 
making describe a process which is consistently used to achieve 
the best possible outcome for the situation with those resources 
that are available for decision making. From the co-operative point 
of view, decision making cannot be evaluated only with reference 
to the outcome, i.e. the safety and validity of the chosen course of 
action. The quality of the decision will naturally depend on the 
personnel’s experience and knowhow to operate in the given situa-
tion. Co-operation and the decision making process itself may be 
apparently successful; however, a decision that is made based on 
insufficient experience and knowhow is not the best possible deci-
sion in terms of the requirements for the situation. A good deci-
sion making process is a means to ensure that the personnel is able 
to make sustained decisions that are the best ones possible consid-
ering the circumstances and their knowhow. The following table 
(Table 5) describes practices related to decision making, showing 
how a member of personnel works.
Practices related to decision making Examples of communication between  
members of personnel
Defines the problem clearly ”The vessel isn’t reacting to manual steering.”
Collects information to double-check the situation ”Could you also check..?”
Discusses alternative modes of action ”We can move straight ahead a little further,  
or slow down and...”
Encourages people to participate in decision making ”Can you think of other alternatives?”
Evaluates the risks included in the alternatives ”If we continue this way, we will come quite close  
to the shallows over there.”
Confirms the chosen course of action ”Okay, we will do so that...”
Assesses the effects of the decision and, if necessary,  
changes the plan by a new decision
”It seems that we may not be able to turn before that,  
so we can either...”
Table 5. Decision making and communication
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Summary
Co-operation on the bridge is a central part of risk and error man-
agement. Efficient resource management is based on open com-
munication, explicit leadership and coordination, active maintain-
ing of the situational awareness and the use of all available 
information when making decisions.
Interpersonal communication is a prerequisite for efficient co-
operation, and therefore all parts of co-operation, from planning to 
problem-solving, should result in communication between people. 
The amount and quality of communication is a good predictor of 
human error management on the bridge. Groups that communi-
cate only little about the factors affecting operations will usually 
regard as surprising the factors that could be anticipated, which 
means that they end up making the decisions in these situations 
quickly and without proper consideration. This will increase the 
workload, complicate the maintaining of the situational awareness 
and increase the risk of errors.
Resource management is basically about the efficient use of the 
available information and workforce. In additions to the people 
present in the situation, information can be obtained by following 
the system displays or from external sources. Workload can be 
divided among the personnel, but it can also be assigned to the 
systems on the bridge by the proper use of automation, for exam-
ple. Traditionally, the manning of the bridge is strengthened when 
the conditions become more challenging, but having more people 
on the bridge does not automatically result in improved safety. 
The task sharing should also be defined efficiently and clearly.
The group can function more efficiently and safely than an 
individual only when its resources are used efficiently. The aim of 
the practices described above is to ensure that this goal can be 
achieved.
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Risky Combinations of Critical Safety Factors onboard Ship               Hedegård, J.
- Jan Hedegard - 
”Bridge 2011”, Rauma, Finland, 9-10 June 2011 
-  PURPOSE OF SPEECH- 
To describe  a number of ”critical safety 
factors” and some combinations of 
these factors which increase the risk of 
incidents and accidents.   
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-  OVERALL COMPANY GOALS - 
Productivity 
Well-being 
Safety 
- 4 
- Accidents 
- Incidents 
- Near-misses  
Produc-
tivity 
Safety 
-  THREATS TO OVERALL COMPANY GOALS - 
Well-    
being 
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- Accidents 
- Incidents 
- Near-misses  
Pro
tivi 
Sa 
We 
be 
-  THREATS TO OVERALL COMPANY GOALS - 
-  CAUSES BEHIND ACCIDENTS ETC - 
- Accidents 
- Incidents 
- Near-misses  
Human 
Errors 
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-Aviation  60 - 85 % 
-Chemical industry  80 - 90 % 
-Off-shore, On-shore  70 - 90 % 
-Nuclear power  38 % (USA) 
 63 % (Germany) 
 5 %   (Ex Soviet Union) 
 
- Ships  60-70 %  
Percentage of all accidents etc: 
-  HUMAN ERRORS - 
- Human Errors and Technical Causes in Civilian Maritime Accidents 
Human Errors 
Technical Causes 
-  CAUSES BEHIND ACCIDENTS ETC - 
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Mistakes  Errors are caused by the fact that the person 
  has a erroneous mental picture of the situation. 
Slips  Errors are made despite the fact that the person 
  has a correct mental picture of the situation and 
  knows what to do and how to do it.    
Human Error Types (Reason):   
-  HUMAN ERRORS - 
Violations  The person choses consciously to violate 
  regulations or a stipulated work routine etc.    
”Herald	  of	  Free	  Enterprise”	  
1.   Bow tanks were filled with water to adjust the bow to the 
 car ramp due to high tide (i.e. the bow was low in water)   
2.  The assistant bosun was asleep in his cabin after extra 
 maintenance work (should have closed the bow doors)  
3.  The bosun did not regard closing the bow doors as his job, 
4.  Great pressure from company management to sail on time 
5.  Unclear bow doors closing procedures and reporting.  
6.  No bow door warning lights were installed despite many 
 requests from the crew  
7.  With the bow doors open the car deck was flooded and 
 the ship listed heavily and finally turned on its side in 
 shallow water - 188 people lost their lives.  
EXAMPLE: HERALD OF FREE ENTERPRISE - 
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a.  No complete check 
whether the bow doors 
were closed 
c. No bow door warning 
 lights  
Mistake  
(Violation) 
- Lack of explicit 
 work methods 
 /ground rules 
Company avoiding 
expenses 
-  High workload 
b.  Lack of proper reporting 
procedure about bow  
  door position when 
leaving harbour 
Mistake  
EXAMPLE: HERALD OF FREE ENTERPRISE - 
Lack of explicit 
work methods/     /
ground rules 
-  CAUSES BEHIND ACCIDENTS ETC - 
- Accidents 
- Incidents 
- Near-misses  
Human 
Errors 
Technical 
Causes 
MTO Factors 
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-  CAUSES BEHIND ACCIDENTS ETC - 
- Accidents 
- Incidents 
- Near-misses  
Human 
Errors 
Technical 
Causes 
“Man” 
(Human Factors, i.e. 
aspects influencing 
human  performance) 
“Technics” 
(Technical Factors, i.e. 
design and production 
aspects from a techni-
cal point of view) 
“Organisation” 
(Organisational Factors, 
i.e. structure and formal 
influence of the organi-
sation) 
”Any aspect that has influence on the 
productivity, well-bring and safety of 
the crew members, passengers and 
other persons onboard or in the 
vicinity of a ship”. 
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1. Safety Management 
2. Training Aspects 
3. Safety Awareness 
4. Attitude Adressing 
5. Human Errors 
6. Work Methods 
7. Leadership Factors 
8. Mental Workload 
9. Group Factors 
10. Social Exchange 
11. Cultural Factors 
12. Communication 
13. Information 
-  A SAMPLE OF SAFETY FACTORS - 
1. Safety Management 
2. Training Aspects 
3. Safety Awareness 
4. Attitude Adressing 
5. Human Errors 
6. Work Methods 
7. Leadership Factors 
8. Mental Workload 
9. Group Factors 
10. Social Exchange 
11. Cultural Factors 
12. Communication 
13. Information 
52 sub-factors 
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LONG TERM 
FACTORS 
SHORT TERM 
(”SITUATIONAL”) 
FACTORS 
OUTCOME 
(RISK) 
LONG TERM FACTORS 
SHORT TERM 
(”SITUATIONAL”) 
FACTORS 
Safety Management 
Training Aspects 
Safety Awareness 
Attitude Adressing 
Human 
Errors/ /
Accidents 
Work Methods 
Leadership Factors 
Mental Workload 
Group Factors 
Social Exchange 
Cultural Factors 
Communication 
Information 
Work Methods 
 Leadership Factors 
Safety Awareness 
Cultural Factors 
Group Factors 
OUTCOME 
(RISK) 
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LONG TERM 
FACTORS 
SHORT TERM 
(”SITUATIONAL”) 
FACTORS 
OUTCOME 
(RISK) 
+ 
- 
+ 
- 
S / F 1 
S / F 2 
S / F 3 
S / F 4 
Low risk 
High risk + + 
+ 
- 
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S / F 1 
S / F 2 
S / F 3 
S / F 4 
Low risk 
High risk 
- - - 
+ 
or 
”ground rules” 
Social norms   
First example: 
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i.  Official ground rules 
ii.  Explicit ground rules 
iii. Implicit ground rules 
Formal Work methods (e.g. SOP/EOP) 
Agreed work methods within a group 
Unoutspoken work methods within a 
group    
The idea behind ground rules: 
Development of 
ground rules in 
advance for work 
situations  
Each group 
member knows 
how act when 
these work 
situations occur 
*  Productivity 
*  Wellbeing 
*  Safety 
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Development of an efficient work group: 
PHASE   PHASE CHARACTERISTICS 
EFFICI-
ENCY 
WELL-
BEING 
LEADER 
DEPEN-
DENCY 
Forming  
Storming   
Norming   
Performing   
Uncertainty, insecurity, tendency 
to try to get to know each other  
 Somewhat increased security, 
getting to know each other better   
 Tendency to try to work together, 
ground rules develop, definition of 
roles and tasks  
 Optimizing ground role develop-
ment and work efficiency and  
well-being  
 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Higher 
Highest 
Higher 
Highest 
Great 
Great 
Less 
Least 
Conclusions: 
i.  Official and  explicit ground rules are far more efficient than
 implicit ground rules.   
ii.  To develop official ground rules (=SOP/EOP, checklists etc) 
 takes a fair amount of work, money and skill.   
iii.  To develop explicit ground rules takes a fair amount of time 
 together with the members and is hampered by change of 
 group members.  
iv.  To enhance the development of explicit ground rules it is 
 advantageous that the group members have frequent informal 
 and formal social exchange.   
v.  The bigger the difference between the group members´ 
 attitudes and social values (e.g. cultural factors), the more 
 social exchange is required to develop explicit ground rules.   
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In other words: 
Develop and maintain a 
healthy set of official 
and explicit ground 
rules  
Keep the crew intact as 
long as possible  
Have formal  frequent 
meetings within and 
between departments to 
discuss work methods 
etc   
Create formal and informal 
forums for crew members 
to socialize frequently  
or 
Suitable, Qualified Experienced Person 
SQEP 
Second example: 
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Suitable – mental abilities, personality, 
  social skills, leadership aspects 
Qualified – formal qualifications, further 
  training requirements  etc  
Experienced – required and desirable 
   experience of relevant positions 
Person – required age, gender, physical 
  status and bodily shape etc 
   
In other words: 
SQEP 
Structured and systematic 
employment procedure 
Structured overall 
training system   
Proper introduction to a 
new ship 
Systematic training 
onboard incl. “on-the-
job” training 
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Conclusions of the two examples: 
Accident 
risk increase 
Cirumstances 
which deminish 
competence, 
experience and 
ground rule 
development 
Long term 
factors 
Drastic 
accident risk 
increase 
Cirumstances 
which deminish 
competence, 
experience and 
ground rule 
development 
Situational 
factors 
Cirumstances 
which increase 
workload and 
hamper com-
munication 
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Insufficient 
training 
New crew 
members 
Unfamiliar 
with the ship 
(insufficient 
introduction) 
Little formal 
and informal 
contacts 
between crew 
members 
High long 
term workoad 
Lack of 
precedural 
support (SOP/
EOP etc) 
Insufficient 
safety 
management 
Bad 
situational 
leadership 
Big cultural 
differences 
Language 
problems 
Inexperienced 
crew members 
Complex , 
unknown and 
rapidly 
developing 
situation, i.e. 
high workload 
CREW 
1. Safety management awareness 
2. Awareness of negative effects of increased workload 
3. Communication procedures between ECR and bridge 
4. Technical knowledge and experience of senior engineers 
5. Dedication of crew members to safe operations 
6. Willingness to put in extra work when required 
7. Positive attitudes amomg senior engineers to 
 inauguration of formal procedures 
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1. Lack of formal communication procedures in ECR 
2. Lack of training in communication 
3. Too short posting onboard 
4. Lack of structure for training onboard  
5. Missed training opportunities due to work schedule 
6. Increasing number of inexperienced 2nd engineers 
7. Insufficient introduction to a new ship 
8. Lack of structure for formal meetings 
9. Insufficient social exchange  
1. Inauguration of a formal communication structure in ECR  
2. Inauguration of a proper introduction to a new ship 
3. Increase of senior watchkeeper competence 
4. Increase of duty period onboard the ships 
5. Increase of formal and informal contacts between 
 especially the engine and deck departments 
”High Priority Improvements”: 
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”If you think investments in safety 
are expensive, try an accident!” 
Quotation of an unknown: 
Any questions? 
III Education, teaching and research
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Integrated Bridge/Navigation Systems        Ausmees, V.
– Training Needs, as seen by Shipowner 
INTEGRATED BRIDGE / NAVIGATION SYSTEMS - 
TRAINING NEEDS, AS SEEN BY SHIPOWNER 
ver. 08.06.2011 
2 
Vahur Ausmees 
¢  Captain, graduated in St.Petersburg Maritime Academy 
¢  Master of m/s Baltic Queen 
¢  Previously: Victoria I, Fantaasia, HSC AutoExpress 2,  
 Regina Baltica, Baltic Kristina, Normandy, Georg Ots 
¢  Worked on cargo vessels, sailing … 
¢  Lecturer / Instructor of IBS-INS in Estonian Maritime Academy 
 and Maritime College 
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3 
Shipowners interest, based on STCW 
¢  Crewmembers qualification to be equal and predictable – challenge to educational 
institutions 
¢  Onboard training and refresment training to be with high(est) standards and not cost to 
much - challenge to educational institutions and developers of training materials (incl. 
Manufacturers) and shipowners 
¢  Shipowners wants more than minimum competency and do not want pay for that! 
4 
To whom we will receive onboard? 
¢  Below average? 
¢  Meeting STCW competencies? 
¢  Above average? 
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5 
What can do educational institutions? 
¢  Cooperate with Shipowner and teach to the student proper roles (i.e. equal and predictable 
professionals) 
Employer (Shipowner) Education institution 
JOB 
- Responsibilities 
- Tasks 
JOB ANALYSIS 
- Knowledges 
- Skills 
JOB DESCRIPTION 
- Tasks / Functions 
- Responsibilities 
- To whom report 
- Qualifications 
- Etc. 
COMPETENCY 
QUALIFICATION                       
(HAVE TO BE MEASUREABLE!) 
 
- Abilities 
ROLE 
 
Set of: 
- Expected results 
- Responsibilities 
To perform a  
roles > 
(Job description 
can include  
sereral roles) 
< To perform a roles 
6 
Simulation as tool to teach a roles 
¢  Technically perfect simulator have no value, 
if there is working skill-less instructor 
¢  Technically non-perfect simulator is 
valuable, if there is working skilled instructor 
Exercise 
To get experience 
and knowledge 
Reality 
To use experience 
and knowledge 
    How to transfer learning outcome? 
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7 
Cone of learning 
8 
How to achieve more effective learning 
¢  Star Trek bridges from 22nd to 29th century! 
¢  Use available AIS info to create excercises! 
¢  Doing by own hands (sextant)! 
¢  Computer is not only possible simulator! 
http://www.tecepe.com.br/nav/CDSextantProject.htm 
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9 
What can do developers of training materials? 
¢  IBS-INS Onboard familiarization training ?&%%%#! 
10 
What can do developers of training materials? 
¢  User manual can not be used as familiarization training material 
¢  Familiarization by service / installation engineer J J J J  
¢  Web-based (free?) tools? > good story to make a decision for 
buying equipment! 
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11 
Educational institutes, system developers and shipowners 
common goal 
¢  To put in this picture well trained, i.e. 
fullfilling the role, professional 
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Teaching INS                  Martikainen, H.
Satakunnan ammattikorkeakoulu  |  Tekniikka ja merenkulku 
Satakunta University of Applied Sciences  |  Faculty of Technology and Maritime Management 
Teaching INS 
Bridge 2011 Rauma 10.6.2011 
Hannu Martikainen 
Deputy Principal Lecturer 
Satakunnan ammattikorkeakoulu  |  Tekniikka ja merenkulku  
Satakunta University of Applied Sciences  |  Faculty of Technology and Maritime Management 
What is Integrated Bridge System ? 
•  The IBS defines the navigation system to be a complete 
working concept comprising all navigation sensors, 
interfaces to different navigation sub-systems in an 
appropriate way and also takes into consideration bridge 
design and ergonomic factors 
•  ”One-man bridge” is commonly used name for the IBS 
•  even though the technical applications could make it possible, 
manning rules and regulations issued by flag authorities in 
most of the countries still oppose to having the bridge watch 
carried out by one man only 
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Satakunnan ammattikorkeakoulu  |  Tekniikka ja merenkulku  
Satakunta University of Applied Sciences  |  Faculty of Technology and Maritime Management 
Purpose of an integrated navigation system 
•  The purpose of an integrated navigation system (INS) is 
to provide “added value” to the functions and 
information needed by the officer in charge of the 
navigational watch (OOW) 
OOW to plan, monitor or control the progress of the ship 
(MSC 86(70) Annex 3, 1.1) 
Satakunnan ammattikorkeakoulu  |  Tekniikka ja merenkulku  
Satakunta University of Applied Sciences  |  Faculty of Technology and Maritime Management 
INS as part of IBS supports safety of navigation by 
•  evaluating inputs from several independent and different 
sensors 
•  combining the inputs to provide information giving 
timely warnings of potential dangers and degradation of 
integrity of this information 
157
Satakunnan ammattikorkeakoulu  |  Tekniikka ja merenkulku  
Satakunta University of Applied Sciences  |  Faculty of Technology and Maritime Management 
Basic INS configuration consists of  
•  Multi sensor Navigation radar  
•  Dual ECDIS 
•  Track-steering system 
•  Positioning equipment 
•  Duplicated heading source 
•  Speed log  
•  Echo sounder 
•  Conning system 
•  AIS  
•  SSAS 
•  VDR 
•  BNWAS 
•  WSS 
•  GMDSS 
Satakunnan ammattikorkeakoulu  |  Tekniikka ja merenkulku  
Satakunta University of Applied Sciences  |  Faculty of Technology and Maritime Management 
Conventional way to present INS 
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Satakunnan ammattikorkeakoulu  |  Tekniikka ja merenkulku  
Satakunta University of Applied Sciences  |  Faculty of Technology and Maritime Management 
9 
Heading  
Sensors 
Position 
Sensors 
AIS 
Sensor 
Speed 
Sensors 
”WSE” 
Sensor 
Processes like steering, positioning, monitoring etc. 
Work stations 
Sensors 
BNWAS ARPA Track-pilot ECDIS Conning ECDIS RADAR 
INS seen by the processes 
Satakunnan ammattikorkeakoulu  |  Tekniikka ja merenkulku  
Satakunta University of Applied Sciences  |  Faculty of Technology and Maritime Management 
•  some most important 
processes  
•  the most important sensor 
infos 
•  position calculation 
•  position accuracy control 
•  heading determination 
•  speed determination 
•  primary heading 
•  primary position 
•  primary speed 
•  primary depth  
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Satakunnan ammattikorkeakoulu  |  Tekniikka ja merenkulku  
Satakunta University of Applied Sciences  |  Faculty of Technology and Maritime Management 
Some history  
Satakunnan ammattikorkeakoulu  |  Tekniikka ja merenkulku  
Satakunta University of Applied Sciences  |  Faculty of Technology and Maritime Management 
”From stand-alone equipment to networked INS” 
•  still in late 1970´s (even 80´s ) the bridges for newbuildings 
were designed and furnished with stand-alone eqpt 
•  separately installed and furnished in wheelhouse and in 
equipment rooms  
•  radars, echo sounders, gyro compasses, pressure logs 
and all kind of repeaters, even satellite navigators and 
other sensors in use 
•  no electrical connection elsewhere than primary power 
•  No I/O ports - no interfacing 
•  main unit + control unit 
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Satakunnan ammattikorkeakoulu  |  Tekniikka ja merenkulku  
Satakunta University of Applied Sciences  |  Faculty of Technology and Maritime Management 
What happened then ? 
•  R & D in components, computer technologies etc. 
brought some benefits to Maritime business too 
•  first commercial ARPA was delivered in year 1969 by 
NORCONTROL  
•  RAYCAS I had 1978 TM presentation with target tracking and 7 
synthetic drawing lines 
•  Sensor  “data” was born – what to do with it  ? 
Satakunnan ammattikorkeakoulu  |  Tekniikka ja merenkulku  
Satakunta University of Applied Sciences  |  Faculty of Technology and Maritime Management 
What to do - we had. . .  
•  whole bunch of interesting navigation “data” available 
•  speed from log 
•  position from Decca/Loran-C/Transit/GPS navigators 
•  heading from gyro 
•  depth from echo sounder 
•  interfacing started slowly  
•  manufacturers added I/O ports on rear panels and 
created their own standards 
•  home made converters and interface boxes started to spread 
out 
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Satakunnan ammattikorkeakoulu  |  Tekniikka ja merenkulku  
Satakunta University of Applied Sciences  |  Faculty of Technology and Maritime Management 
and we ended up. . .  
•  various proprietary protocols were hanging like 
“TROPICAL LIANAS“ in the jungle  
•  the word INTERFACE became swearword until common 
understanding was found with NMEA 
•  in mid 80´s integration started when almost all 
equipment started to talk same language – NMEA 
Satakunnan ammattikorkeakoulu  |  Tekniikka ja merenkulku  
Satakunta University of Applied Sciences  |  Faculty of Technology and Maritime Management 
Today we have networked INS  
•  networking has also climbed up to the bridges and the 
latest system integration are done by secured and 
doubled BUS connections, even with fiber-optics and 
such 
•  MANUFACTURERS´ FORUM 9.6.  
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Satakunnan ammattikorkeakoulu  |  Tekniikka ja merenkulku  
Satakunta University of Applied Sciences  |  Faculty of Technology and Maritime Management 
We need to remember, that. . .  
•  all operational acts related to watch keeping on the 
bridge requires a human operator despite of automation, 
integration, orbiting satellites and high speed data 
•  GLOBAL maritime transportation of goods cannot be 
done virtually via the satellite or broadband lines, but 
new technologies can support safe navigation on the 
bridges 
Satakunnan ammattikorkeakoulu  |  Tekniikka ja merenkulku  
Satakunta University of Applied Sciences  |  Faculty of Technology and Maritime Management 
Worldwide Maritime ”ruling” order 
•  several operators and organizations together with 
manufacturers and suppliers continuously research and 
develop for new rules and standards to increase the 
safety of Navigation (?)  
•  on the highest top there are IMO, IEC and Classification 
societies all in co-operation, including Flag authorities 
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Satakunnan ammattikorkeakoulu  |  Tekniikka ja merenkulku  
Satakunta University of Applied Sciences  |  Faculty of Technology and Maritime Management 
”ruling” order cont. 
•  IMO, IEC  / ISO and classification societes give: 
•  carriage requirements, performance standards, technical 
requirements for testing, type approvals, training 
•  flag authorities follow what has been said by the above 
Satakunnan ammattikorkeakoulu  |  Tekniikka ja merenkulku  
Satakunta University of Applied Sciences  |  Faculty of Technology and Maritime Management 
Training is a LIFETIME project  
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Satakunnan ammattikorkeakoulu  |  Tekniikka ja merenkulku  
Satakunta University of Applied Sciences  |  Faculty of Technology and Maritime Management 
Target group 
•  Course name : Integrated Bridge Systems  
    MK04218 Integroidut komentosiltajärjestelmät 
•  part of the Master´s studies as specified in STCW 
•  intended for ship´s nautical officers, cadets and other bridge 
team members with responsible duties in navigation operation 
work with INS 
 
 
Satakunnan ammattikorkeakoulu  |  Tekniikka ja merenkulku  
Satakunta University of Applied Sciences  |  Faculty of Technology and Maritime Management 
Course content: 
•  carriage requirements and performance standards 
•  classification societies´s standards for IBS/INS 
•  examples of different system configurations and 
applications 
•  operation +basic functions of INS sensors 
•  INS processes and safe operation 
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Satakunnan ammattikorkeakoulu  |  Tekniikka ja merenkulku  
Satakunta University of Applied Sciences  |  Faculty of Technology and Maritime Management 
•  interconnections and Data transfer between the 
sensors and INS 
•  examples of Failure analysis and actions in failure 
situation 
•  use of INS delivery documentation and fault finding 
procedures 
Satakunnan ammattikorkeakoulu  |  Tekniikka ja merenkulku  
Satakunta University of Applied Sciences  |  Faculty of Technology and Maritime Management 
Target of the IBS/INS course 
•  to gain general understanding and operation of 
integrated navigation system 
•  strengthen the knowledge of the system configuration 
and applications 
•  reading and understanding of the operating manual 
•  using and understanding technical documentation and 
fault finding instructions provided for INS on possible 
failures 
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Satakunnan ammattikorkeakoulu  |  Tekniikka ja merenkulku  
Satakunta University of Applied Sciences  |  Faculty of Technology and Maritime Management 
•  In addition to the completed and accepted written exam 
the trainee has participated in following courses and 
done separate tasks: 
•  Shipbuilding theory 
•  Documentation; reading the diagrams and manuals 
•  Route planning exercise 
•  Simulator training 
•  Personal Study work on given subject 
Satakunnan ammattikorkeakoulu  |  Tekniikka ja merenkulku  
Satakunta University of Applied Sciences  |  Faculty of Technology and Maritime Management 
Training specified by IMO/IEC 
•  manufacturers/suppliers of integrated bridge systems shall 
provide training possibilities for the ship’s crew 
•  training shall take place ashore or on board  
•  shall be carried out by means of suitable material and methods to 
cover the following topics : 
•  general understanding and operation of the system 
•  knowledge and understanding of the system’s configuration and 
application 
•  reading and understanding of the operating manual 
•  usage and understanding of brief descriptions and instructions provided 
on the bridge 
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Satakunnan ammattikorkeakoulu  |  Tekniikka ja merenkulku  
Satakunta University of Applied Sciences  |  Faculty of Technology and Maritime Management 
Who needs INS training and when ? 
•  Cadets/OOWs/Masters ? 
•  Basic training/refresh/ 
•  Pilots 
•  Old school mates 
•  Retrofit vessel´s team 
Satakunnan ammattikorkeakoulu  |  Tekniikka ja merenkulku  
Satakunta University of Applied Sciences  |  Faculty of Technology and Maritime Management 
What happens after the the school ? 
•  New MATE from the school 
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Satakunnan ammattikorkeakoulu  |  Tekniikka ja merenkulku  
Satakunta University of Applied Sciences  |  Faculty of Technology and Maritime Management 
Who takes care of those ”Old school men” ? 
•  Old masters and mates from stand-alone bridge 
 
Satakunnan ammattikorkeakoulu  |  Tekniikka ja merenkulku  
Satakunta University of Applied Sciences  |  Faculty of Technology and Maritime Management 
Co-operation on the bridge – is there ? 
•  Has the BRIDGE TEAM common understanding  
•  DO not forget to introduce INS to the watchman ! 
•  How about on-job training ? 
•  Are the pilots´ skills adequate and up-to-date ? 
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Satakunnan ammattikorkeakoulu  |  Tekniikka ja merenkulku  
Satakunta University of Applied Sciences  |  Faculty of Technology and Maritime Management 
Could engineers sail/navigate the ships ? 
•  See today´s INS + add-on tasks !   
•  Vision of tomorrow  
•  There is no SHORE-based pilotage how about shore 
based navigation 
•  Value added features can be good 
•  Shore-based supprot can be aacepted, but decisions are made 
ON BRIDGE 
•  METRo trains become remotely controlled, but vessels ? 
•  Masters/Mates need more than just traditional navigator
´s tasks  
•  Adminstrator 
Satakunnan ammattikorkeakoulu  |  Tekniikka ja merenkulku  
Satakunta University of Applied Sciences  |  Faculty of Technology and Maritime Management 
In which direction we should develop the training ? 
•  MAINTAINER 
•  ADMINISTRATOR 
•  ELECTRICIAN 
•  FIRST-AID NURSE 
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Satakunnan ammattikorkeakoulu  |  Tekniikka ja merenkulku  
Satakunta University of Applied Sciences  |  Faculty of Technology and Maritime Management 
 
 
Don´t be afraid – Be prepared ! 
 
 
Thank You ! 
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Intelligent Navigation Data Evaluation for Integrated Ship’s Bridge Systems        Müller, R.
Intelligent Navigation Data 
Evaluation for Integrated 
Ship’s Bridge Systems 
Prof. Dr.-Ing. Reinhard Mueller, Capt. 
Dipl.-Math. Michaela Demuth 
Funded by German Federal Ministry of Business and Technology 
DGON - Bridge 
Entwicklung einer integrierten, 
modularen Schiffsführungszentrale 
Gefördert vom  
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Reinhard Mueller, Michaela Demuth BRIDGE 2011, Rauma 
Current Alarm Signals Layout  
§  Bridge equipment signals are not harmonized 
§  Alarms have to be acknowledged individually 
§  Alarms are sorted chronologically 
§  Often Alarms are not situational 
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Reinhard Mueller, Michaela Demuth BRIDGE 2011, Rauma 
Approach 
§  Bridge-wide, overriding data processing 
§  Situation-dependent assessment and 
evaluation of data 
-  Context definition  
-  Context classification  
§  Layout of ship’s bridge sensor architecture 
§  Implementation of an agent-based data fusion 
method  
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Data Fusion on Ship’s Bridge  
Technical  
Systems 
And 
Processes 
Data- 
processing 
 
Multi- 
Layer- 
Model 
Knowledge 
Sign à Data à State Vectors à Labels à Information 
Context  
Information 
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Reinhard Mueller, Michaela Demuth BRIDGE 2011, Rauma 
The Structure of an Agent 
Surroundings 
Knowlegde 
base 
Agent 
Fusion  
Node 
Mgmt. 
Node 
Goal / Event 
Report 
Sensor 1 
Sensor k 
Plan 1 
Plan m 
Internal E. 
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Hierarchical Multi-Layer-Model 
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Reinhard Mueller, Michaela Demuth BRIDGE 2011, Rauma 
Field Study on MS „Cape Flint“ 
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Reinhard Mueller, Michaela Demuth BRIDGE 2011, Rauma 
Data Exploration 
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Motion data 
Machine data  
Environmental data 
Aggregation  
Functional relation 
Classification 
Knowledge Base 
Plans and alternatives 
Thresholds 
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Reinhard Mueller, Michaela Demuth BRIDGE 2011, Rauma 
Data Processing 
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Reinhard Mueller, Michaela Demuth BRIDGE 2011, Rauma 
Context Definition 
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Reinhard Mueller, Michaela Demuth BRIDGE 2011, Rauma 
Context Identification 
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Reinhard Mueller, Michaela Demuth BRIDGE 2011, Rauma 
Context Identification 
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Reinhard Mueller, Michaela Demuth BRIDGE 2011, Rauma 
Context based Information Evaluation 
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Reinhard Mueller, Michaela Demuth BRIDGE 2011, Rauma 
Conclusion 
§  A networking sensor architecture offers an 
enhanced  information management. 
§  An information evaluation has to be dynamical 
designed according to a context.   
§  The methods of Data Fusion using agents are 
suitable exceedingly in view of:  
-   hierarchical structure of data processing 
-   enhancement of information quality by knowledge  
-   dynamical classifying and sorting of data 
-   online data investigation in real time 
§  Reducing the information overflow aboard by a 
Data Fusion approach is a well-promising solution. 
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Cafe – Competitive, Advantage by Safety                 Salokorpi, M.
BRIDGE	  2011	  10.6.2011	  
Mirva	  Salokorpi,	  Kymenlaakso	  University	  of	  Applied	  Sciences	  
30.12.2011	   1	  Kotka	  Mari*me	  Research	  Centre	  –	  Mussalon*e	  428	  B,	  48100	  Kotka	  
The	  results	  of	  METKU	  project	  
The	  inﬂuences	  of	  the	  ISM	  code	  
•  Incident	  and	  near	  miss	  reporJng	  is	  weak	  (shipping	  
companies	  varies	  a	  lot)	  
•  The	  informaJon	  collected	  of	  incident	  and	  near	  miss	  
cases	  has	  not	  been	  used	  or	  shared	  eﬃciently	  (example	  
staJsJcs)	  	  
•  There	  is	  no	  systemaJc	  safety	  improving	  in	  the	  mariJme	  
domain	  (compare	  to	  conJnuous	  improving	  philosophy	  
of	  ISM	  code)	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The	  results	  of	  METKU	  project	  
Best	  pracJces	  for	  mariners	  
•  Safety	  management	  systems	  should	  be	  based	  
on	  risk	  assessment	  (the	  ISM	  code	  don´t	  
support	  that	  at	  the	  moment)	  
•  From	  reacJve	  safety	  management	  level	  to	  
proacJve	  level	  (and	  predicJve)	  	  
•  More	  resources	  for	  shipping	  companies	  
•  More	  training	  
•  Guidance	  and	  good	  examples	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Safety	  management	  levels	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Reac*ve	  method	  
The	  reacJve	  method	  responds	  to	  
events	  that	  have	  already	  
happened,	  such	  as	  incidents	  and	  
accidents.	  
Proac*ve	  method	  
The	  proacJve	  method	  looks	  
acJvely	  for	  the	  idenJﬁcaJon	  of	  
safety	  risks	  through	  the	  analysis	  
of	  the	  organizaJon´s	  acJviJes.	  
Predic*ve	  method	  
The	  predicJve	  method	  
captures	  system	  performance	  
as	  it	  happens	  in	  real-­‐Jme	  
normal	  operaJons	  to	  idenJfy	  
potenJal	  futureproblems.	  
ICAO,	  2008	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CAFE	  project	  
•  Main	  themes:	  
–  Improving	  operaJonal	  mariJme	  safety	  and	  developing	  
proacJve	  safety	  with	  internaJonal	  co-­‐working	  	  
–  The	  inﬂuence	  of	  safety	  management	  for	  compeJJveness	  of	  a	  
shipping	  company	  
•  5	  subjects:	  
–  Developing	  near	  miss	  reporJng	  
–  Developing	  OHS	  indicators	  
–  Modeling	  of	  safety	  management	  
–  CSR	  CorporaJve	  Social	  Responsibility	  
–  Networking	  internaJonally	  –	  co-­‐working	  with	  mariJme	  
safety	  experts	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Developing	  near	  miss	  reporJng	  
•  The	  informaJon	  collecJon	  conJnuing	  
–  Address	  the	  main	  problems	  
–  CollecJng	  experiences	  
–  CollecJng	  best	  pracJces	  and	  good	  examples	  
•  Preparing	  training	  material	  for	  mariJme	  schools	  
•  Workshop	  and	  seminar	  on	  September	  
–  Aim	  to	  determine	  the	  most	  important	  improving	  steps	  
•  Co-­‐working	  with	  authoriJes	  (Finland)	  
•  Inﬂuencing	  and	  co-­‐working	  on	  internaJonal	  level	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Reasons	  for	  lack	  of	  reporJng	  
1.  Fear	  of	  what	  the	  bosses	  will	  think	  and	  do.	  	  
2.  Embarrassment	  with	  respect	  to	  what	  peers	  will	  think	  and	  do.	  	  
3.  Lack	  of	  "real"	  management	  follow-­‐thru	  on	  previous	  reported	  near	  
misses.	  	  
4.  Lack	  of	  company	  commitment	  to	  gedng	  near	  misses	  reported	  and	  
invesJgated,	  including	  lack	  if	  training	  of	  staﬀ	  on	  invesJgaJon.	  	  
5.  The	  workers	  or	  management	  perceive	  there	  to	  be	  much	  more	  eﬀort	  
involved	  in	  invesJgaJng	  near	  misses	  that	  in	  gains	  received.	  	  
6.  Lack	  of	  understanding	  of	  the	  value	  of	  learning	  from	  near	  misses.	  	  
7.  Not	  knowing	  what	  is	  a	  near	  miss	  -­‐-­‐	  most	  know	  the	  diﬀerence	  between	  
NM	  and	  a	  loss	  of	  any	  kind.	  	  
8.  Poor	  reporJng	  system	  for	  near	  misses.	  	  
9.  DisincenJves	  to	  reporJng	  near	  misses.	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Bridges,	  W.	  2011	  
Reasons	  conJnued	  
•  Easy	  to	  report	  
•  Feedback	  	  
•  The	  report	  really	  inﬂuences	  
– Something	  changes	  
•  No	  blaming	  or	  punishment	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How	  the	  reporJng	  system	  works?	  
•  How	  many	  reports	  (per	  year,	  per	  month,	  etc.)?	  
•  The	  quality	  of	  the	  reports	  /	  the	  raJo	  of	  the	  total	  
number	  of	  the	  reports	  
–  How	  many	  accidents/incidents/near	  misses/safety	  ?	  
–  Technical	  problems	  /	  performance	  of	  humans?	  
–  Concerns	  of	  the	  performance	  of	  fellow	  workers	  /	  
mistakes	  of	  the	  reporter´s	  own?	  
–  Concerns	  of	  the	  issues	  that	  are	  able	  to	  observe	  in	  all	  
cases,	  or	  the	  issues	  that	  are	  diﬃcult	  to	  get	  known	  
without	  the	  reports?	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Safety	  ensuring	  system	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Internal	  
reports	  
Internal	  audits	  
External	  audits	  
Other	  sources	  
VDR	  
Safety	  related	  
data	  /informaJon	  
collecJon	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Safety	  pyramid	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1	  
Accident	  
29	  
Incidents	  
300	  
Near	  misses	  
3000	  
Unsafe	  condiJons	  or	  acts	  	   Heinrich,	  1931	  
Safety	  pyramid	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Accident	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Incidents	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Near	  misses	  
3000	  
Unsafe	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  or	  acts	  	  
185
Safety	  pyramid	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Unsafe	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Welcome	  to	  IMISS!	  
•  InternaJonal	  MariJme	  Incident	  and	  Near	  Miss	  
ReporJng	  Seminar	  (www.merikotka.ﬁ/cafe)	  
•  1.-­‐2.9.2011	  in	  Helsinki	  
•  First	  day:	  	  
–  PresentaJons	  experiences	  of	  shipping	  companies	  and	  
other	  domains	  
–  Workshop:	  Plan,	  how	  to	  improve	  
•  Second	  day:	  	  
–  How	  to	  use	  incident	  reports	  in	  safety	  modeling	  
•  ForeSea	  meeJng	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Thank	  you!	  
Mirva.salokorpi@kyamk.ﬁ	  
www.merikotka.ﬁ/cafe	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MarTEL Plus – Maritime English           Ziarati, M. 
               Dr Martin Ziarati 
 
www.martel.pro        	  
Mari&me	  English	  
•  h/p://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=clL1pO_vJ0A	  
•  h/p://www.spike.com/video-­‐clips/
/kn9t/berlitz-­‐sinking-­‐ship	  
•  h/p://www.jokeroo.com/videos/yt/
4bkd1-­‐berlitz-­‐learn-­‐english-­‐ad.html	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Background	  
•  The	  ﬁrst	  MarTEL	  Project	  (2007	  –	  2009)	  created	  
a	  set	  of	  mari&me	  English	  tests	  for	  seafarers.	  
	  
Phase	  1	  
Phase	  2	  
Phase	  3	  
MarTEL	  European	  Partners	  
•  Centre	  for	  Factories	  of	  the	  Future	  
•  TUDEV	  Ins&tute	  of	  Mari&me	  Studies	  
•  Satakunta	  University	  of	  Applied	  Sciences	  
•  Spinaker	  d.o.o.	  	  
•  University	  of	  Strathclyde	  
•  University	  of	  Tromso	  
•  Mari&me	  University	  of	  Szczecin	  	  
•  Glasgow	  College	  of	  Nau&cal	  Studies	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New	  Funding	  Awarded	  
•  In	  August	  2010,	  the	  MarTEL	  Plus	  project	  was	  
awarded	  funding	  by	  the	  European	  Union.	  
•  The	  MarTEL	  Plus	  project	  will	  build	  upon	  the	  
successfully	  concluded	  MarTEL	  project	  with	  a	  
range	  of	  new	  features	  and	  func&onali&es.	  	  
•  The	  project	  will	  run	  for	  a	  period	  of	  two	  years.	  
	  
	  
	  
MarTEL	  Plus	  Core	  Partners	  
•  Centre	  for	  Factories	  of	  the	  Future	  (UK)	  
•  TUDEV	  Ins&tute	  of	  Mari&me	  Studies	  (TR)	  
•  Satakunta	  University	  of	  Applies	  Sciences	  (FI)	  
•  Spinnaker	  d.o.o.	  (SL)	  
•  Nicola	  Vaptsarov	  Naval	  Academy	  (BG)	  
•  World	  Mari&me	  University	  (SE)	  
•  University	  of	  Cadiz	  (ES)	  
•  Centre	  of	  Development	  Works	  /	  OPR	  (PL)	  
•  Na&onal	  Mari&me	  College	  of	  Ireland	  (IE)	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MarTEL	  Plus	  Associated	  Partners	  
•  Mari&me	  Oﬃce	  in	  Szczecin	  (MOS)	  	  
•  Finnish	  Ship	  Oﬃcers'	  Union	  	  
•  Finnish	  Engineer´s	  Oﬃcers	  Associa&on	  	  
•  WinNova	  West	  Coast	  Educa&on	  	  
•  Port	  of	  Rauma	  	  
•  Irish	  Ins&tute	  of	  Master	  Mariners	  	  
•  1st	  Evening	  Voca&onal	  Senior	  School	  of	  Egaleo	  	  
•  Finnish	  Shipowners	  Associa&on	  	  
•  Glasgow	  College	  of	  Nau&cal	  Studies	  	  
•  Transport	  Safety	  Agency	  (Traﬁ)	  	  
•  Bureau	  of	  Voca&onal	  Training	  ,	  Ministry	  of	  Educa&on	  and	  Lifelong	  Learning	  	  
•  University	  of	  the	  Aegean	  	  
•  ASAP	  English	  Courses	  
•  Kiev	  State	  University	  
The	  Project	  	  
•  Enhanced	  speaking	  test,	  with	  one-­‐to-­‐one	  examina&on.	  
•  Test	  of	  mari&me	  English	  for	  ra&ngs.	  	  
•  Teachers’	  Guidelines	  for	  all	  MarTEL	  tests.	  	  
•  Mobile	  phone	  applica&on	  with	  prac&ce	  tests.	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Enhanced	  speaking	  test	  
•  Developed	  by	  experts	  at	  Nicola	  Vaptsarov	  Naval	  Academy;	  
the	  same	  people	  who	  developed	  the	  STANAG	  6001	  test	  for	  
NATO.	  
•  Mul&-­‐level	  test,	  guided	  by	  the	  interviewer.	  	  
•  Based	  on	  extensive	  research	  into	  tests	  such	  as	  RELTA,	  SEW,	  
OPI,	  and	  STANAG	  6001.	  
Enhanced	  speaking	  test	  
•  The	  IMO	  requirements	  for	  English	  language	  competence	  needed	  for	  work	  in	  the	  mari&me	  
environment	  have	  been	  s&pulated	  in	  SOLAS,	  Chapter	  5	  and	  the	  STCW	  conven&on	  and	  code.	  
To	  sum	  them	  up,	  they	  can	  all	  be	  expressed	  as	  the	  ability	  to	  communicate:	  
	  
–  with	  other	  ships	  and	  coast	  sta&ons	  	  
–  with	  mul&lingual	  crews	  in	  a	  common	  language	  
–  informa&on	  relevant	  to	  the	  safety	  of	  life	  at	  sea	  ,	  pollu&on	  preven&on,	  etc.	  
	  	  
•  The	  ISM	  Code,	  in	  addi&on,	  emphasizes	  the	  need	  for	  eﬀec&ve	  communica&on	  in	  the	  
execu&on	  of	  crew’s	  du&es,	  which	  in	  prac&ce	  is	  usually	  made	  in	  English.	  
Velikova,	  G;	  Toncheva,	  S;	  Zlateva,	  D:	  ‘On	  the	  Way	  to	  Developing	  a	  MarTEL	  Plus	  Speaking	  Test’	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Test	  of	  mari&me	  English	  for	  ra&ngs	  	  
•  Developed	  by	  subject	  specialists	  at	  TUDEV,	  
SUAS,	  and	  OPR,	  with	  support	  from	  NMCI.	  	  
•  Will	  feature	  a	  range	  of	  tasks	  appropriate	  for	  
tes&ng	  the	  eﬀec&ve	  communica&on	  of	  
ra&ngs.	  
•  En&tled	  ‘Phase	  R’.	  
Phase	  R	  -­‐	  Deck	  
Read	  the	  ques&on	  choose	  the	  correct	  picture.	  
	  
Q.	  	  Which	  picture	  shows	  ‘a	  mooring	  line	  around	  a	  
bollard’?	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Phase	  R	  -­‐	  Engineering	  
Read	  the	  ques&on	  choose	  the	  correct	  picture.	  
	  
Q.	  Which	  one	  is	  a	  turbocharger?	  
	  	   	  	   	  	  	   	   	  	  	   	   	  	  	  	  
	  	   	  	  	   	   	  	  	   	   	  	  	  	  
Teachers’	  Guidelines	  
•  Developed	  by	  mari&me	  English	  Teachers	  at	  UCA,	  NMCI,	  
C4FF,	  and	  OPR.	  	  
•  Follows	  a	  ‘task	  based’	  approach.*	  
•  A	   func&onal	   and	   topic	  oriented	   syllabus	  has	  been	  devised	  
aqer	   pairing	   into	   one	   structured	   syllabus	   IMO’s	   model	  
course	  learning	  outcomes,	  SMCP	  chapters,	  tasks,	  and	  skills’	  
typology.*	  
	  *	  Prof	  Araceli	  Losey	  Leon,	  ‘MarTEL	  Plus	  Teachers’	  Guidelines;	  A	  TheoreBcal	  Framework’	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Teachers’	  Guidelines	  
•  Includes:	  
– Syllabus	  design	  for	  teachers	  
– Teaching	  &ps	  
– Skills	  based	  tasks	  for	  reading,	  listening,	  speaking	  
and	  wri&ng	  
Teachers’	  Guidelines	  
MarTEL	  Plus	  teachers’	  guidelines	  also	  provide	  sample	  lesson	  plan	  sheets	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Mobile	  Phone	  Applica&on	  
•  Developed	  by	  Spinaker	  d.o.o.,	  the	  largest	  
mari&me	  educa&on	  company	  in	  Slovenia.	  	  
•  SPIN’s	  previous	  work,	  ‘www.egmdss.com’	  was	  
chosen	  as	  one	  of	  9	  best	  from	  443	  e-­‐learning	  
resources	  in	  the	  "My	  favourite	  e-­‐learning	  
resources"	  contest*	  	  
*(16.6.2006	  -­‐	  an	  European	  Commission	  ini&a&ve	  elearningeuropa.info).	  
Mobile	  Phone	  Applica&on	  
•  Self	  assessment	  applica&on	  for	  mobile	  phones,	  directly	  
connected	  to	  the	  Learning	  Management	  System	  	  
•  Several	  mobile	  learning	  soqware	  packages	  were	  tested,	  and	  
the	  best	  was	  selected	  for	  use	  in	  MarTEL	  Plus.	  
•  Content	  will	  be	  developed	  by	  mari&me	  educa&on	  specialists	  
and	  made	  available	  in	  the	  coming	  months.	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Mobile	  Phone	  Applica&on	  
	  
Screenshot	  of	  download	  page	  
MarTEL Website  
www.martel.pro 
 
MarTEL Plus Website 
www.plus.martel.pro 	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Captains – Communication and Practical Training Applied in Nautical Studies      Ziarati, M.
Summary	  
	  
	  	  
	  A	  recent	  study	  found	  that	  almost	  65%	  of	  all	  	  
commercial	  ships	  have	  mul8na8onal	  crews.	  Over	  10%	  
of	  the	  ﬂeet	  has	  crews	  with	  members	  from	  ﬁve	  or	  
more	  na8onali8es.	  	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  (Kahveki,	  E.	  Lane	  T.	  	  and	  Sampson,	  H.,	  (2001),	  	  Transna8onal	  Seafarers	  	  Communi8es,	  Cardiﬀ	  University,	  Seafarers	  Interna8onal	  Research	  
Centre,	  Cardiﬀ.)	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Summary	  
	  
	  The	  STCW	  conven8on,	  which	  speciﬁes	  the	  
minimum	  standards	  for	  training	  and	  
cer8ﬁca8on	  of	  seafarers	  in	  133	  countries	  
worldwide,	  speciﬁes	  that	  seafarers	  should	  be	  
able	  to	  speak	  English.	  	  
Summary	  
	  
	  The	  CAPTAINS	  project	  will	  provide	  computer	  
based	  English	  language	  training	  materials	  and	  
courses	  for	  non-­‐na8ve	  speakers	  of	  English,	  
aimed	  speciﬁcally	  at	  the	  seafaring	  voca8on.	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Summary	  
	  
	  The	  materials	  and	  courses	  will	  be	  designed	  
following	  a	  thorough	  needs	  analysis	  of	  
seafarers	  and	  mari8me	  English	  teachers	  from	  
all	  around	  the	  world,	  and	  will	  be	  created	  in	  
collabora8on	  with	  experienced	  captains,	  chief	  
engineers,	  and	  mari8me	  English	  experts.	  	  
Main	  Goals	  	  
	   	  	  
•  To	  contribute	  to	  an	  enhanced	  safety	  at	  sea	  culture	  by	  improving	  English	  
communica8on	  skills,	  oral	  or	  wriYen,	  through	  the	  	  iden8ﬁca8on	  of	  safety	  issues	  
based	  on	  exis8ng	  real-­‐life	  cri8cal	  situa8ons	  emerging	  from	  English	  communica8on	  
problems	  and	  diverse	  cultures	  due	  to	  mul8-­‐na8onal	  ship	  crews.	  
	  
•  To	  create	  a	  respec8ve	  knowledge	  base	  of	  such	  real-­‐life	  scenarios	  of	  ineﬀec8ve	  
English	  communica8on	  and	  their	  relevance	  to	  poten8al	  cri8cal	  situa8ons.	  
	  
•  To	  develop	  aYrac8ve	  rich	  media	  interac8ve	  virtual	  simulators	  of	  iden8ﬁed	  real-­‐life	  
scenarios	  taking	  place	  on	  ship	  (bridge,	  engine,	  deck	  and	  social	  interac8on)	  to	  allow	  
for	  eﬀec8ve	  learning	  of	  func8onal	  communica8on	  of	  mari8me	  English	  and	  avoid	  
culturally	  originated	  communica8ve	  incompetence	  or	  misunderstandings.	  
	  	  	  
•  To	  achieve	  transfer	  and	  evolu8on	  of	  knowledge	  by	  merging	  advanced	  learning/
collabora8on	  and	  evalua8on	  so[ware	  that	  already	  exists	  (AIT)	  and	  the	  rich	  media	  
interac8ve	  learning	  simula8ons	  resul8ng	  from	  aims	  2	  and	  3.	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Main	  Goals	  	  
•  To	  develop	  an	  assessment	  method	  which	  will	  lead	  to	  some	  form	  of	  cer8ﬁca8on,	  
thereby	  allowing	  professionals	  to	  establish	  a	  meaningful	  and	  well-­‐established	  as	  
well	  as	  standardised	  way	  to	  carry	  out	  safety	  cri8cal	  procedures	  based	  on	  a	  
communica8on	  on	  meaningful	  topics.	  	  
	  
•  To	  increase	  coopera8on	  between	  the	  training	  ins8tu8ons	  and	  several	  social	  
partners	  for	  overcoming	  linguis8c	  and	  cultural	  deﬁciencies,	  resul8ng	  in	  the	  need	  to	  
develop	  new	  voca8onal	  skills	  such	  as	  communica8ve	  English	  competence.	  
Op8mized	  learning	  will	  be	  achieved	  by	  using	  real-­‐life	  scenarios	  for	  prepara8on	  of	  
innova8ve	  rich	  media	  simula8ons	  that	  will	  mo8vate	  learners,	  deﬁning	  a	  scenario-­‐
based	  learning	  approach.	  	  	  
	  
•  To	  enhance	  mari8me	  VET	  by	  integra8ng	  innova8ve	  Informa8on	  and	  
Communica8on	  Technology	  (ICT)	  together	  with	  the	  latest	  reﬁnements	  in	  
Communica8ve	  Language	  Teaching	  (CLT)	  in	  mari8me	  VET.	  	  
	  
Partners	  
•  University	  of	  the	  Aegean	  (AEGEAN)	  
•  Centre	  for	  Factories	  of	  the	  Future	  (C4FF)	  
•  Athens	  InformaAon	  Technology	  (AIT)	  
•  TUDEV	  InsAtute	  of	  MariAme	  Studies	  
•  1st	  Evening	  VocaAonal	  Senior	  School	  of	  Egaleo	  (EPAL)	  
•  Osrodek	  Prac	  Rozwojowych	  (OPR	  -­‐	  Centre	  for	  Development	  
Works)	  
•  University	  of	  Cadiz	  (UCA)	  
•  Bureau	  of	  VocaAonal	  Training,	  3rd	  Sector	  of	  Athens,	  Ministry	  of	  
EducaAon	  and	  Lifelong	  Learning	  (BVT)	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Work	  Packages	  
•  WP1	  Project	  Management	  
•  WP2	  User	  Requirements	  CollecAon	  and	  Needs	  Analysis	  
•  WP3	  Novel	  Learning	  Approaches	  
•  WP4	  Course	  Design	  and	  Development	  
•  WP5	  Learning	  PlaWorm	  
•  WP6	  Training	  Events	  and	  EvaluaAon	  
•  WP7	  DisseminaAon	  
•  WP8	  ExploitaAon	  and	  Sustainability	  
WP2	  –	  User	  Requirements	  
Collec8on	  and	  Analysis	  	  
	  
•  To	  come	  in	  close	  contact	  with	  stakeholders	  and	  target	  user	  groups	  in	  the	  
mari8me	  sector	  in	  order	  to	  fully	  understand	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  problem	  
of	  ineﬀec8ve	  English	  communica8on.	  
•  To	  form	  up	  ques8onnaires,	  contact	  interviews,	  run	  user	  workshops,	  etc.	  
so	  as	  to	  gather	  appropriate	  feedback	  and	  analyse	  the	  needs	  of	  target	  
user	  groups	  based	  on	  the	  ini8al	  discussions	  with	  them.	  
	  
•  To	  deﬁne	  a	  knowledge	  base	  of	  mari8me	  accidents	  where	  poor	  
communica8on	  in	  English	  was	  a	  contribu8ng	  factor.	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WP2	  –	  User	  Requirements	  
Collec8on	  and	  Analysis	  
Deliverables	  
	  
•  User	  workshop	  results	  report.	  
•  Knowledge	  base	  of	  mari8me	  accidents	  due	  to	  ineﬀec8ve	  English	  
communica8on.	  	  
WP2	  –	  User	  Requirements	  
Collec8on	  and	  Analysis	  
Knowledge	  Base	  
	  
•  A	  knowledge	  base	  containing	  reports	  of	  mari8me	  accidents	  contributed	  
to	  by	  failures	  in	  communica8on	  was	  formed	  by	  C4FF.	  	  
•  Two	  examples	  came	  from	  ques8onnaire	  par8cipants.	  	  
•  The	  knowledge	  base	  has	  been	  sampled	  in	  the	  course	  design	  process	  
(which	  is	  ongoing).	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Completed	  Steps	  
	  
•  Research	  on	  mari8me	  accidents	  due	  to	  communica8on	  
failures	  	  
•  Online	  Surveys	  
–  Seafarers’	  	  ques8onnaire	  
–  Mari8me	  English	  Teachers’	  ques8onnaire	  
•  Analysis	  of	  Surveys	  -­‐	  learning	  needs	  
•  Workshops	  with	  Academia,	  Industry	  and	  Stakeholders	  
•  Syllabus	  design	  -­‐	  content	  and	  level	  sedng	  
Future	  Steps	  
	  
•  Syllabus	  review	  
•  Training	  scenarios	  	  
•  E-­‐learning	  	  system	  
•  2D/3D	  Anima8ons	  
•  Implementa8on	  
–  ini8al	  training	  sessions	  
–  Evalua8on	  
–  Final	  training	  session	  
•  Dissemina8on	  and	  Exploita8on	  
•  Sustainability	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M’aider                    Ziarati, M. & R.
	  
 
 
M’AIDER  
(MAYDAY)  
	  
Prof.	  R.	  Ziara+	  
Dr.	  	  Mar+n	  Ziara+	  
Oﬃcer	  Ugurcan	  Acar	  
	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Bridge	  2011	  –	  Rauma,	  Finland	  
	  
STCW	  was	  introduced	  in	  1995.	  	  	  
This	  is	  some	  15	  years	  ago	  
	  
	  
Research	  at	  TUDEV	  has	  shown	  that	  
STCW	  has	  a	  number	  of	  deﬁciencies.	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B Communication 24%
C Equipment failure including engines 16%
D Confusion due to standards and regulations 12%
E Inadequacy of standards/applications by third parties 8%
F Unknown 12%
Disputed/Vague
Mainly disregard for 
current standards & 
regulations.
Mainly human error Partly human error
Partly disregard for current 
standards & regulations.
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Common Factors in Groundings
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Poor manning level
Bad decision making
Fatigue
Inexperience
Poor communication between personel
Poor use of radar
Unfamiliarity with area
Poor voyage plan
Poor judgement of speed
Tiredness
Poor visibility
Poor use of charts
Equipment Location Failure
Number of times Factor was a Contributary Cause 
 
Common Factors in Collisions
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Poor manning level
Broke Rules
Bad decision making
Poor lookout
Poor training
Unfamiliarity with equipment
Fatigue
Over working
Inexperience
Poor communication between personel
Radio failure
Poor use of radar
Number of times Factor was a Contributary Cause 
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Iden+ﬁed	  Deﬁciencies	  
	  
1. 	  STCW	  content	  –	  SOS	  (2005-­‐07)	  	  
	  
2.	  Language	  Competence	  –	  MarTEL	  (2007-­‐09)	  
(Interna+onal	  standards	  for	  Mari+me	  English)	  
	  
3.	  Automa+on	  –	  SURPASS	  (2009-­‐11)	  
	  
4.	  Emergency	  situa+ons	  –	  M’aider	  (2009-­‐11)	  
	  
5.	  Environment	  -­‐	  Clean	  Diesel	  (2010-­‐13)	  
	  
6.	  Compliance	  -­‐	  EMSA	  	  	  
	  
Address	  Deﬁciencies	  
	  
Wait	  for	  IMO	  vs.	  Take	  ac+on	  	  
	  
TUDEV	  and	  C4FF	  choices:	  
	  
Find	  means	  to	  address	  deﬁciencies	  
	  
Approach	  IMO,	  UN,	  EU,	  Na+onal	  Government,	  
Industry?	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•  IMO	  has	  passed	  the	  responsibility	  for	  delivery	  
and	   assessment	   of	   Merchant	   Navy	   Oﬃcers	  
programmes	   to	   member	   countries	   and	   does	  
not	   take	   part,	   in	   any	   shape	   or	   form,	   in	   the	  
inspec+on,	   evalua+on	   or	   delivery	   of	   these	  
programmes	  (ibid).	  
	  	  
•  IMO	   cannot	  work	   alone.	   	   Governments,	   and	  
related	   industries	   should	   show	   the	   same	  
determina+on	  to	  implement	  these	  standards.	  	  
	  
	  
	  
IMO	  –	  Can	  be	  sluggish	  and	  reac+ve	  
	  
UN	  –	  Lacks	  resources	  
	  
EU	  –	  Progressive,	  proac+ve	  and	  willing	  
	  
Na+onal	  Government	  –	  a	  mix	  bag	  
	  
Industry	  –	  Aware	  of	  problems	  and	  willing	  
	  
Professional	  bodies	  –	  Very	  suppor+ve	  	  
	  
Awarding	  bodies	  –	  Very	  Suppor+ve	  
	  
Licensing	  authori+es	  –	  At	  +mes	  can	  be	  diﬃcult,	  
but	  willing	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MarEDU	  (TUDEV	  and	  C4FF	  ini+ally)	  Choice	  
	  
• Form	  consor+ums	  
• Seek	  support	  from	  major	  	  bodies	  
• Conduct	  serious	  research	  into	  iden+ﬁed	  problems	  	  
• Develop	  serious	  proposals	  
• Develop	  and	  mo+vate	  staﬀ	  	  
• Publish	  papers	  in	  conferences	  and	  journals	  
• Seek	  partners	  	  
	  
	  
	  
 
TUDEV 
 
Ø   BTEC CENTRE (ACADEMIC) 
Ø  NVQ CENTRE (VOCATIONAL) 
Ø  ASSESSMENT & VERIFIER CENTRE 
Ø  GEMİ ADAMLARI SINAVLARI  
   MERKEZİ -   (GASM) – MCA 
   EQUIVALENT 
Ø  LEONARDO PROJECT SITE 
    
NORWAY 
: 
Ø  TROMSÖ UNIVERSITY-COLLEGE 
    DECK / ENGINEER OFFICERS, 
    CHIEF MATE/MASTER/ CAPTAIN 
     
 
    
 UNITED KINGDOM 
Ø   Degrees/Phils/PhDs –  
    
  De Montfort University 
   Coventry University 
 
Ø   National/transnational Projects 
 
    
EUROPEAN 
Ø   Center for Factories of Future  
Ø   EU Education and Training 
     Programmes 
Ø    EU Framework P rogrammes   
    
SCOTLAND 
Ø   DECK & ENGINEER OFFICERS, CHIEF 
    MATES/ENGINEER   
 
    GLASKOW COLLEGE OF NAUTICAL 
    STUDIES: 
   Navigation 
    Marine Engineering 
    + Higher Diplomas 
 
Ø  Captain/ Master/ Chief Engineer 
    STRATHCLYDE UNIVERSITY 
    + Degrees / Higher Degrees 
    
ENGLAND 
Ø   DECK & ENGINEER OFFICERS, CHIEF 
    MATES/ENGINEERS 
 
    SOUTH TYNESIDE COLLEGE: 
    Navigation 
    Marine Engineering 
    + Higher Diploma 
 
Ø  Captain/ Master/ Chief Engineer 
   NORTHUMBERIA UNIVERSITY 
 
    + Degrees / Higher Degrees 
    
TRANSNATIONAL 
Ø   MAREDU ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
     Composed of representatives  
     from partner organisations               
    
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 
BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY  EDUCATION   
COUNCIL  (BTEC – EDEXCEL) 
l    HIGHER DIPLOMAS  
l    ACADEMIC 
l    VOCATIONAL  
 
  
STUDENTS AND STAFF ARE MEMBERS 
OF INSTITUTE OF MARINE 
ENGINEERING, SCIENCE  & 
TECHNOLOGY (IMarEST) –  
 ROYAL CHARTER TO AWARD 
 PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS 
 
MEMBER OF ENGINEERING COUNCIL 
  WASHINGTON ACCORD TREATY 
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Main	  educa+on	  and	  training	  problem	  areas	  :	  
-­‐	  Knowledge	  of	  English	  
	  
-­‐	  Correct	  applica+on	  of	  mari+me	  terms	  and	  
terminologies	  
	  
-­‐	  Ability	  to	  use	  naviga+on	  tools	  and	  automa+on	  
	  
-­‐	  Conformance	  with	  standards	  or	  rules	  and	  conven+ons	  
	  
-­‐	  Applica+on	  of	  current	  standards	  or	  conven+ons	  by	  
third	  par+es	  
	  
-­‐ Inadequate	  standards	  
	  
Source:	  ziara+	  (2006)	  
	  
EDUCATION AND CULTURE                                                                                                                                                               
- EU Leonardo SOS (Safety on Sea) Project, TR/05/B/P/PP/178 001, 2005	  
- EU Leonardo TRAIN 4Cs Mobility Project, TR/06/A/F/PL1-132, 2006	  
- EU Leonardo E-GMDSS Project, SI/06/B/F/PP-176006, 2006	  
- EU Leonardo MarTEL Project, UK/07/LLP-LdV/TOI-049, 2007	  
- EU Leonardo TRAIN 4Cs – II Project,  2008-1-TR-LEO01-00681, 2008	  
- EU Leonardo E-GMDSSVET Project, 142173-LLP-1-2008-1-SI	  
- EU Leonardo EBDIG Project, UK/09/LLP-LdV/TOI-163_262, 2009	  
- EU Leonardo MarEng Plus Project (Maritime English  Programmes)	  
- EU Leonardo M’Aider Project, 	  2009-­‐1-­‐NL1-­‐LEO05-­‐01624, 2009	  
- EU Leonardo SURPASS Project  2009-1-TR1-LEO05-08652, 2009   	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EDUCATION AND CULTURE                                                                                                                                                               
 
M’AIDER	  	  (MAYDAY)	  	  
 
-    To improve safety at sea and at ports by identifying emergency situations 
known so far and create knowledge based  scenarios for training of 
seafarers at officer level and higher ranks.   
-   To develop exercises based on scenarios created for application in bridge, 
engine room, propulsion areas as well as in integrated and full mission 
simulators. 
-   To transfer the knowledge that already exists in the form of a software 
suite together with an existing internet e-learning/assessment to integrate 
the scenarios and exercises created based on above aims.  
 
Partners: Satakunta University (SUAS), FI; Glasgow College of Nautical Studies 
(GCNS), Scotland; Tromsø University College (TUC), NO; Maritime University of 
Szczecin (MUS), PL ; Spinaker (SPIN), SL ; Centre for Factories of the Future 
(C4FF) UK 
Research	  Findings	  
The	  major+ty	  of	  accidents	  at	  sea	  and	  ports	  are	  
mainly	  due	  to	  either	  disregard	  for	  rules	  or	  
inadequate	  training	  and	  their	  assessment,	  
par+cularly	  rela+ng	  to	  use	  of	  naviga+onal	  
equipment	  and	  issues	  concerning	  survival	  at	  
sea	  and	  ﬁre-­‐ﬁgh+ng.	  
	  
Crews	  were	  found	  not	  to	  be	  prepared	  or	  
trained	  for	  emergency	  situa+ons	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Marine	  Simulators	  
Development	  of	  Scenarios	  
•  MET	  Experience	  
•  Case	  Studies	  –	  Accidents	  and	  Incidents	  
•  Surveys/QuesDonnaires	  
•  RepresentaDve	  samples	  
•  Scenarios	  
•  Exercise	  Format	  
•  Text	  
•  E-­‐material:	  Text,	  Picture,	  Video,	  Anima+on	  
•  Simulators	  
214
Exercise	  Format	  
•  Objec+ve	  
•  Subject	  Area	  
•  Ini+al	  Condi+ons	  
•  Instructor’s	  Notes	  
•  Brieﬁng	  
•  Simula+on	  Exercise	  
•  De-­‐Brieﬁng	  
•  Analysis	  
•  Evalua+on	  of	  training	  exercise	  
•  Conclusion	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Thank	  you	  for	  your	  ahen+on	  
	  
M’AIDER	  
MAY DAY  
	  
	  
Prof.	  R.	  Ziara+	  
Dr.	  Mar+n	  Ziara+	  
Oﬃcer	  Ugurcan	  Acar	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION 
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MariFuture                     Ziarati, M. & R.
	  
 
 
MariFuture  
 
	  
Prof.	  Reza	  Ziara-	  
Dr.	  	  Mar-n	  Ziara-	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Bridge	  2011	  –	  Rauma,	  Finland	  
B Communication 24%
C Equipment failure including engines 16%
D Confusion due to standards and regulations 12%
E Inadequacy of standards/applications by third parties 8%
F Unknown 12%
Disputed/Vague
Mainly disregard for 
current standards & 
regulations.
Mainly human error Partly human error
Partly disregard for current 
standards & regulations.
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60%19%
11%
10%
Human Error
Structure/Mechanical
Failure
Equipment Failure
Other Causes
Iden-ﬁed	  Deﬁciencies	  
	  
1. 	  STCW	  content	  –	  SOS	  (2005-­‐07)	  	  
	  
2.	  Language	  Competence	  –	  MarTEL	  (2007-­‐09)	  
(Interna-onal	  standards	  for	  Mari-me	  English)	  
	  
3.	  Automa-on	  –	  SURPASS	  (2009-­‐11)	  
	  
4.	  Emergency	  situa-ons	  –	  M’aider	  (2009-­‐11)	  
	  
5.	  Environment	  -­‐	  Clean	  Diesel	  (2010-­‐13)	  
	  
6.	  Compliance	  -­‐	  EMSA	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Address	  Deﬁciencies	  
	  
Wait	  for	  IMO	  vs.	  Take	  ac-on	  	  
	  
TUDEV	  and	  C4FF	  choices:	  
	  
Find	  means	  to	  address	  deﬁciencies	  
	  
Approach	  IMO,	  UN,	  EU,	  Na-onal	  Government,	  
Industry?	  
	  
IMO	  –	  Can	  be	  sluggish	  and	  reac-ve	  
	  
UN	  –	  Lacks	  resources	  
	  
EU	  –	  Progressive,	  proac-ve	  and	  willing	  
	  
Na-onal	  Government	  –	  a	  mix	  bag	  
	  
Industry	  –	  Aware	  of	  problems	  and	  willing	  
	  
Professional	  bodies	  –	  Very	  suppor-ve	  	  
	  
Awarding	  bodies	  –	  Very	  Suppor-ve	  
	  
Licensing	  authori-es	  –	  At	  -mes	  can	  be	  diﬃcult,	  
but	  willing	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•  IMO	  has	  passed	  the	  responsibility	  for	  delivery	  
and	   assessment	   of	   Merchant	   Navy	   Oﬃcers	  
programmes	   to	   member	   countries	   and	   does	  
not	   take	   part,	   in	   any	   shape	   or	   form,	   in	   the	  
inspec-on,	   evalua-on	   or	   delivery	   of	   these	  
programmes	  (ibid).	  
	  	  
•  IMO	   cannot	  work	   alone.	   	   Governments,	   and	  
related	   industries	   should	   show	   the	   same	  
determina-on	  to	  implement	  these	  standards.	  	  
	  
	  
	  
MarEDU	  (TUDEV	  and	  C4FF	  ini-ally)	  Choice	  
	  
• Form	  consor-ums	  
• Seek	  support	  from	  major	  	  bodies	  
• Conduct	  serious	  research	  into	  iden-ﬁed	  problems	  	  
• Develop	  serious	  proposals	  
• Develop	  and	  mo-vate	  staﬀ	  	  
• Publish	  papers	  in	  conferences	  and	  journals	  
• Seek	  partners	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TUDEV 
 
Ø   BTEC CENTRE (ACADEMIC) 
Ø  NVQ CENTRE (VOCATIONAL) 
Ø  ASSESSMENT & VERIFIER CENTRE 
Ø  GEMİ ADAMLARI SINAVLARI  
   MERKEZİ -   (GASM) – MCA 
   EQUIVALENT 
Ø  LEONARDO PROJECT SITE 
    
NORWAY 
: 
Ø  TROMSÖ UNIVERSITY-COLLEGE 
    DECK / ENGINEER OFFICERS, 
    CHIEF MATE/MASTER/ CAPTAIN 
     
 
    
 UNITED KINGDOM 
Ø   Degrees/Phils/PhDs –  
    
  De Montfort University 
   Coventry University 
 
Ø   National/transnational Projects 
 
    
EUROPEAN 
Ø   Center for Factories of Future  
Ø   EU Education and Training 
     Programmes 
Ø    EU Framework P rogrammes   
    
SCOTLAND 
Ø   DECK & ENGINEER OFFICERS, CHIEF 
    MATES/ENGINEER   
 
    GLASKOW COLLEGE OF NAUTICAL 
    STUDIES: 
   Navigation 
    Marine Engineering 
    + Higher Diplomas 
 
Ø  Captain/ Master/ Chief Engineer 
    STRATHCLYDE UNIVERSITY 
    + Degrees / Higher Degrees 
    
ENGLAND 
Ø   DECK & ENGINEER OFFICERS, CHIEF 
    MATES/ENGINEERS 
 
    SOUTH TYNESIDE COLLEGE: 
    Navigation 
    Marine Engineering 
    + Higher Diploma 
 
Ø  Captain/ Master/ Chief Engineer 
   NORTHUMBERIA UNIVERSITY 
 
    + Degrees / Higher Degrees 
    
TRANSNATIONAL 
Ø   MAREDU ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
     Composed of representatives  
     from partner organisations               
    
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 
BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY  EDUCATION   
COUNCIL  (BTEC – EDEXCEL) 
l    HIGHER DIPLOMAS  
l    ACADEMIC 
l    VOCATIONAL  
 
  
STUDENTS AND STAFF ARE MEMBERS 
OF INSTITUTE OF MARINE 
ENGINEERING, SCIENCE  & 
TECHNOLOGY (IMarEST) –  
 ROYAL CHARTER TO AWARD 
 PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS 
 
MEMBER OF ENGINEERING COUNCIL 
  WASHINGTON ACCORD TREATY 
 
EDUCATION AND CULTURE                                                                                                                                                               
- EU Leonardo SOS (Safety on Sea) Project, TR/05/B/P/PP/178 001, 2005	  
- EU Leonardo TRAIN 4Cs Mobility Project, TR/06/A/F/PL1-132, 2006	  
- EU Leonardo E-GMDSS Project, SI/06/B/F/PP-176006, 2006	  
- EU Leonardo MarTEL Project, UK/07/LLP-LdV/TOI-049, 2007	  
- EU Leonardo TRAIN 4Cs – II Project,  2008-1-TR-LEO01-00681, 2008	  
- EU Leonardo E-GMDSSVET Project, 142173-LLP-1-2008-1-SI	  
- EU Leonardo EBDIG Project, UK/09/LLP-LdV/TOI-163_262, 2009	  
- EU Leonardo MarEng Plus Project (Maritime English  Programmes)	  
- EU Leonardo M’Aider Project, 	  2009-­‐1-­‐NL1-­‐LEO05-­‐01624, 2009	  
- EU Leonardo SURPASS Project  2009-1-TR1-LEO05-08652, 2009    
-  www.marifuture.org	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Research	  Findings	  
The	  major-ty	  of	  accidents	  at	  sea	  and	  ports	  are	  
mainly	  due	  to	  either	  disregard	  for	  rules	  or	  
inadequate	  training	  and	  their	  assessment,	  
par-cularly	  rela-ng	  to	  use	  of	  naviga-onal	  
equipment	  and	  automated	  systems	  on	  board	  
vessels	  
	  
MariFuture 
	  	  
• 	  MariFuture	  is	  an	  extensive	  network	  of	  mari-me	  	  
organisa-ons 
	  
• 	  MariFuture	  is	  primarily	  involved	  with	  iden-fying	  	  
the	  research,	  educa-on	  and	  training	  needs	  of	  the	  
mari-me	  industries 
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MariFuture	  Objec-ves	   
• Iden0fying	  educa0on	  and	  training	  needs	  of	  the	  mari0me	  industry 
• Iden0fying	  the	  research	  and	  development	  needs 
• Looking	  for	  solu0ons	  to	  problems	  faced	  by	  mari0me	  educa0on	  and	  
training	  organisa0ons 
• Looking	  for	  R&D	  solu0ons	  or	  ini0a0ng	  new	  research	  and/or	  
development	  work. 
• Promo0ng	  good	  prac0ce	  in	  mari0me	  educa0on	  and	  training. 
• Seeking	  funds	  for	  Educa0on	  and	  research	  projects 
• Suppor0ng	  projects	  involved	  in	  mari0me	  educa0on	  and	  training. 
• Oﬀering	  advice	  and	  guidance	  to	  the	  mari0me	  educa0on	  and	  training	  
ins0tu0ons. 
• A	  Point	  of	  contact	  for	  na0onal	  and	  EU	  bodies/organisa0ons/
ins0tu0ons	  regarding	  mari0me	  educa0on	  and	  training. 
• Represen0ng	  the	  interests	  of	  its	  members	  i.e.	  the	  interests	  of	  mari0me	  
educa0on	  and	  training	  organisa0ons	  in	  Europe. 
• Working	  with	  professional,	  industrial,	  commercial	  organisa0ons	  to	  
improve	  mari0me	  educa0on	  and	  training	  and	  mari0me	  research	  and	  
development 
	  
	  
Thank	  you	  for	  your	  afen-on	  
	  
MariFuture 
	  
	  
Prof.	  R.	  Ziara-	  
Dr.	  Mar-n	  Ziara-	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UniMET – Unification of Marine Education and Training            Ziarati, M. & R. 
Uniﬁcation	  of	  Marine	  Education	  and	  Training	  
Bridge	  2011	  –	  Rauma,	  Finland	  	  	  
AIMS	  AND	  OBJECTIVES	  
Prof.	  Dr.	  Reza	  Ziarati	  
Dr	  Martin	  Ziarati	  
Bridge	  2011	  –	  Rauma,	  Finland	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• 	  IMO	  	  STCW	  Standards	  	  	  	  
• 	  STCW	  78	  	  -­‐	  	  Amended	  	  in	  1991,	  1995,	  2003	  
and	  2010	  
• 	  EMSA	  	  monitoring	  of	  STCW	  implementation	  
• 	  SOS	  Project	  (2005-­‐7)	  and	  TRAIN	  4c	  1,	  2	  &	  3	  
• 	  IMarEST	  ,	  	  MNTB,	  MCA	  and	  EDEXEL	  ,	  NVQ	  
and	  SVQ	  	  collaborations	  
• 	  MarTEL	  (2007-­‐09),	  MarTEL	  (2010-­‐12)	  
EGMDSS	  and	  E-­‐GMDSS	  VET	  achievements	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•  	   UniMET	   is	   in	   line	   with	   and	   supports	   the	  
priorities	   and	   objectives	   	   of	   Lisbon	   treaty	   and	  
Bo logna	   a c co rd	   -­‐	   ha rmon i sa t i on	   and	  
standardisation	  of	  HE	  in	  Europe	  
• 	  UniMET	  will	  ensure	  VET	  in	  the	  MET	  are	  in	  line	  
with	   the	  STCW	  compliant	  but	  set	  gold	  standards	  
by	   meeting	   the	   local	   and	   international	  
requirements	   of	   the	   industry	   for	   all	   ranks	   and	  
types	  of	  seafarer	  and	  promote	  good	  practice	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• 	  Varied	  MET	  practices	  
• 	  Shortage	  of	  seafarers	  ,	  estimated	  to	  grow	  	  
• 	  	  Partners	  to	  use	  cross-­‐referencing	  
techniques	  	  to	  ﬁll	  the	  	  identifying	  Good	  
practices	  and	  diﬀerences	  	  
• 	  IMO	  Model	  programmes	  	  not	  applied	  and	  
not	  monitored	  in	  many	  countries	  
• 	  Building	  on	  	  the	  outcomes	  of	  the	  previous	  
projects	  such	  as	  MASSTER/METNET	  /METHAR	  
• 	  	  
Bridge	  2011	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  Rauma,	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• 	  To	  embed	  the	  UniMET	  programme	  within	  	  the	  partner	  countries	  
through	  	  cross-­‐referencing	  and	  review	  of	  the	  IMO	  Model	  
programmes	  and	  courses	  as	  well	  as	  inclusion	  of	  good	  practices	  
• 	  To	  ensure	  that	  seafarers	  are	  compliant	  with	  IMO	  	  requirements	  	  	  
• 	  To	  make	  seafarers	  more	  	  mobile	  and	  employable	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[Sample	  of	  Cross	  referencing	  in	  IMO	  Model	  course	  7.04	  at	  TUDEV	  on	  Marine	  Engineering	  Programme]	  	  	  
Bridge	  2011	  –	  Rauma,	  Finland	  	  	  
	  
• 	  To	  inform	  local,	  national	  and	  international	   	  maritime	  organizations,	  
awarding,	   licensing	   and	   professional	   bodies	   about	   the	   	   UniMET	  
programme	   and	   seek	   their	   support	   in	   the	   harmonisation	   of	   MET	  
provisions	  
•  	   By	   	   disseminating	   UniMET	   programme	   to	   key	   decision	   makers	  
within	   maritime	   and	   government	   bodies	   it	   is	   hoped	   that	   they	   will	  
accept	  and	  support	   the	  programme	  therefore	  enabling	   	   the	  expected	  
changes	  to	  policies	  regarding	  MET	  to	  be	  made	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• 	  To	  establish	  a	  quality	  assurance	  and	  control	  
system	  for	  the	  delivery	  of	  UniMET	  Programme	  
based	  on	  an	  existing	  	  good	  practices	  such	  as	  BTEC/
Edexcel	  system	  
• 	  C4FF	  was	  involved	  in	  the	  development	  of	  the	  
BTEC	  system	  and	  will	  provide	  valuable	  contacts	  
and	  assistance	  in	  enhancing	  the	  system	  for	  the	  use	  
in	  the	  delivery	  of	  	  the	  UniMET	  Programme	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• 	  To	  spread	  UniMET	  further	  across	  Europe	  both	  during	  and	  after	  the	  
project's	  completion,	  raising	  awareness	  and	  transferring	  good	  
practices	  with	  the	  ultimate	  aim	  of	  improving	  the	  quality	  of	  MET	  and	  
safety	  at	  sea	  worldwide.	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• 	  The	  	  UniMET	  to	  be	  promoted	  through	  MET	  	  centers	  
• 	  Cross	  referencing	  will	  be	  developed	  
• 	  Quality	  management	  model	  will	  be	  developed	  	  
• 	  EDEXEL	  and	  partners	  own	  systems	  will	  be	  reviewed	  
• 	  	  UniMET	  will	  address	  the	  EU	  	  Youth	  and	  Citizenship	  programme	  
aged	  between	  16	  and	  30	  will	  have	  increased	  employability	  within	  
shipping	  industry.	  This	  will	  increase	  the	  attractiveness	  of	  
profession	  by	  reducing	  the	  shortage	  of	  seafarers	  	  
Bridge	  2011	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  Rauma,	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• 	  UniMET	  	  -­‐	  partnership	  consortium	  then	  wider	  audience	  	  
	  
• 	  Questionnaires	  	  to	  the	  target	  group	  
	  
• 	  	  IMarEST	  accreditation	  	  
• 	  	  Seminars	  with	  the	  staff	  and	  cadets	  in	  each	  institution	  and	  
representatives	  from	  various	  stake	  holders	  particularly	  from	  
industry	  	  
• 	  Articles,	  papers	  and	  workshops	  to	  be	  published	  for	  conferences	  
such	  as	  IMLA,	  IMEC,	  IMAM	  and	  so	  forth.	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• 	  Presentations	  to	  be	  made	  to	  IMO	  sub-­‐committee	  	  
and	  major	  awarding,	  accreditation	  and	  	  licensing	  
bodies	  	  
• 	  Each	  	  partner	  will	  support	  the	  expansion	  of	  UniMET	  	  
across	  EUROPE.	  
• 	  UniMET	  will	  encourage	  young	  people	  to	  undertake	  
career	  	  in	  the	  merchant	  navy.	  
• 	  EMSA	  will	  be	  a	  major	  incentives	  for	  UniMET	  to	  be	  
promoted	  and	  sustained	  
Bridge	  2011	  –	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• 	  Programme	  will	  be	  supported	  and	  will	  lead	  to	  quali`ications	  
recognised	  internationally	  
• Having	  international	  recognitions	  for	  of`icers	  has	  a	  tremendous	  
impact	  for	  shipping	  companies	  such	  as	  	  those	  in	  Turkey	  
• 	  Acceptance	  of	  SOS	  programme	  which	  is	  the	  core	  of	  the	  UniMET	  
has	  already	  been	  tested	  through	  mobility	  programmes	  such	  as	  
TRAIN	  4Cs	  I	  and	  II	  
• 	  The	  approach	  adopted	  in	  the	  SOS	  was	  to	  `ind	  the	  common	  
denominators	  through	  cross-­‐referencing	  methods	  which	  
developed	  in	  a	  previous	  EU	  project	  (EUTOTECNET).	  These	  
methods	  will	  be	  used	  in	  UniMET	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• 	  MarTEL,	  which	  standardises	  the	  English	  language	  for	  non-­‐
native	  speakers,	  will	  be	  	  included	  in	  UniMET	  	  
• 	  EGMDSS	  e-­‐platform	  developed	  will	  enable	  MET	  institutions	  to	  
adapt	  online	  learning	  materials	  for	  cadet	  in	  UniMET	  programme	  
Uniﬁcation	  of	  Marine	  Education	  and	  Training	  
Bridge	  2011	  –	  Rauma,	  Finland	  	  	  
Thank	  you	  for	  your	  attention	  
Prof.	  Dr.	  Reza	  Ziarati	  
Dr	  Martin	  Ziarati	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Deficiencies versus Innovations 
TUDEV Institute of Maritime Studies 
 
 
Prof. Dr. R. Ziarati 
 
 
                                                                                    
 
 
 
 
 
Identifying a methodology for effective 
improvements  
  Torkel (2004) reports that 25% of the world fleet was 
responsible for more than 50% of shipping accidents around 
the world.  The study notes that the top 25% of the safest 
ships were involved in just 7% of all accidents.   
  NTNU (2005) published by the University of Technology 
and Science (NTNU) in Norway, reports that by improving 
the quality of the world fleet to the same level as those in the 
safest 25% category, there might be an overall reduction of 
72% in shipping accidents.  
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Human Resource Planning - Officer 
Shortage 
  5000 Shortages in TR and 100000 worldwide by 2020 
 
   The BIMCO/ISF 2005 - there could be a lack of 
27,000 senior officers by 2015 worldwide".  Officer 
shortage 10,000  in 2005.   
 
   Drewry Shipping Consultants (2008) - Officer 
shortage may be 34,000, a figure that could reach 
83,900 2012.  
  Economic Crisis! - New BIMCO/ISF figures 2010/11 
– Discussions. 
 
 
 
 
 
The reason for review of STCW 
Convention and its codes  
 STCW 78/95, is now almost 15 years old  -  
 
Many practices in ship management,  
 
operations , and  
 
technology have changed and these changes are 
now playing a major role in ship operations.   
233
STCW Changes - Ziarati and Yongxing 2009 
  Retain STCW1995  
  Clean up up the inconsistencies, misleading 
interpretations  and outdated provisions 
  Make communication more effective 
  Flexibility for compliance and take account of innovation 
in technology 
  Address special circumstances of short sea shipping and 
offshore industry 
  Address the maritime security  
  Amend the articles of the Convention – Still Minimum. 
www.marifuture.org – Development Paper for Oct 10. 
Amendments to the International 
Convention on STCW (78) 1995 
  New requirements 
 
  Demands on, administrations, ship-owners and maritime 
institutions 
 
  Shift from a knowledge-based to competency-based   
 
   Need for updating and recertification  
 
   Simulators  - training or assessing competence (compliance with 
provisions in Section A-I/12 of the STCW Code   
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Other Changes 
  Security training and related issues 
  
  Simplifying navigation calculations 
  
  Adding training requirements for VTS 
 
  Introducing electrical-electronic officers 
  Making BRM and ERM training compulsory 
  ILO Maritime Labour Convention 2006  
  
 
Revising the Chapter V - This Chapter of the 
Convention deals with such Regulation as  
  Requirements for the training and qualifications of 
masters, officers and ratings on oil, and chemical tankers 
  Same as above but for liquefied gas tankers 
  Competence requirements for Dynamic Positioning 
  The training requirements for: 
  
 - ice-covered waters  
 - anchor-handling operations 
 - offshore supply vessels 
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Updating model courses 
Including: 
 
  Basic training in marine environment awareness  
 
  lBS 
 
  Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) Tanker Cargo and  
Ballast Handling Simulator,  
 
Conclusions 1 
  STCW 2010 – significant 
 
  Many deficiencies remains 
 
 MariFuture:  Three major areas  
 
 1. Stricter and tougher standards for Maritime English 
(MarTEL, 2007-09 and MarTEL Plus, 2009-11) 
 
 2. Reducing automation failures (SURPASS, 2009-11)  
 
 3.  Prevent emergencies (M’AIDER, 2009-11).   
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EDUCATION AND CULTURE  
- EU Leonardo SOS (Safety on Sea) Project, TR/05/B/P/PP/178 001, 2005 
- EU Leonardo TRAIN 4Cs Mobility Project, TR/06/A/F/PL1-132, 2006 
- EU Leonardo E-GMDSS Project, SI/06/B/F/PP-176006, 2006 
- EU Leonardo MarTEL Project, UK/07/LLP-LdV/TOI-049, 2007 
- EU Leonardo TRAIN 4Cs – II Project,  2008-1-TR-LEO01-00681, 2008 
- EU Leonardo E-GMDSSVET Project, 142173-LLP-1-2008-1-SI 
- EU Leonardo EBDIG Project, UK/09/LLP-LdV/TOI-163_262, 2009 
- EU Leonardo MarEng Plus Project (Maritime English  Programmes) 
- EU Leonardo M’Aider Project, 	  2009-­‐1-­‐NL1-­‐LEO05-­‐01624, 2009 
- EU Leonardo SURPASS Project  2009-1-TR1-LEO05-08652, 2009    
EDUCATION AND CULTURE  
- EU Leonardo SOS (Safety on Sea) Project – Now UniMET   
 
- EU Leonardo MarTEL Project  now MarTEL Plus 
-New Project CAPTAINS 
 
- New Project  Sail Ahead  
- All projects have led to a new major  European Network 
called: 
- MariFuture  (www.marifuture.org) 
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Why? 
  Responding to identified deficiencies 
  Reducing officer shortages 
  Offering our Cadets Maximum Opportunity 
  Staff Development 
  Supporting the maritime industry 
  Creating jobs 
  Creating wealth 
  Achieving Gold standards 
  Learning from others 
  Attracting young people to our profession 
 
Completed Projects 
SOS (Safety On Sea)  
- The SOS project is designed to improve safety at sea through improved 
education and training by  using the syllabuses developed by northern 
European countries.  
- This also satisfied the requirements of a major international awarding body 
(Edexcel) for the award of a Higher National Diploma (HND). 
 - Graduates from these programmes can continue their education and enrol 
on the final year of appropriate degree programmes.  
 
EDUCATION AND CULTURE  
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15 
TUDEV HND  
NAV ENG & Marine ENG 
 HND PROGRRAMME    
     APPROVED by  
    BTEC 
              
     BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY  
     EDUCATION COUNCIL 
                 
   
                  
                                      
 
 ACCREDITATED by 
EDEXCELL 
 EXCELLENT EDUCATION                          
     SEA TRAINING PROGRAMME 
         MNTB 
 MERCHANT NAVY TRAINING BOARD 
                 
    
                          
   
       VOCATIONAL   
          QUALIFICATION 
 NVQ/SVQ 
 NATIONAL/SCOTISH  
       VOCATIONAL 
QUALIFICATION 
 
MCA 
- BTEC  HND                       DEGREE 
- OOW UNLIMITED CERTIFICATE 
 
-  GOC CERTIFICATE 
-  ALL STCW CERTIFICATES 
-  BTM & SHIPHANDLING   CERTIFICATE 
-  ELIGIBILITY  TO FURTHER MCA EXAMS 
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PREPARATIONS  
FOR 
 SVQ & MCA 
 EXAMINATIONS 
IN SCOTLAND 
MCA    (Maritime Coastguard Agency) 
SVQ    (Scottish Vocational Qualification) 
MNTB (Merchant Navy Training Board) 
 
Completed Projects 
TRAIN4Cs  
12 cadets on the pilot SOS programme were sent to 
Scotland for their post diploma studies and 
preparation for  
Maritime Coastguard Agency of England (MCA) Oral 
Examination  
EDUCATION AND CULTURE  
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THE UNIVERSITY OF PLYMOUTH 
FACULTY OF SCIENCE 
BSc (Hons) Marine Studies (Merchant Shipping) 
Stage 3   2007 / 2008  (120 credits) 
 
Compulsory modules   
 
EOE3501     Ocean Navigation           20 credits  
EOE3502     Marine Industrial Issues          20 credits  
EOE3503     Problem – Solving in the Marine Environment   20 credits  
EOE3504     Marine Management and Law         20 credits  
EOE3505     Marine Honours Project          40 credits  
 
 
INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED 
CERTIFICATION & EXAMINATION SYSTEM  
LEONARDO MOBILITY AND PILOT PROJECTS       
TRAIN4CS  
& 
SAFETY ON SEA (SOS) 
 
TUDEV 
 
CFF/U.K            HND                  PLYMOUTH U. 
                                                   DEGREE PROG. 
GCNS 
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Completed Project  
MarTEL (Maritime Tests of English Language)   
 
EDUCATION AND CULTURE  
- To overcome the problem of not having international or 
European standards for Maritime English through 
transfer of innovation from existing English language 
standards and maritime English model courses 
 
- Maritime language competency assessment for the 
language certification  
Partners : Factories of the Future (C4FF); Satakunta University (SUAS), FI 
Tromsø University College (TUC); Maritime University of Szczecin (MUS), PL 
Spinaker (SPIN) ; MarEdu UK 
 
 
Completed Projects :     E  –  G M D S S 
 
EDUCATION AND CULTURE  
Partners : Spinaker Si ; CFF (Centre for Factories of the Future); Facultad de 
Sciencias Nauticas; Cetemar;  C.S.S.; SE.MA2; Maritime Institute Willem 
Barentsz; Maritime University of Szczecin;TUDEV 
 
The project focuses on the provision of vocational education and 
continuing vocational training for Short Range Certificate (SRC) 
which is mandatory for mariners operating vessels of up to 300 GRT 
 within 30 Nautical Miles from coast. 
 
All mariners with adequate professional qualification must also obtain 
the SRC, however, access to the required knowledge is limited which 
doesn’t encourage regular refreshing of knowledge – life-long 
learning. 
 
The project outcome will be a GMDSS e-learning system accessible on 
the Internet web site www.egmdss.com in all EU languages 
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Ongoing Projects : 2008 - 2010 
 
TRAIN4Cs – II Mobility 
 
TRAIN 4Cs II is a follow-up of the former project and is 
intended to apply the findings of the TRAIN 4Cs and also those 
from the SOS project by developing an integrated mobility 
proposal. The proposal will give  TUDEV cadets the opportunity 
to acquire qualifications which will be recognised throughout 
the EU and worldwide  
EDUCATION AND CULTURE  
NEW PROPOSALS 2008 - 2010 EDUCATION AND CULTURE                                                                                                                                                               
 
SURPASS  
(Short Course Programmes in Automated Systems in Shipping)  
(Budget : 377 147 €) 
 The main aim of this project is to fill the gap 
created as the result of emergence and 
application of the automated systems in the 
education and training of seafarers by provision 
of a training course enabling them to have a full 
understanding of automated systems, and these 
systems’ weaknesses and limitations  
Partners: Satakunta University (SUAS), FI; Glasgwo College of Nautical Studies 
(GCNS), Scotland; Tromsø University College (TUC), NO; Maritime University of 
Szczecin (MUS), PL; Spinaker (SPIN), SL; Centre for Factories of the Future (C4FF) 
UK; Plymouth University (PLY), UK 
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SURPASS 
(SHORT COURSE PROGRAMME for AUTOMATED SYSTEMS in SHIPPING) 
 
 
1)  RATINGS AND  CADET OFFICERS ON AUTOMATION COMPONENTS 
2) DECK CADET OFFICER ON AUTOMATED NAVIGATION SYSTEMS AT SUPPORT 
AND OPERATIONAL LEVELS 
  
3) ENGINEERING CADET OFFICERS ON AUTOMATED PROPULSION SYSTEMS AT 
SUPPORT AND OPERATIONAL LEVELS 
 
4) CHIEF MATES, ON INTEGRATED NAVIGATION ON OPERATION AND 
MANAGEMENT LEVELS 
  
5) SECOND ENGINEERS ON AUTOMATED PROPULSION AND POWER 
TRANSMISSION SYSTEMS 
 
6) CHIEF ENGINEERS ON FULLY INTEGRATED AND COMPUTER CONTROLLED 
PROPULSION SYSTEM 
 
7) MASTERS/CAPTAINS ON FULLY INTEGRATED BRIDGE-PROPULSION-POWER 
TRANSMISSION SYSTEM AND 
 
8) ON TEAM OPERATION, DECK-ENGINEERS INTERACTION AND COMBINED 
SCENARIOS.   
 
EDUCATION AND CULTURE                                                                                                                                                               
 
M’AIDER  (MAYDAY)  
 
-    To improve safety at sea and at ports by identifying emergency situations 
known so far and create knowledge based  scenarios for training of 
seafarers at officer level and higher ranks.   
-   To develop exercises based on scenarios created for application in bridge, 
engine room, propulsion areas as well as in integrated and full mission 
simulators. 
-   To transfer the knowledge that already exists in the form of a software 
suite together with an existing internet e-learning/assessment to integrate 
the scenarios and exercises created based on above aims.  
 
Partners: Satakunta University (SUAS), FI; Glasgow College of Nautical Studies 
(GCNS), Scotland; Tromsø University College (TUC), NO; Maritime University of 
Szczecin (MUS), PL ; Spinaker (SPIN), SL ; Centre for Factories of the Future 
(C4FF) UK 
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Ongoing Projects EDUCATION AND CULTURE  
 
EBDIG 
(European Boat Design Innovation Group ) 
get 400 000€) 
 
Aims; to provide marine industry professionals with the skills and infrastructure to 
understand and exploit the opportunities presented by design, ergonomics, 
sustainable materials and ICT so that they may assist, excite and capture the 
imagination of consumers and respond to societal issues and a more demanding 
powerful customer base. 
Objectives; to use on line courses and an interactive e-learning environment to 
transfer existing innovation in the automotive industry and education in 
ergonomics, design, new technologies, materials and technology application within 
the work environment so that the European marine work force develop world class 
skills and competencies to ensure the continued growth and competitiveness of 
the European Marine industry.  
Partners:Coventry University – ; KKG ; Ladida International; TU Delft ; 
University of Genoa ; Ricardo ;TUDEV - The Institute of Maritime studies 
Turkey 
NEW PROPOSALS   
 
Piri Reis University  - Budget 75 Million EUR 
 
Marine Engineers Conversion Course 
Conversion of 50 Mechanical Engineers to Marine Engineers 
after 6 months compensation courses and one year vocational 
sea training 
Budget :373 000 EUR 
 
TURKISH Maritime Centre of Excellence – Budget 41 
Million EUR 
Budget 
Partners: Chamber of Shipping and many major shipping companies 
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NEW PROPOSALS 
EDUCATION AND CULTURE   
 
PICK-UP 
Professional, Industrial, Competence and sKills – 
UPdating (Budget: 400000 Euros) 
 
 
This is a pilot project to update the knowledge, skills and 
understanding of those working in the water transportation sector. 
The proposal responds to the needs of the sector for training of 
employees and employers, paying particular attention to the 
training and re-training needs of smaller companies and self-
employed. 
 
GROUPING VARIOUS SHORT COURSE PROGRAMMES 
UNDER SPECIFIC HEADINGS:  
 SAFETY, SECURITY, SPECIALISED, LEGAL, MANAGEMENT, 
ENVIRONMENTAL e.t.c.  
SHARING OF RESOURCES AND VALUE ADDED ACTIVITIES 
MANIFESTED IN JOINTLY PLANNED AND/OR JOINT DELIVERY 
OF THESE COURSES 
SPECIFIC TRAINING AND RE-TRAINING COURSES ON NEWLY 
EMERGING REQUIREMENTS 
PICK – UP 
Professional, Industrial, Competence and sKills – UPdating 
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NEW PROPOSALS 
EDUCATION AND CULTURE  
MariFuture 
 
 This Framework 7 proposal aims to reduce ‘human 
related errors’ due to the use of complex navigational 
systems in shipping through a new intelligent 
training method based on simulations as a training 
support tool that bridges the gap between the 
operational and human factors in pilots’ and masters’ 
training. The rationale being that despite having 
modern technologies, well equipped and seaworthy 
ships with qualified crew, accidents continue to occur 
at undesirable level. 
ACADEMIC RESEARCH – With De Montfort 
 
 
   ‘’Activity Based Costing for Small and Medium sized Maritime 
Enterprises in Turkey’’ 
 
  To investigate the needs for costing systems for SMEs in the 
maritime sector in Turkey.  
   To design, develop and test a generic costing system which is 
capable of associating costs and margins with products, processes 
and customers.  
 
MPhils/PhDs  in collaborations with De Montfort University, UK  
 and Centre for Factories of the Future, UK 
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ACADEMIC RESEARCH – with De Montfort 
 
Sustaining competitive advantage through co-
operative decision making  
 
 -  To study competitive advantage and how it can be sustained 
through co-operative decision making processes   
 
 -  To look into the reasons why family businesses are not competitive 
and why they go out of business after a few generations.  
 
 - To develop a checklist as a basis for constructing a model for family 
businesses in shipping industry, particular in Turkey with a view 
to help them to remain competitive for generations to come.  
 
 
 
ACADEMIC RESEARCH – TUDEV and De Montfort 
 
An Investigation into the design, manufacturing and 
management processes considering modern lean and 
total quality principles to improve demand and capacity 
forecasting for merchant navy vessels 
 
The initial aim of the investigation was how maritime small 
and medium manufacturing enterprises manage the 
design and manufacturing processes in order to develop 
an improved manufacturing management system using 
modern lean and total quality principles that is capable 
of reacting responsively to changes in the competitive 
global market place 
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ACADEMIC RESEARCH 
 
 
 - Quality in Higher Education   
                            - Oxford     Brookes University  
 
- Marketing Mix –  Coventry University  
 
- Clean Diesel   –  Coventry University  
 
 
Research Project 
Clean Diesel II 
 
This project is based on the successful EU funded 
Clean Diesel project. The project comprises an 
Engine management system called Main Diesel 
Program which provides real-time simulation of a 
diesel propulsion unit in parallel with actual 
Engine Finger-print software 
(Heat release and Rate of Injection Programs) 
 
TUDEV, C4FF and Coventry University 
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ACADEMIC RESEARCH 
 
 
Application of Neural and Expert Systems in Capacity 
Requirement and Ship Building (Budget: 4M Euros)  
 
 
-   To use novel tools to predict capacity requirement and apply neural and expert 
systems to build ships at a minimized cost  
 
-   An activity based costing system to be adapted to ship construction and 
maintenance process and the dismantling arrangements.  
 
-   The project would involve importing knowledge, cognitive and learning 
systems, simulation and visualisation techniques as well as technology enhanced 
learning, adaptive and active learning. Dismantling would be a corner stone of 
the intended areas for particular attention and recycling of dismantled 
components would be a priority area in the knowledge solicitation of the 
intended expert system.  
 
ACADEMIC RESEARCH 
Improving estimating and forecasting model development 
processes  
(Budget: 1.2 Million Euros)  
C4FF, De Montfort, Unipart, Preactor and Trellberg 
 
 The proposed project is intended to assist those 
business organizations who make frequent use of 
quantitative and/or qualitative models for 
making a variety of business decisions. It will 
achieve this aim by automating the data 
identification, collection and analysis tasks 
involved in the modelling process hence 
considerably reducing the high levels of cost, 
expertise and time resources required. 
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MariFuture Map – Previous State 
ILO 
CONTRACTUAL 
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         E  
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       G        G 
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MariFuture Map - Current State 
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MariFuture Map - Future State 
TR or UK? 
252
TR or UK? 
 
 
For full paper on Changes to STCW in 
2010 See October Development 
Paper 2010 
www.marifuture.org 
 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION 
 
 
Prof. Dr. Reza Ziarati 
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SURPASS - Developing scenarios on automation failures on board vessels       Ziarati, R. 
Developing	  scenarios	  on	  automation	  failures	  on	  board	  
vessels	  
Bridge	  2011	  –	  June	  	  9-­‐10,	  Rauma,	  Finland	  
Prof.	  Dr.	  Reza	  Ziarati	  
 
• 	  	  
• TUDEV	  Institute	  of	  Maritime	  Studies	  (TUDEV),	  TR	  
• 	  Satakunta	  University	  (SUAS),	  FL	  
• 	  Maritime	  University	  of	  Szczecin	  (MUS),	  PL	  
• 	  Spinaker	  (SPIN),	  SL	  
• 	  Centre	  for	  Factories	  of	  the	  Future	  (C4FF)	  UK	  
• 	  Plymouth	  University	  (PLY),	  UK	  
• 	  Edexcel/BTEC	  
	  	  
	  
	  
Bridge	  2011	  –	  June	  	  9-­‐10,	  Rauma,	  Finland	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• 	  	  
• STCW	  was	  introduced	  in	  1995	  .	  	  	  This	  is	  some	  15	  
years	  ago	  
	  
• 	  Research	  at	  TUDEV	  has	  shown	  that	  STCW	  has	  a	  
number	  of	  deﬁciencies.	  	  
	  
	  	  
	  
	  
Bridge	  2011	  –	  June	  	  9-­‐10,	  Rauma,	  Finland	  
• 	  	  	  
• The	  main	  aim	  of	  this	  project	  is	  to	  Oill	  the	  gap	  
created	  as	  the	  result	  of	  emergence	  and	  
application	  of	  the	  automated	  systems	  on	  
board	  ships	  by	  provision	  of	  a	  training	  course	  
enabling	  them	  to	  have	  a	  full	  understanding	  of	  
automated	  systems,	  and	  these	  systems’	  
weaknesses	  and	  limitations	  
	  
	  	  
	  
	  
Bridge	  2011	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  June	  	  9-­‐10,	  Rauma,	  Finland	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1. 	  STCW	  content	  –	  SOS	  (2005-­‐07)	  	  
	  
2.	  Language	  Competence	  –	  MarTEL	  (2007-­‐09)	  
(International	  standards	  for	  Maritime	  English)	  
	  
3.	  Automation	  –	  SURPASS	  (2009-­‐11)	  
	  
4.	  Emergency	  situations	  –	  M’aider	  (2009-­‐11)	  
	  
5.	  Environment	  -­‐	  Clean	  Diesel	  (2010-­‐13)	  
	  
6.	  Compliance	  -­‐	  EMSA	  	  	  
	  
	  
	  	  
• 	  	  
	  
Bridge	  2011	  –	  June	  	  9-­‐10,	  Rauma,	  Finland	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60%19%
11%
10%
Human Error
Structure/Mechanical
Failure
Equipment Failure
Other Causes
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Bridge	  2011	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Common Factors in Groundings
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Poor manning level
Bad decision making
Fatigue
Inexperience
Poor communication between personel
Poor use of radar
Unfamiliarity with area
Poor voyage plan
Poor judgement of speed
Tiredness
Poor visibility
Poor use of charts
Equipment Location Failure
Number of times Factor was a Contributary Cause 
 
	  
	  	  
	  
Bridge	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Common Factors in Collisions
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Poor manning level
Broke Rules
Bad decision making
Poor lookout
Poor training
Unfamiliarity with equipment
Fatigue
Over working
Inexperience
Poor communication between personel
Radio failure
Poor use of radar
Number of times Factor was a Contributary Cause 
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Bridge	  2011	  –	  June	  	  9-­‐10,	  Rauma,	  Finland	  
[A	  capture	  from	  the	  introduction	  part	  ]	  	  
Bridge	  2011	  –	  June	  	  9-­‐10,	  Rauma,	  Finland	  
[Source	  :	  Surpass	  2009]	  	  
Over	  300	  accident	  report	  synopsis	  were	  reviewed	  
Questionnaire	  developed	  and	  the	  results	  were	  reviewed	  
6	  of	  them	  were	  chosen	  for	  scenario	  development	  	  
Scenarios	  are	  developed	  to	  use	  in	  	  full-­‐mission	  simulators	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Exercise	  Format	  
Objective	  
Subject	  Area	  
Initial	  Conditions	  
Instructor’s	  Notes	  
Brieﬁng	  
Simulation	  Exercise	  
De-­‐Brieﬁng	  
Analysis	  
Evaluation	  of	  training	  exercise	  
Conclusion	  
	  
Bridge	  2011	  –	  June	  	  9-­‐10,	  Rauma,	  Finland	  
	  
	  	  
	  
Bridge	  2011	  –	  June	  	  9-­‐10,	  Rauma,	  Finland	  
Over	  300	  accident	  report	  synopsis	  were	  reviewed	  
Questionnaire	  developed	  and	  the	  results	  were	  reviewed	  
6	  of	  them	  were	  chosen	  for	  developing	  scenarios	  
Scenarios	  are	  developed	  to	  use	  in	  full	  mission	  simulators	  
[Source	  :	  Surpass	  2009]	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[Development	  of	  interactive	  tests	  for	  Surpass	  course]	  	  
	  
Clean	  Diesel	  I	  
	  
Clean	  Diesel	  II	  
	  
Optimisation	  
	  
	  -­‐	  Variable	  Geometry	  Diesel	  
	  -­‐	  Weight	  Reduction	  
-­‐ 	  System	  Management	  
-­‐ 	  Lubricants	  
-­‐ High	  inlet	  pressures	  
-­‐ High	  ﬁe	  Pressures	  
	  
Bridge	  2011	  –	  June	  	  9-­‐10,	  Rauma,	  Finland	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Thank	  you	  for	  your	  attention	  
Bridge	  2011	  –	  June	  	  9-­‐10,	  Rauma,	  Finland	  
Prof.	  Dr.	  Reza	  Ziarati	  
IV Manufacturer’e forum
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Kelvin Hughes                             Bent, M.
Bridge 2011 
Welcome to BRIDGE 2011 
9th  June  2011                                            Commercial Equipment  Bent Mitens 
Bridge 2011 
BRIDGE 2011 
     AGENDA 
   - Corporate 
   - Integrated Navigation Solutions 
   - MantaDigital Product Line 
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Bridge 2011 
Thomas Hughes 
 Master Clockmaker 1750 
William Thompson - Lord Kelvin 
1830 - 1907 
The Founders 
Bridge 2011 
Kelvin Hughes’ History 
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Bridge 2011 
Group Activities 
!   Supplier of navigation electronic solutions to the commercial 
shipping ﬂeet 
!   Bespoke integrated solutions to over 30 navies worldwide 
!   Supplier of high-end surveillance radar systems 
!   World’s leading supplier of nautical charts, publications and 
associated updates, both electronic and paper 
World leader in marine data and electronics 
Bridge 2011 
Consistent Leaders in Innovation 
!   First commercial radar 
!   First chart tracing service 
!   First slotted waveguide array 
!   First colour widescreen bridge system 
!   First commercial solid-state radar system 
!   First global update service  
Responsible for many of the industry’s key developments 
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Bridge 2011 
The Kelvin Hughes Difference 
We believe that we have all of the attributes you require of a trusted long term partner 
Cost-
   effective 
Consultative 
approach 
    Global 
technical 
support 
Flexible 
Innovative 
Bridge 2011 
BRIDGE 2011 
     INTEGRATED NAVIGATION SOLUTIONS
     
 
266
Integrated Navigation Systems 
Integrated Navigation Systems 
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Bridge 2011 
MantaDigital IBS 
Bridge 2011 
BRIDGE 2011 
      
    MantaDigital Product Line 
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Bridge 2011 
MantaDigital Chart Radar – Single PPI Mode 
Bridge 2011 
MantaDigital Chart Radar - Dual PPI mode 
269
Harbour Approach & Pilotage (HAP) Docking Mode 
Bridge 2011 
Swapping Display Modes 
270
Bridge 2011 
ECDIS Maximised Chart Area 
Bridge 2011 
ETD in Secondary  PPI 
271
Bridge 2011 
ETD in Secondary PPI (cont) 
Bridge 2011 
ETD / Ice Mode 
Improved Manoeuvrability in Icy Waters 
Highlights the safest route  
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Bridge 2011 
Success Stories 
“Even when the sea state is rough, we are passing buoys at 50 
meters distance”...(when the buoys) “...on the regular radar 
picture are invisible.” 
“All vessel's nautical operators are very impressed about the 
performance of the ETD radar, which give the operators a lot of 
advantage in vessel's operation and discovering of small 
objects close”  
Captain Gijs Dijkdrenth, AHTS Blizzard 
 
It displays the channel in 3D and it is easier to follow th n on 
a conventio al display. In open sea the ice mode helps us to 
see and ﬁnd the ic  walls." 
Mikko Lindqvist, Master of the Baltic Excellent 
 
Our Kelvi Hug es' Ma ta igital rad  with Ice Navigator 
software h s surpassed all expectations. I  a difﬁc lt Arctic
environm nt it has proven to be an excellent tool in assisting 
the bridge team to select the safest passage through ice infested 
waters.” 
Craig Whiteway, Marine Operations Superintendent, Woodward Group. 
 
This is t e best radar I have ever use , I can ell the difference 
bet een he wave  and th  buoys even ba  weather.  
Navigatio  is u ually very difﬁcult in th  Wes  Scheld in bad 
w ather but this radar is am zing!”. 
Captain Peter den Herder - Swalinge Scheepvaart  
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 •   Improved performance 
•   Improved reliability 
•   Low maintenance 
•   Low through life cost 
World’s 1st Solid State 
Marine Navigation Radar 
SharpEye 
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Bridge 2011 
Comparative performance of 
Magnetron vs SharpEye in Heavy Rain 
Magnetron X-Band SharpEye S-Band 
Bridge 2011 
Summary 
! MantaDigital Chart Radar is the BEST Radar… 
!   Multi Display Modes 
•  Single PPI, Dual PPI, HAP, ECDIS 
!   Intuitive User Interface 
!   Advanced Clutter Reduction & Processing techniques 
!   Enhanced Target Detection (ETD) 
! SharpEye 
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Bridge 2011 
Global Support 
9 Kelvin Hughes Service Locations 
100+ Service Agents Globally 
300+ Trained Engineers  
 
Bridge 2011 
Why work with Kelvin Hughes ? 
We are the best in innovation, reliability and affordability. 
We believe that we are ideally placed to work with you..... 
We understand your requirements 
Absolute commitment to the Market 
A collaborative approach will enable us to provide the best possible solution  
Excellent radar performance and high level built-in redundancy 
A belief in, and an eagerness to assist with the implementation of IBS 
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Wärtsilä 3C                               Granqvist, R.
WÄRTSILÄ 3C 
GATEWAY TO ULTIMATE INTEGRATION 
 
 
REIJO GRANQVIST 
January 2, 2012 Ship Power Technology / Reijo Granqvist 1    © Wärtsilä  
The marine industry’s leading provider of integrated solutions 
is launching the Wärtsilä Control and Communication Centre: 
Wärtsilä 3C. 
January 2, 2012 Wärtsilä 3C 2    © Wärtsilä  
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Wärtsilä 3C: Integrating multiple systems into one common platform 
Fleet management 
Vessel modeling 
Integrated automation 
Remote maintenance 
Propulsion control 
Communication 
Navigation 
Installation / Commissioning Search lights 
Dynamic positioning 
Consoles 
Project engineering 
Alarm system 
January 2, 2012 Wärtsilä 3C 3    © Wärtsilä  
Wärtsilä 3C – Scope of Supply 
Dynamic Positioning 
System Integration 
ü  INS  (Integrated Navigation System) 
ü  IAS  (Integrated Automation System) 
ü  AMS (Alarm Monitoring System) 
ü  PCS (Propulsion Control System) 
ü  PMS (Power Management System) 
Consoles 
Project Engineering 
Additional Systems according to specification 
•  Search Lights 
•  CCTV 
•  Etc. 
Fleet management 
January 2, 2012 Wärtsilä 3C 4    © Wärtsilä  
Navigation System 
”Plug & Play” 
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January 2, 2012 Wärtsilä 3C 5    © Wärtsilä  
Wärtsilä 3C Changing the market 
•  This decade can be considered the most 
chaotic in the history of the maritime industry. 
•  The key market drivers for the future will be: 
•  Environmentally friendly, fuel strategies 
•  Optimized vessel and energy management 
systems 
•  Integrated solutions 
•  Wärtsilä has taken the pole position in total 
system integration providing additional value 
by innovative solutions and life cycle services. 
January 2, 2012 Wärtsilä 3C 6    © Wärtsilä  
278
Energy Management aproach 
•  Current navigation system offerings are not 
fully-integrated with machinery controls, 
preventing ship owners/operators from 
realizing the maximum benefits of an 
optimized energy management approach. 
•  The Wärtsilä 3C will be a key enabler to 
leverage energy management and integrated 
navigation solutions 
Wärtsilä positioned for global leadership in optimized power management! 
January 2, 2012 Wärtsilä 3C 7    © Wärtsilä  
Wärtsilä 3C Strategy  
•  Wärtsilä’s EL & Automation strategy supports 
an Integrated Bridge Platform 3C to develop a 
competitive all in one solution by a total 
integration package. 
•  Wärtsilä’s current market position for engines 
and propulsion equipment provides leverage 
and credibility to move into full scope EL & 
Automation supply. 
Wärtsilä 3C concept fully in-line with EL & Automation strategy 
January 2, 2012 Wärtsilä 3C 8    © Wärtsilä  
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Wärtsilä 3C Enhanced data exchange 
January 2, 2012 Wärtsilä 3C 9    © Wärtsilä  
Control & Communication Center = 3C 
Propulsion Optimisation Vessel Process Control Power Management Vessel Performance 
•  Navigation 
•  Automation 
•  Propulsion 
•  Power 
•  Performance 
•  Efficiency 
•  Environment 
•  Safety 
Radar Conning ECDIS Automation 
3-C User friendly controls 
•  Control and monitoring devices and their 
arrangements onboard are becoming increasingly 
complex and their final location and positioning are 
not always the best possible due to limited space. 
•  Wärtsilä has foreseen this problem with an 
innovative new panel design that provides user 
friendly environment to achieve optimum 
performance with enhanced safety and decision 
support. 
January 2, 2012 Wärtsilä 3C 10    © Wärtsilä  
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Wärtsilä 3C: Benefits to shipyards 
Design  Project Management       Commissioning      Maintenance  
Works on the ‘Plug and play’ principle. 
 
 
One contract and one contact person. 
January 2, 2012 Wärtsilä 3C 11    © Wärtsilä  
Wärtsilä 3C: Benefits to owners 
Minimized fuel consumption 
Minimized emissions 
Remote monitoring and worldwide lifecycle 
support to minimize downtime 
Maximal operational value and minimal 
pay back time 
January 2, 2012 Wärtsilä 3C 12    © Wärtsilä  
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Wärtsilä 3C: Benefits to environment 
Minimized emissions and maximized safety.  
Derived from combining optimized fuel 
efficiency and route planning with risk 
avoidance. 
January 2, 2012 Wärtsilä 3C 13    © Wärtsilä  
Wärtsilä 3C: Benefits to crew 
Easier and safer operation than ever before. 
Improved situational awareness on all crucial 
operating systems 
January 2, 2012 Wärtsilä 3C 14    © Wärtsilä  
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Benefits to Ship Yards and Owners 
Project Execution 
•  Optimized interfacing 
•  Full scope responsibility 
•  Reduced yard oversight 
Reduced Risk 
•  Fewer delays/penalties 
•  Works right first time 
•  Proven partnerships 
Integration 
•  Single source supply 
•  Fewer Components 
•  Simplified installation 
Safety 
•  Vessel modeling 
•  Propulsion control 
•  Advanced conning (combined 
automation + navigation) 
Ergonomics 
•  Integrated controls 
•  Multi-function interface 
•  Dynamic Positioning integration 
Performance 
•  Fleet management 
•  Remote maintenance 
•  Vessel routing 
Ship Yards Owners 
Wärtsilä 3C 
 
January 2, 2012 Wärtsilä 3C 15    © Wärtsilä  
Wärtsilä 3C: Benefits in summary 
Maximized 
safety. 
Maximized 
efficiency. 
Minimized 
emissions. 
Wärtsilä 3C 
Gateway to ultimate integration. 
January 2, 2012 Ship Power Technology / Reijo Granqvist 16    © Wärtsilä  
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Thank you 
January 2, 2012 Ship Power Technology / Reijo Granqvist 17    © Wärtsilä  
Reijo Granqvist 
Project Manager 3C 
+358 (0)10 709 3419 
More information from 
reijo.granqvist@wartsila.com  
Eirik Holm 
Business Sales Manager 3C 
+47 47451003 
More information from 
eirik.holm@wartsila.com 
  www.wartsila.com 
284
Northrop Grumman Sperry Marine            Munch, H. 
Copyright 2005 Northrop Grumman Corporation  2 2.1.2012 14:57 
Three legacies to “One Source” for marine electronics 
Since 1946 Since 1837 
Sperry Marine 2011 
Since 1910 
Sperry Marine Decca C. Plath 
Copyright 2005 Northrop Grumman Corporation  1 2.1.2012 14:57 
Component 
 Technologies 
Florham Park, NJ 
Information  
Technology 
 
Herndon, VA 
Electronic Systems  
 
Baltimore, MD 
Integrated Systems 
 
Dallas, TX 
Ship Systems 
 
Pascagoula, Miss. 
C4ISR&N 
 
Baltimore, MD 
Sperry Marine 
 
Charlottesville, VA 
Northrop Grumman 
Corporate Structure 
 
WW Employees – 120.000 
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Copyright 2005 Northrop Grumman Corporation  3 2.1.2012 14:57 
Sperry Marine Segmentation 
45% 
34% 
Defense 
Commercial 
1,300 Employees Worldwide 
Service 
21% 
Defense 
47% 
Commercial  
Service 
22% 
Commercial 
31% 
Copyright 2005 Northrop Grumman Corporation  4 2.1.2012 14:57 
Integrated Bridge System - Commercial Applications 
RCCI - Freedom of the Seas 
Sperry Marine 
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Copyright 2005 Northrop Grumman Corporation  
Sperry Marine Commercial Business Portfolio 
PRODUCTS 
SYSTEMS 
CUSTOMER SERVICE 
Radar Speed Log Comm/Nav Sensors 
Machinery 
Control 
Ship Stabilizers Vessel Traffic & 
Coastal Surveillance 
Repair Spares Training 
Voyage 
Data 
Recorder 
Gyrocompasses/ 
 Steering Control Systems 
Performance Based 
Logistics 
PBL 
Autopilot 
Global Coverage 
VISIONMASTER FT 
Integrated Bridge 
ECDIS 
Copyright 2005 Northrop Grumman Corporation  6 
VisionMaster FT WideView Series 
VisionMaster FT WideView Integrated Bridge  
VisionMaster FT 
ARPA Radar 
VisionMaster FT  
Chart Radar 
VisionMaster FT  
ECDIS 
VisionMaster FT  
Multi Function Workstation  
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Copyright 2005 Northrop Grumman Corporation  7 2.1.2012 14:57 
VisionMasterFT Radar Configurations  
Scanner Unit 
2 Way 6 Way 
or 
4’, 6’,  8’, X-Band or 9’,12’ S-Band 
Transceiver 
Interswitch 
Display 
Aloft or Below Option 
Tabletop 
Configuration 
Deck 
standing 
Configurat
ion 
Kit 
Format  
Configur
ation 
Copyright 2005 Northrop Grumman Corporation  8 
Radar 
Chart Radar ECDIS  
AIS 
Nav Sensors  
Machinery Automation 
Sys 
Central Alarm Manager  
Performance Based Navigation   
CCTV & Night Vision  
Evolving Customer Requirements - 
Data integration and fusion of information  
Multi-function 
Workstation  
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Copyright 2005 Northrop Grumman Corporation  9 
VisionMaster FT WideView Series  
Benefits from Common hardware / Network 
REDUCED TRAINING  
NEEDS COMMON DIAGNOSTICS TRAINING 
SHARED SENSOR  
DATA  
COMMON SPARES  
ACROSS ALL PRODUCTS 
REDUNDANCY 
COMMON UPGRADE 
PATHS 
COMMON INSTALLATION  
& COMMISSIONING 
COMMONALITY OF 
INSTALLATION 
DRAWINGS 
SHARED TARGET & ROUTE PLANS  
ACROSS RADAR & ECDIS 
Copyright 2005 Northrop Grumman Corporation  10 
VisionMaster FT WideView Series Common User Interface 
VisionMaster FT Radar 
VisionMaster FT Chart Radar 
VisionMaster FT ECDIS  
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Copyright 2005 Northrop Grumman Corporation  11 2.1.2012 14:57 
VISIONMASTER FT Series – Advanced Control Panel 
Copyright 2005 Northrop Grumman Corporation  12 
 
•  New innovative user interface with commonality VisionMaster products 
•  Multi View / Operator Selectable Conning Information Display  
•  Interactive Advanced tracker performance in clutter 
•  Target tracking capability of 100 ARPA and 200 AIS targets 
•  Advanced target correlation with tracked ARPA and AIS targets  
•  Operator selection of target views (ARPA only or ARPA/AIS) 
•  Integrated voyage plan and radar maps 
•  Automatic transfer of target data and voyage plan to 
•  VisionMaster ECDIS and / or TotalWatch Workstation 
•  User savable settings and removal storage media (USB flash drive) 
•  Innovative context sensitive iHelp facility – Cursor, Standard and Advanced 
(browser) modes 
•  Extensive diagnostics capability. Sensor integrity checking for improved fault 
detection & safety 
•  Playback Module    
•  Built-in upgrade path to Chart Radar, ECDIS and TotalWatch Workstation 
•  Backwards compatibility with legacy BME & VMS products 
VisionMaster FT Series  
Radar / ARPA Highlights  
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Copyright 2005 Northrop Grumman Corporation  13 
VisionMaster FT Series  
Radar / ARPA  
Copyright 2005 Northrop Grumman Corporation  15 
VisionMaster FT Series –  
Chart Radar – Unfilled w/  CID – Basic View  
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Copyright 2005 Northrop Grumman Corporation  16 
VisionMaster FT Series –  
Chart Radar: Filled w/  CID – Basic View  
Copyright 2005 Northrop Grumman Corporation  14 
•  Baseline features of VisionMaster FT Radar 
•  Complies with Chart Radar Standard 
•  Built-in DVD reader for electronic charts 
•  Superimposition of voyage plan graphics 
•  Displays official ENC (S57 & S63) and C Map (ENC & CM93)  
•  Operator selection of Radar or Chart Radar modes 
•  In Chart Radar mode, operator control of electronic chart density 
•  Low (Base) 
•  Medium (Standard) 
•  High (Custom)  
•  Built-in upgrade to ECDIS and TotalWatch Workstation 
•  Playback Module (Optional) 
VisionMaster FT Series –  
Chart Radar Highlights  
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Copyright 2005 Northrop Grumman Corporation  17 
VisionMaster FT Series –  
Chart Radar: Filled w/ CCTV CID View  
Copyright 2005 Northrop Grumman Corporation  18 
VisionMaster FT WideView Series –  
Chart Radar: Filled w/  CID – Docking View  
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Copyright 2005 Northrop Grumman Corporation  19 
•  Innovative user interface with commonality with other VisionMaster products 
•  Multi View / Operator Selectable Conning Information Display 
•  Direct target tracking (built in ARPA facility) 
•  Operator movable system menu controls with hide facility  
•  Advanced track-keeping module 
•  Chart portfolio management and voyage planning capability 
•  Split screen (vertical & horizontal) and Picture in Picture display modes 
•  Multiple Conning Information Display Pages 
•  User-Defined Chart Additions 
•  Data Logging and Playback 
•  Powerful options    
•   Central Alarm Manager 
•   Playback Module  
•   i3DView 
•  Performance Based Navigation 
•  Trim Module 
 
VisionMaster FT   
ECDIS Highlights  
Copyright 2005 Northrop Grumman Corporation  20 
VisionMaster FT ECDIS –  
With Movable Windows & Picture in Picture Feature  
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Copyright 2005 Northrop Grumman Corporation  21 
VisionMaster FT ECDIS –  
With Horizontal Split Screen 
Copyright 2005 Northrop Grumman Corporation  22 
VisionMaster FT ECDIS –  
With Vertical Spilt Screen  
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Copyright 2005 Northrop Grumman Corporation  23 
VisionMaster FT ECDIS –  
With Horizontal Split Screen & CID – CCTV View  
Copyright 2005 Northrop Grumman Corporation  
24 
VisionMaster FT - Conning Information Display w/ 
Selectable Viewing Pages  
Routes Mode Sea Mode 
Steering Mode Autopilot Mode 
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Copyright 2005 Northrop Grumman Corporation  25 
•  Record 
•  Comprehensive default screen capture facility (x =  1 frame / 2 sec) 
•  Basic recording memory 8-12 hours  
•  Expandable storage via USB connection  
•  Playback 
•  Activation via through mode selection  
•  Operator selectable playback speeds (1X,2X,4X,20X,50X,100X) 
•  Playback timeline bar with complete functionality (start, stop, point, etc.) 
•  Files exportable via USB for onshore review at VMFT Workstation 
•  Benefits 
•  Minimum training via easy to use menus 
•  Excellent onboard tool for training and incident review 
•  Built-in DVD reader for electronic charts 
•  Superimposition of voyage plan graphics 
•  Displays official ENC (S57 & S63) and C Map (ENC & CM93)  
•  Operator selection of Radar or Chart Radar modes 
•  In Chart Radar mode, operator control of electronic chart density 
•  Low (Base) 
•  Medium (Standard) 
•  High (Custom)  
•  Built-in upgrade to ECDIS and TotalWatch Workstation 
•  Playback Module (Optional) 
VisionMaster FT Series –  
Record & Playback Feature Highlights    
Copyright 2005 Northrop Grumman Corporation  26 
VisionMaster FT  – Playback Feature  
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Copyright 2005 Northrop Grumman Corporation  2.1
.20
12 
14:
57 
27 
VisionMaster FT – Playback Feature  
Copyright 2005 Northrop Grumman Corporation  
Problem: Blind Arcs & Blanked Sectors 
•  No radar or ARPA information from the blind arcs 
 or blanked sectors 
•  Poor situation awareness and vulnerability 
 
28 
VisionMaster FT Series 
Dual Channel Radar Highlights (Optional)  
Sector Blanked 
Areas 
Independent Gain, 
Rain and Sea 
Clutter control 
Channel 2 
Channel 1 
Transceiver Control 
Independent 
Tuning Control 
Note: The clutter has been enhanced to 
make it easier to see the sector blanked 
areas !
Highlights  
 
•  Two independent asynchronous radars displayed on a 
single screen 
•  Two independent VisionMaster FT radars controlled 
from a single screen 
•  Seamless operator view from two radar heads 
•  Targets seamlessly tracked across the two radars 
•  Virtually no limit to the separation of the radar heads 
Solution:  Dual Channel Radar 
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Copyright 2005 Northrop Grumman Corporation  
29 
•  iView3D Display  
•  Additional aid to navigation that improves situational awareness 
•  Multi color 3D representation of ocean floor is produced from S57 chart data 
•  Lighting effects used to emphasis changes in ocean floor depths 
•  Simple user controls to change 3D perspective, zoom and ownship orientation 
•  Red translucent vertical rectangle shows operator selected safety depth     
VisionMaster FT – 
ECDIS w/ iView3D Display (Optional)  
Copyright 2005 Northrop Grumman Corporation  30 2.1.2012 14:57 
Oasis of the Seas 
§     
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.20
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14:
57 
31 
VisionMaster FT Series –  
RCI Allure of the Seas – Integrated Bridge  
Copyright 2005 Northrop Grumman Corporation  32 2.1.2012 14:57 
Sperry Marine Scandinavian  
Ferry Radar References 
Color line    DK/NO + NO/Ger  4 ships 
Scandlines    Gedser/Rostock  4 ships 
Nordic Ferry Services   Domestic ferry  1 ship 
P&O Ferries (Dover)       Dover/Calais                7 ships 
Mols Linien    Odden/Aarhus   4 ships 
P&O Ferries                    Irish Sea                        4 ships           
Sea France                       Dover/ Calais                4 ships 
Brittany Ferries               Portsmouth/Caen           6 ships 
Stena Line                       Harwich/Hook               4 ships           
DFDS                      Esbjerg/Immingham   3 ships           
Condor Ferries                Poole/Channel Islands   4 ships 
Wightlink                        Portsmouth/Isle of W.   3 ships 
Red Funnel                     Southampton/Isle of W.4 ships 
Caledonian McBrayne   Scottish Islands             6 ships  
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Copyright 2005 Northrop Grumman Corporation  
X-Band 8 Ft." S-Band 12 Ft."
 Radar Display"
23 TFT" ECDIS/Navstation" Display  23 TFT"
NAVIGATION SENSORS 
 
• Gyro System 
• Dual Axis Doppler Log 
 
• Echo Sounder 
• AIS System 
• Dual D-GPS System 
• Wind sensor system 
 
Integrated  Navigation System  
Block Diagram 
P&O Ferry - Class: DNV 
Radar Display"
23 TFT"
Radar 6X6"
Interswitch"
SeaNet Network 
   ECDIS Back-up "
Display  23 TFT"
Sperry Marine A2 GMDSS station 
St. b Bridge Wing 
• Bearing Repeater   
• ARPA radar 19” TFT 
To interswitch 
 
 
 
• ECDI Slave display 
19 TFT  
 
 
Port Bridge Wing 
• Bearing Repeater   
• ARPA radar  19” TFT 
 
• To interswitch 
 
 
 
• ECDIS Slave display 
 19” TFT 
 
 
RADAR / ECDIS / CONNING 
 System 
CONNING "
Overhead 19 TFT"
 Magnetic  
Compass 
X-Band 6 Ft." X-Band 6 Ft."
Bridge Watch  
Alarm 
 
Sound Reception  
System 
NAVIPILOT 4000  
SCU 
Navtex 
Safe return to port room 
Total Watch Radar ECDIS system 
Spare AIS/GPS System 
Inmarsat Equipment 
SSAS 
Fleet 33 
Voyage Master II VDR 
Copyright 2005 Northrop Grumman Corporation  34 2.1.2012 14:57 
Thank You 
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Transas               Semenov, D. & Sitkov, A.
INTEGRATED	  BRIDGE	  SYSTEMS	  
IN	  SIMULATION	  
STCW’10	  MANILA	  AMMENDMENTS	  
The	  amendments	  to	  the	  STCW	  suggest	  84	  new	  competence	  areas	  where	  Methods	  for	  
demonstra5ng	  competence	  is	  approved	  simulator	  training,	  where	  appropriate.	  
	  The	  proposed	  revision	  contains:	  	  
!  upgrade	  of	  the	  exis5ng	  sec5ons	  for	  
!   bridge	  opera5on	  
!   machinery	  opera5on	  
!   communica5on	  
!   cargo	  handling	  
!   dry	  cargo	  
!   DP	  opera5ons	  
!   safety	  &	  security	  
!   VTS	  simulators	  
!  in	  addi5on,	  3	  new	  sec5ons	  are	  added,	  covering	  
!   survival	  craF	  and	  rescue	  boat	  
!   oﬀshore	  crane	  and	  
!   remotely	  operated	  vehicle	  (ROV)	  simulators	  
The	  STCW	  text	  implies	  the	  
following	  mandatory	  
simulator-­‐based	  trainings	  for:	  
!   GMDSS	  operator	  
!   Radar	  observer	  
!   ARPA	  operator	  
!   ECDIS	  operator	  (NEW!)	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REVISED	  DNV	  STANDARD	  
The	  proposed	  revised/extended	  standard	  is	  divided	  
into	  13	  sec5ons,	  with	  the	  following	  main	  changes	  in	  
Sec5on	  3	  BRIDGE	  OPERATION	  
!  Updated	  the	  competence	  tables	  to	  reﬂect	  the	  new	  
STCW	  
!  Added	  new	  Physical	  realism	  requirements	  to	  meet	  
the	  new	  STCW	  
!  Added	  new	  Behavioural	  realism	  requirements	  to	  
meet	  the	  new	  STCW	  
!  Added	  new	  Opera5ng	  environment	  requirements	  to	  
meet	  the	  new	  STCW	  
!  Removed	  requirements	  no	  longer	  appropriate	  
	  
Slides	  6	  –	  12	  reﬂect	  these	  changes	  
INTEGRATED	  BRIDGE	  SYSTEMS	  
IN	  SIMULATION	  
IBS	  
!   Combina5on	  of	  
interconnected	  systems	  
!   Centralized	  access	  to	  sensor	  
informa5on	  	  
!   Command/control	  from	  
worksta5ons	  
!   Increasing	  safe	  and	  eﬃcient	  
ship	  management	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All	   worksta5ons	   are	   completely	  mul5func5onal,	   and	  may	   be	   used	   for	   any	   IBS	  
func5on	  at	  any	  5me.	  
3D	   layout	   studies	   are	   oﬀered	   to	   ensure	   the	   best	   possible	   working	   environment	   and	  
compliance	  with	  IMO/DNV	  standards	  and	  Class	  Rules.	  
	  
IBS	  BRIDGE	  ERGONOMICS	  
	  
New	  requirements	  in	  revised	  standard	  
!   MFD	  4000	  ECDIS	  /	  Radar	  X-­‐Band	  /	  Conning	  
Display	  /	  AMS	  (Master	  sta5on)	  
!   Manoeuvring	  console	  with	  controls	  and	  
indicators	  for	  main	  engine(s),	  propulsion	  and	  
steering	  systems	  
!   Overhead	  naviga5on	  displays	  for	  indica5on	  
environmental	  condi5ons	  and	  ship	  moving	  
parameters	  
WORKSTATION	  FOR	  NAVIGATING	  
AND	  MANOEUVRING	  
	  
!   Night	  vision	  and	  searchlight	  equipment	  
!   Ship’s	  signals	  transmicer	  
!   Automa5c	  device	  for	  emergency	  alarm	  (BNWAS)	  
!   VHF	  point	  with	  channel	  selector	  
!   Internal	  communica5on	  equipment	  
!   Watch	  and	  internal	  alarms	  panel	  
*	  DNV	  Standard	  for	  Cer5ﬁca5on	  No.2.14	  Table	  C1	  i.	  1.1.1	  –	  1.3;	  1.1.6-­‐1.1.21,	  1.3.1,	  1.3.8	  
i.	  1.1.1,	  1.1.13,	  1.1.18,	  1.1.21,	  1.3.1	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!   MFD	  4000	  ECDIS	  /	  Radar	  S-­‐Band	  /	  
Conning	  Display	  /AMS	  (Backup	  
sta5on)	  
!   NTPRO	  Conning	  Display	  
!   Ship’s	  signals	  transmicer	  
!   VHF	  point	  with	  channel	  selector	  
!   Internal	  communica5on	  
equipment	  
!   Watch	  and	  internal	  alarms	  panel	  
WORKSTATION	  FOR	  MONITORING	  
New	  requirements	  in	  revised	  standard	  
*	  DNV	  Standard	  for	  Cer5ﬁca5on	  No.2.14	  Table	  C1	  i.	  1.1.1,	  1.1.9	  –	  1.1.21;	  1.3.2,	  1.3.8	  
i.	  1.1.1,	  1.1.13,	  1.1.21,	  1.3.2	  
!   Steering	  wheel	  /	  steering	  lever	  
!   Steering	  mode	  selector	  switch	  
!   Rudder	  pump	  selector	  switch	  
!   Autopilot	  
!   Gyro	  and	  Magne5c	  repeaters	  
!   Rudder	  order	  and	  angle	  indicators	  
!   Rate	  of	  turn	  indicator	  
!   Talkback	  to	  bridge	  wing	  worksta5on	  
	  
WORKSTATION	  FOR	  STEERING	  
(HELMSMAN’S)	  
	  
New	  requirements	  in	  revised	  standard	  
*	  DNV	  Standard	  for	  Cer5ﬁca5on	  No.2.14	  Table	  C1	  i.	  1.1.1,	  1.1.6	  –	  1.1.8;	  1.1.12,	  1.3.3,	  1.3.8	  
i.	  1.1.1,	  1.1.18,	  1.3.3	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!   Steering	  posi5on	  selector	  switch	  
!   Controls	  and	  indicators	  for	  main	  
engine(s),	  propulsion	  and	  steering	  
systems	  
!   Indicators	  for	  wind	  direc5on	  and	  
velocity	  
!   VHF	  point	  with	  channel	  selector	  
!   Internal	  communica5on	  
equipment	  
!   Night	  vision	  and	  search	  light	  
equipment	  
!   Watch	  and	  internal	  alarms	  panel	  
WORKSTATION	  FOR	  DOCKING	  
(BRIDGE	  WING)	  
New	  requirements	  in	  revised	  standard	  
*	  DNV	  Standard	  for	  Cer5ﬁca5on	  No.2.14	  Table	  C1	  i.	  1.1.1	  –	  1.1.21,	  1.3.4,	  1.3.8	  
i.	  1.1.1,	  1.1.13,	  1.1.18,	  1.1.21,	  1.3.4	  
!   Chart	  table	  with	  drawing	  
instruments	  
!   MFD	  4000	  ECDIS	  (Slave	  sta5on)	  
with	  Chart	  Assistant,	  Route	  
Planner	  and	  Weather	  chart	  
plocer	  
!   NavAids	  Conning	  Display	  
!   Command	  printer	  
!   VHF	  point	  with	  channel	  
selector	  
WORKSTATION	  FOR	  PLANNING	  
AND	  DOCUMENTATION	  
	  
New	  requirements	  in	  revised	  standard	  
*	  DNV	  Standard	  for	  Cer5ﬁca5on	  No.2.14	  Table	  C1	  i.	  1.1.1,	  1.1.12,	  1.1.13,	  1.3.5,	  
1.3.8	  
i.	  1.1.1,	  1.1.13,	  1.3.5	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!   Fire	  alarm,	  Fire-­‐ex5nguishing,	  Air	  condi5on	  
and	  Ven5la5on,	  Refrigera5ng,	  Bilge	  and	  
Ballast	  systems	  
!   SEPS	  control	  panel,	  Bridge	  distribu5on	  
switchboard	  
!   Fin	  Stabilizer	  Control	  panel	  
!   Strength	  Load	  Monitor	  
!   Monitor	  of	  SOx	  and	  NOx	  emissions,	  CO	  
concentra5on	  and	  unburned	  fuel	  contents,	  
fuel	  consump5on	  
!   Internal	  communica5on	  equipment	  
!   Two-­‐way	  VHF	  radiotelephone	  (walkie-­‐talkie)	  
WORKSTATION	  FOR	  SAFETY	  
	  
New	  requirements	  in	  revised	  standard	  
*	  DNV	  Standard	  for	  Cer5ﬁca5on	  No.2.14	  Table	  C1	  i.	  1.1.1	  –	  1.1.3,	  1.1.5;	  1.1.11,	  1.1.12,	  1.3.6,	  
1.3.8	  
i.	  1.1.1,	  1.3.6	  
!   VHF-­‐DSC,	  radiotelephone	  
!   MF-­‐DSC,	  radiotelephone	  
!   MF/HF-­‐DSC,	  NBDP,	  
radiotelephone	  
!   Inmarsat-­‐SES	  
!   NAVTEX/EGC/HF	  direct	  prin5ng	  
telegraph	  
!   EPIRB	  trigger	  
!   Main	  sta5on	  for	  two-­‐way	  VHF	  
radiotelephone	  (walkie-­‐talkie)	  
WORKSTATION	  FOR	  COMMUNICATIONS	  
New	  requirements	  in	  revised	  standard	  
*	  DNV	  Standard	  for	  Cer5ﬁca5on	  No.2.14	  Table	  C1	  i.	  1.1.1,	  1.1.10	  –	  1.1.12,	  1.3.7	  
i.	  1.1.1,	  1.3.7	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IMO	  STCW	  78	  CODE	  WITH	  MANILA	  
AMENDMENTS	  (JUNE	  2010)	  
	  New	  Competencies	  
	  
New	  Bridge	  Resource	  Management	  requirements:	  
.1	  alloca3on,	  assignment,	  and	  priori3za3on	  of	  resources;	  
.2	  eﬀec3ve	  communica3on	  on	  board	  and	  ashore;	  
.3	  asser3veness	  and	  leadership,	  including	  mo3va3on;	  	  
.4	  obtaining	  and	  maintaining	  situa3onal	  awareness	  
	  
New	  competence:	  “Maintain	  the	  safety	  of	  naviga\on	  through	  the	  use	  of	  ECDIS	  and	  associated	  naviga\on	  systems	  to	  
assist	  command	  decision	  making”:	  
.5	  create	  and	  maintain	  route	  plan	  ﬁles	  in	  accordance	  with	  established	  procedures	  
.6	  use	  ECDIS	  log-­‐book	  and	  track	  history	  func3ons	  for	  inspec3on	  of	  system	  func3ons,	  alarm	  seSngs	  and	  user	  responses	  
.7	  use	  ECDIS	  playback	  func3onality	  for	  passage	  review,	  route	  planning	  and	  review	  of	  system	  func3ons	  
	  
New	  competence:	  “Use	  of	  leadership	  and	  managerial	  skill”.	  Addi\onal	  requirement	  for	  eﬀec\ve	  resource	  
management:	  
.5	  decisions	  reﬂect	  considera3on	  of	  team	  experiences	  
	  
Knowledge	  and	  ability	  to	  apply	  decision-­‐making	  techniques:	  
.1	  situa3on	  and	  risk	  assessment	  
.2	  iden3fy	  and	  generate	  op3ons	  
.3	  selec3ng	  course	  of	  ac3on	  
.4	  evalua3on	  of	  outcome	  eﬀec3veness	  
	  
	  
IMO	  STCW	  78	  CODE	  WITH	  MANILA	  
AMENDMENTS	  (JUNE	  2010)	  
	  
The	  scope	  of	  courses	  and	  trainees	  is	  going	  to	  expand:	  
	  
!  Special	  training	  courses	  for	  personnel	  on	  certain	  types	  of	  ships,	  
including	  large	  ships	  with	  Azipod	  propulsion	  system	  
!  Joint	  ship	  and	  port	  Security	  Oﬃcer	  courses	  
!  Electrical	  Department	  personnel	  courses	  for	  the	  addi5onal	  
maintenance	  of	  electronic	  naviga5onal	  and	  GMDSS	  equipment	  
!  Members	  of	  the	  ship’s	  deck	  crew	  other	  than	  the	  master	  or	  an	  
oﬃcer	  (deck	  ra5ngs)	  will	  have	  to	  demonstrate	  their	  ability	  to	  
perform	  elementary	  navigator’s	  du5es:	  course	  plonng,	  course	  
selec5on	  for	  a	  helmsman,	  etc.	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Transas	  Integrator	  u\lity	  
MFD	  4000	  INTEGRATED	  
NAVIGATION	  SYSTEM	  
Transas	  Chart	  Assistant	  u\lity	  
MFD	  4000	  INTEGRATED	  
NAVIGATION	  SYSTEM	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Transas	  Navi-­‐Planner	  
MFD	  4000	  INTEGRATED	  
NAVIGATION	  SYSTEM	  
ECDIS	  Mul\-­‐Func\on	  Display	  
MFD	  4000	  INTEGRATED	  
NAVIGATION	  SYSTEM	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RADAR	  Mul\-­‐Func\on	  Display	  
MFD	  4000	  INTEGRATED	  
NAVIGATION	  SYSTEM	  
CONNING	  Mul\-­‐Func\on	  Display	  (Standard	  View)	  
MFD	  4000	  INTEGRATED	  
NAVIGATION	  SYSTEM	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CONNING	  Mul\-­‐Func\on	  Display	  (Charts	  with	  CCTV)	  
MFD	  4000	  INTEGRATED	  
NAVIGATION	  SYSTEM	  
MFD	  4000	  INTEGRATED	  
NAVIGATION	  SYSTEM	  
Alarm	  Monitoring	  System	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MFD	  4000	  INTEGRATED	  
NAVIGATION	  SYSTEM	  
MFD	  Playback	  
MFD	  4000	  INTEGRATED	  
NAVIGATION	  SYSTEM	  
Voyage	  Data	  Recorder	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MFD	  4000	  Sensors	  
MFD	  4000	  INTEGRATED	  
NAVIGATION	  SYSTEM	  
MFD	  Interconnec\on	  Diagram	  
MFD	  4000	  INTEGRATED	  
NAVIGATION	  SYSTEM	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1.  Training	  on	  various	  vessel	  
models	  
2.  Training	  using	  real	  and	  
simulated	  5me	  
3.  Possibility	  to	  conﬁgure	  an	  
exercise	  	  
INS-­‐NTPRO	  INTEGRATION	  
NTPRO	  5000	  
3d	  PARTY	  INS	  TRANSAS	  INS	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...but	  in	  simulator	  you	  would	  like	  to	  conduct	  the	  training	  on	  number	  of	  models	  
BENEFITS	  OF	  NTPRO	  –	  TRANSAS	  INS	  
INTEGRATION:	  VARIOUS	  MODELS	  
Real	  Time	  
Simulated	  \me,	  
many	  sessions	  
BENEFITS	  OF	  NTPRO	  –	  TRANSAS	  INS	  
INTEGRATION:	  TIME	  SYNCRONISATION	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BENEFITS	  OF	  NTPRO	  –	  TRANSAS	  INS	  
INTEGRATION	  
	  	  
From	  opera\onal	  point	  of	  view:	  
!  NTPRO	  allows	  performing	  procedural	  training	  in	  ordering	  
new	  charts	  via	  Chart	  Assistant	  soFware	  (part	  of	  MFD	  
soFware)	  
!  On	  the	  stage	  of	  exercise	  loading	  NTPRO	  Instructor	  
automa5cally	  transfers	  the	  following	  informa5on	  to	  all	  MFD	  
sta5ons:	  exercise	  date	  and	  5me,	  own	  ship’s	  dimensions,	  
own	  ship’s	  route	  (including	  SAR	  Route),	  all	  ship’s	  sensors	  
posi5on	  and	  its	  senngs	  	  
!  MFD	  Log	  Books	  keep	  real	  data	  for	  each	  NTPRO	  session	  
automa5cally	  
!  Radar,	  UAIS,	  IAIS	  and	  Chart	  Overlays	  are	  applied	  
automa5cally	  in	  all	  MFD	  Sta5ons	  (including	  SVDR)	  
!  TrackControl	  	  
!  NAVTEX	  	  
!  Navi-­‐Conning	  with	  customized	  templates	  
!  Common	  worldwide	  database	  on	  currents	  and	  5des	  
	  
California	  Mari\me	  Academy,	  USA	  
Royal	  New	  Zealand	  Navy	  
BENEFITS	  OF	  NTPRO	  –	  TRANSAS	  INS	  
INTEGRATION	  
From	  technical	  point	  of	  view:	  
!  Data	  Collec5on	  Unit	  (DCU)	  allows	  	  abandoning	  
COM-­‐Ports	  and	  tranfering	  bigger	  amounts	  of	  data	  
in	  comparison	  with	  NMEA	  format	  	  
	  
From	  conﬁgura\on	  point	  of	  view:	  
!  Transas	  INS	  automa5cally	  uses	  charts	  from	  
NTPRO	  folder	  installed	  along	  with	  areas	  (both	  
TX97	  and	  S57	  format)	  
!  Transas	  INS	  sta5ons	  may	  work	  in	  either	  Master	  
or	  Slave	  mode	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CONCLUSIONS	  
	  
All	  systems	  related	  to	  the	  IBS	  include	  
failure	  control(s)	  and	  method(s)	  to	  train	  
and	  assess	  the	  learner	  in	  the	  use	  of	  
advanced	  equipment,	  technology	  and	  
enable	  familiariza5on	  and	  training	  to	  
understand	  the	  limita5ons	  of	  automa5c	  
systems.	  
	  The	  IBS	  bridge	  opera5on	  simulators	  with	  
7	  worksta5ons	  described	  above	  are	  
perfectly	  suited	  for	  the	  seafarers’	  
training	  and	  cer5ﬁca5on	  at	  the	  
management,	  opera5onal	  and	  support	  
levels	  of	  responsibility.	  
	  
THANK	  YOU	  FOR	  YOUR	  ATTENTION!	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